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Chapter I
Overview
[...] the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of
prediction with experience.
Milton Friedman (1953, p. 89)
This dissertation comprises three self-contained papers that contribute to the empirical re-
search in the area of Corporate Finance and Financial Market Microstructure. With regard
to Corporate Finance such research has a long tradition and is concerned with various corpo-
rate ﬁnancing and investment decisions, e.g., on capital structure and merger & acquisitions.
For the ﬁeld of Financial Market Microstructure, however, consideration of empirical data
reﬂects a more recent development, targeting the trading of ﬁnancial securities and the mode
of operation and design of ﬁnancial market places.
Before providing a short summary for each of the essays, I brieﬂy outline what they have
in common and how they relate to each other, despite the fact that they cover fairly dis-
tinct research questions. The ﬁrst essay Measuring the Quality of Corporate Governance:
Is There a Uniform Standard? is dedicated to the subject of Corporate Governance that
forms a cross-sectional topic in the ﬁeld of Corporate Finance. In particular, Corporate
Governance covers the process of decision making and implementation within large corpora-
tions in the tension of separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (managers) and the
required alignment of the management's interests with those of the owners. In the second es-
say Repurchasing Shares in the Open Stock Market: Beneﬁcial or Harmful to Stock Market
Liquidity?, a speciﬁc corporate ﬁnance decision is examined: the repurchase of own shares
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by corporations in the open stock market. While contributing to a growing literature that
establishes a link between research questions from the ﬁeld of Financial Market Microstruc-
ture and Corporate Finance, this paper speciﬁcally covers the impact of ﬁrms' repurchase
activity on the stocks' market liquidity. Finally, with the third essay Breaking Up Large
Trades: Do Theoretical Trade Execution Models Explain Insider Trading Behavior?, the
ﬁeld of Corporate Finance is left behind to investigate the decision making of individuals in
the area of trade execution. I test the predictions of trade execution models with the help
of insider trading data. By considering stocks' microstructure characteristics as exogenous
factor in rational decision making concerning trade execution strategies, this essay extends
the research in the ﬁeld of Financial Market Microstructure.
Beside the fact that all essays deal with research questions from the ﬁeld of Corporate
Finance or Financial Market Microstructure, they also have in common to provide empirical
ﬁndings. Empirical analysis and research requires the availability of and access to large-
sample data of high quality. At present, these requirements frequently favor the use of US
data. Therefore, the two essays dealing with share repurchases and insider trading are based
on US data drawn from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), the premier data
provider for ﬁnancial databases. More speciﬁcally, I use the NYSE's Trades and Quotes
(TAQ) database, Thomson Reuters' Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF), Thomson Financial's
SDC Merger & Acquisitions database, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database, as well as Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT database. In contrast, due to its
topic of interest, the essay on corporate governance is a cross-country study with inter-
national data coming from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Thomson Reuters'
Worldscope/Datastream database. To analyze the large samples, I make extensive use of
statistical and econometrical methods. I conduct my analyses with the help of the statistical
software program STATA. In addition, I use SAS software to run computations on TAQ
data on the WRDS servers and to run linear optimizations as well as maximum likelihood
estimations. Based on this approach, I derive the following results:
The ﬁrst essay (Chapter II), Breaking Up Large Trades: Do Theoretical Trade Ex-
ecution Models Explain Insider Trading Behavior?, examines trade execution models by
exploiting the availability of actual trading data for insiders on a daily basis. More speciﬁ-
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cally, it addresses the optimal break up of large blocks of shares into multiple trades executed
over the course of several trading days. Using IFDF insider trading data, I document that
trade splitting - which is already a well recognized phenomenon in institutional trading -
is also commonly applied by corporate insiders. In general, four distinct trade patterns
can be distinguished. While trading a constant volume over all days within a trading se-
quence accounts for about 10% of all multiple-day trading strategies, increasing, decreasing,
and non-monotone trade patterns account for about 30% each. Explaining these observable
trade patterns requires trade execution models with diverse assumptions. In this paper, I
examine the group of decreasing trade patterns as these are predicted by standard trade ex-
ecution models. Speciﬁcally, I calibrate a discrete-time model which uses an expected utility
framework and assumes traders to be risk averse and price impact functions to be linear.
Utilizing this model calibrated with high-frequency TAQ data, I explore to which extend the
model's predictions are consistent with actually observed trading strategies. With respect
to the trade pattern dimension, the model correctly predicts about 28% of the observations
in the sample when deviations are measured in revenue terms. For a small number of obser-
vations (11%), however, the model fails to yield an admissible solution for the given trading
horizon and instead favors immediate execution or execution over shorter trading horizons.
Optimizing the trade pattern and trade horizon dimension at the same time reduces the
successful prediction rate to about 13%. Optimizing the actual trading strategies accord-
ing to the predictions of the model yields on average a revenue improvement of 1.74% for
sale transactions and 0.55% for purchase transactions. Going beyond this analysis, I use
the large cross-sectional sample to empirically assess the overall beneﬁt from splitting up
large trades. The overall revenue improvement associated with switching from immediate to
optimal execution is positively related to the size of the total asset position. Expressed as
multiple of the relative trade size, the median percentage improvement amounts to 1.6-1.7
times the $ trading volume scaled by the average daily $ trading volume. Of this total im-
provement potential, the median insider realizes about two thirds with his/her their actual
trading strategy. Finally, several robustness checks with respect to the risk aversion of the
insiders and the price impact functions convey that the convexly decreasing trade patterns
of the optimal trading strategies are sensitive to the assumed functional form of the price
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impact function which even dominates the same eﬀect steaming from a certain risk aver-
sion of the traders. However, so far little research is available on the estimation of price
impact functions for individual stocks and their functional form. More research in this area
is needed before the endeavor of empirically explaining multiple day trading strategies based
on mathematical models can fully succeed.
The second research paper (Chapter III), titled Repurchasing Shares in the Open Stock
Market: Beneﬁcial or Harmful to Stock Market Liquidity?, deals with open market repur-
chases which are the most popular repurchase method in the US. The US dollar volume of
share repurchases has surpassed cash dividends as dominant payout channel over the last
years. Compared to other traders, repurchasing ﬁrms usually trade very large volumes and
managers who execute the repurchase programs possess non-public information about the
ﬁrm. The combination of these two facts raises the question whether and how open market
share repurchases aﬀect the stock's market liquidity. By answering this question, the paper
contributes to the long debate about the liquidity impact of open market repurchases. In
December 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a new rule which
enhanced the disclosure of ﬁrms' actual implementation of share repurchase programs. I
use these newly available data for my analysis. The sample covers all ﬁrms with a primary
listing of common stock at the NYSE between 2004 and 2008. Based on this data set, I
test two competing hypotheses on the liquidity eﬀect of open market repurchases. The com-
peting market maker hypothesis predicts a positive liquidity eﬀect, while the information
asymmetry hypothesis speaks in favor of a negative liquidity eﬀect. In contrast to the latter
hypothesis, the analysis reveals no evidence in support of a harmful liquidity eﬀect of open
market stock repurchases. Rather, a beneﬁcial liquidity impact is observable as reﬂected in
narrower bid-ask spreads and larger (bid-side) depths. Put diﬀerently, the price and quan-
tity dimension of liquidity is found to improve in the course of open market repurchases.
Beside making diﬀerent predictions about the ﬁnal liquidity impact of share repurchases,
the competing hypotheses also diﬀer with respect to the main transmission channel of the
liquidity eﬀect. The information asymmetry hypothesis assumes liquidity to deteriorate due
to a change in the ﬁrm's information environment. The competing market maker hypoth-
esis assumes the liquidity to improve due to a change in the ﬁrm's trading characteristics.
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Disentangling informational and real friction eﬀects, however, is diﬃcult. I use two diﬀerent
methods to validate the robustness of my ﬁndings. I observe that the favorable liquidity ef-
fects are attributable to changes in ﬁrms' real trading characteristics rather than to changes
in their information environment. In summary, open market repurchases seem not to be as-
sociated with previously unrecognized liquidity costs that stem from adverse selection related
to an increase in the fraction of informed market participants.
The third essay (Chapter IV) is joint work with Ernst Maug and titled Measuring the
Quality of Corporate Governance: Is There a Uniform Standard?. An emerging literature
in corporate governance investigates governance indices and typically follows a tick-box-
approach, which constructs comprehensive governance indices by simply adding the number
of desirable governance provisions in place for each company. Some recent papers show
that only a small number of critical corporate governance attributes that are included in
these comprehensive indices can be consistently related to ﬁrm valuation. However, the
critical attributes in these papers relate so far only to the institutional environment in
the US and it is unclear whether they have any relevance for ﬁrms domiciled outside the
US. We investigate the heterogeneity of the critical attributes that determine the quality of
corporate governance across institutional environments. Our starting point is the hypothesis
that what is a good provision in one country may not at all be also a good provision in
another country. To establish which corporate governance attributes are reliably related
to ﬁrm value within an institutional environment, we group countries according to their
legal origin (e.g., Scandinavian law). For each resulting group of countries, we identify
between three and six (out of a total of 53) attributes that are consistently related to ﬁrm
valuation. In a subsequent step, we then use these attributes to construct parsimonious
governance indices for each group of countries. The attributes that we include in each of
the indices are hardly overlapping, resulting in correspondingly small correlations between
indices. Importantly, each index was found to have a statistically and economically signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on company valuation for the respective group of countries with the same legal
origin, but hardly any association with ﬁrm valuation in any of the other groups. These
ﬁndings indicate that there is no uniform cross-country standard against which ﬁrm-level
corporate governance can be measured.
5
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Chapter II
Breaking Up Large Trades:
Do Theoretical Trade Execution Models
Explain Insider Trading Behavior?
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes trade execution strategies of corporate insiders, or, more speciﬁcally, the
optimal break up of large blocks of shares by insiders into multiple trades executed over the
course of several trading days. In doing so, the paper aims to answer two main questions:
Do corporate insiders follow a rational model in splitting up their trades into a sequence
of several daily transactions? And, do theoretical trade execution models describe trading
behavior as it actually occurs in real life? To answer these questions, I develop an empirically
implementable model of optimal trade execution and calibrate it to actual ﬁrm data to assess
observable execution strategies of US insiders. Under the assumptions of constant absolute
risk aversion and normally distributed stock prices, I determine optimal trading strategies
for a sample of NYSE or AMEX listed companies over the period 2004-2009.
In the relevant literature, breaking up large trades over several trading days is already
a well recognized phenomenon for institutional trades. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) as
well as Keim and Madhavan (1995) show that a signiﬁcant dollar volume of institutional
trades is completed within two or more trading days. Similar strategies are used by large
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individual investors such as the management of the company or other large blockholders.
An example is the purchase of 1,000,000 shares worth $4.4 million in November 2008 by
Steve Creamer, CEO of EnergySolutions Inc. Over 3 subsequent trading days he traded
450,000, 319,200, and 230,800 shares, respectively. Another example is the sale of 410,000
shares worth $3.0 million in July 2004 by Andrea Jung, CEO at Avon Inc. She traded daily
amounts of 195,000, 125,000, and 90,000 shares. Whether such execution strategies are an
optimal trading approach is the topic of this paper.
The theoretical literature on optimal trade execution studies the following problem: A
trader wants to liquidate (purchase) a large position of shares in a risky stock within a ﬁnite
time horizon. Thereby, the price of the underlying security is aﬀected by exogenous events as
well as by the insider's trades. In particular, the stock price is pushed up (moved down) as
the trader buys (sells) a large position of shares. Thus, the trader faces a trade-oﬀ situation.
The larger the position she immediately trades at once, the larger the unfavorable permanent
and temporary price impact caused by her trade. At the same time, the uncertainty about
the security's fundamental value is minimized due to immediate execution. However, the
longer the period used by the trader to execute the transaction, the larger the uncertainty
about exogenous price changes, while the unfavorable price impact is minimized. Several
authors develop models to solve this optimization problem.1 This theoretical literature is
limited to formally deriving solutions to models of diﬀerent complexity. As such, the models
are highly stylized with a strong focus on their mathematical tractability. Numerical analyzes
are only provided sporadically to illustrate the comparative statics of the models.
So far, no attempt has been made to apply these models to real world settings. Therefore,
I develop a discrete-time model in this paper, which can be calibrated empirically and which
yields optimal trading strategies that are representative of the corresponding continuous-
time models in the theoretical literature. The optimal trading strategies derived with this
model are characterized by decreasing daily trade volumes that evolve following a convex
curvature. Beside examining the optimality of trade patterns, I apply the model to examine
the optimality of the length of the trading horizon by prioritizing optimal trading strategies of
1See, e.g., Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Hisata and Yamai (2000), Almgren and Chriss (2001), Subramanian
and Jarrow (2001), Almgren (2003), He and Mamaysky (2005), Huberman and Stanzl (2005), Schoeneborn
(2008), Schied and Schoeneborn (2009), and Schied, Schoeneborn, and Tehranchi (2010).
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diﬀerent length. In the empirical part of the paper, I parametrize the theoretical model with
cross-sectional data. In particular, I use high-frequency trade and quote data to estimate the
microstructure parameters that describe the price formation process in the trade execution
model. These parameters are the stock price volatility as well as the expected price impact
from the insider's own trading. I use the parametrized model to determine optimal trading
strategies that are then compared to the trading strategies actually observed for a sample of
US insiders. The trading behavior of insiders - these are either members of the management
or large shareholders with an equity stake of more than 10%2 - is particularly well suited
for the test of these trade execution models, because insiders usually trade larger asset
positions than other shareholders and are more sensible to liquidity- and/or information-
related concerns, which drive the price impact.
In a ﬁrst step, I document that trade splitting is commonly applied by corporate insid-
ers. In general, four distinct trade patterns can be distinguished. While trading a constant
volume over all days within a trading sequence accounts for about 10% of all multiple-
day trading strategies, increasing, decreasing, and non-monotone trade patterns account for
about 30% each. Explaining these observable trade patterns requires trade execution models
with diverse assumptions. I examine the group of decreasing trade patterns as these are pre-
dicted by standard trade execution models. In a second step, I use a representative standard
trade execution model to explore to which extend the model's predictions are consistent
with actually observed trading strategies. With respect to the trade pattern dimension, the
model correctly predicts about 28% of the observations in the sample when deviations are
measured in revenue terms. For a small number of observations (11%), however, the model
fails to yield an admissible solution for the given trading horizon and instead favors immedi-
ate execution or execution over shorter trading horizons. Optimizing the trade pattern and
trade horizon dimension at the same time reduces the successful prediction rate to about
13%. Further optimization of the actual trading strategies, according to the predictions of
the model, yields on average a revenue improvement of 1.74% for sale transactions and 0.55%
for purchase transactions. Going beyond this analysis, I use the large cross-sectional sample
to empirically assess the overall beneﬁt from splitting up large trades. The overall revenue
2See the deﬁnition in Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act.
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improvement associated with switching from immediate to optimal execution is positively
related to the size of the total asset position. Expressed as multiple of the relative trade size,
the median percentage improvement amounts to 1.6-1.7 times the $ trading volume scaled
by the average daily $ trading volume. Of this total improvement potential, the median
insider realizes about two thirds with his/her their actual trading strategy. Finally, several
robustness checks with respect to the risk aversion parameters and the price impact coeﬃ-
cients convey that the convexly decreasing trade patterns of the optimal trading strategies
are sensitive to the assumed functional form of the price impact function which even domi-
nates the same eﬀect steaming from the trader's level of risk aversion. However, so far little
research is available on the estimation of price impact functions for individual stocks and
their functional form. More research in this area is needed before the endeavor of empirically
explaining multiple day trading strategies based on theoretical models can fully succeed.
This paper contributes the trade execution literature as well as to the literature on insider
trading. To the best of my knowledge, this paper oﬀers the ﬁrst empirical and structural
test of a theoretical trade execution model. Thus, it provides empirical evidence on how
asset-speciﬁc microstructure parameters such as price impact and price volatility inﬂuence
the execution of trading strategies. By examining the trade execution decision of insiders,
the paper also adds an additional aspect to the empirical literature on insider trading.
So far, the insider trading literature mainly focuses on assessing short-term and long-term
returns following the disclosure of insider trades and examining insider trading activities
around ﬁrm-speciﬁc announcements or events. Only very recently, empirical studies have
started to look at sequences of insider trades (Betzer, Gider, Metzger, and Theissen, 2010;
Lebedeva, Maug, and Schneider, 2009). However, these papers focus on the relation between
insider trades and their public reporting and changes in the disclosure regulation due to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Therefore, the identiﬁcation of trade sequences in these papers
is based on the point in time at which (one or more) trades are disclosed to the public.
In contrast to these papers, I use a simpler and more intuitive trade sequence deﬁnition
that is consistent with the trade execution literature. I consider all trades executed in the
same direction on subsequent trading days by the same insider as belonging to one trading
sequence or strategy, independent from any disclosure.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop and solve the
theoretical trade execution model. In Section 3, I describe the construction of the data set
and explain the empirical calibration of the model. In Section 4, I present and discuss the
obtained empirical ﬁndings. In this section, I also include tests validating the robustness of
the main results. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Trade execution model
2.1 Related literature
Before I introduce the trade execution model that I calibrate empirically, I give a short
overview of the various models available in the trade execution literature. I classify and
compare the most relevant models along four crucial dimensions: the framework for the risk-
reward trade-oﬀ, the exogenously given time parameter, the assumed stock price dynamics,
and the chosen time dimension.
First, diﬀerent frameworks are applied to model the risk-reward trade-oﬀ. While He
and Mamaysky (2005), Schied and Schoeneborn (2009), as well as Schied, Schoeneborn,
and Tehranchi (2010) use an expected utility framework, previous authors optimized mean-
variance functions (Almgren and Chriss, 2001; Almgren, 2003) or mean-standard-deviation
functions (Hisata and Yamai, 2000; Konishi and Makimoto, 2001; Dubil, 2002; Moench,
2009). Since mean-variance optimization is a second-order approximation, and thus, a special
case of an expected utility functional, the resulting objective functions only diﬀer with respect
to the weighting of the risk aversion parameter (see Schoeneborn, 2008, p. 27).3
Second, the models diﬀer with regard to the exogenous parameter that concerns the time
dimension of the optimization problem. Almgren and Chriss (2001), Almgren (2003), He
and Mamaysky (2005), and Schied, Schoeneborn, and Tehranchi (2010) assume that the liq-
uidation horizon is exogenously given. These models derive a distribution of trading volumes
over the given horizon as solution. They make no assumption on the speed of liquidation,
i.e., on how many shares are sold per trading period. Other authors such as Hisata and
Yamai (2000), Dubil (2002), and Moench (2009) endogenize the liquidation horizon. In con-
3However, the equivalence of mean-variance and expected utility optimization in a static setting disap-
pears in a dynamic setting (Schoeneborn, 2008, p. 27f).
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sequence, these authors derive the optimal liquidation horizon as solution in their models.
This endogenization comes at the cost of assuming a constant speed of execution which
implies that the same number of shares is traded in each period.4
Third, the models work with diﬀerent stock price processes. The building blocks for
modeling the stock price process include a Brownian motion and either one or two functions
that model the price impact. The Brownian motion is usually arithmetic with zero drift.5
Concerning the price impact functions, all models are partial equilibrium models which
assume that the price impact of large trades is exogenously given. The price impact is not
derived from equilibrium considerations as in the prominent model of Kyle (1985). The vast
majority of models follows the microstructure literature and incorporates temporary and
permanent price impact eﬀects. The permanent price impact aﬀects all subsequent trades,
while the temporary price impact only aﬀects the current trade, but vanishes instantly
thereafter. It is rather the assumed functional form of the price impact functions in which
the models diﬀer. The base case is to assume a linear functional form for both price impact
components as done by Almgren and Chriss (2001), Hisata and Yamai (2000), as well as
Schied and Schoeneborn (2009). Other papers such as Almgren (2003), Dubil (2002), or
Schied, Schoeneborn, and Tehranchi (2010) assume non-linear impact functions. Deviating
from the linear functional form implies that the price impact per unit traded is no longer
constant irrespective of trade size, but is either increasing (or decreasing) in trade size.
Accordingly, rapid trading leads to larger (or lower) price eﬀects. Thus, the optimal solutions
derived from the models are directly aﬀected by the modeling choice for the price dynamics.
A comparative study on the size of this eﬀect has not yet been conducted. However, the
general shape of the optimal trading strategy - which is a decreasing trade volume that
follows a convex curvature - is not aﬀected by this modeling choice.
4A third group of papers works with an inﬁnite time horizon, but allows daily trade volumes to become
zero. See, e.g., Konishi and Makimoto (2001) as well as Schied and Schoeneborn (2009).
5A geometric Brownian motion is the more traditional model. However, due to the short trade horizons
typically considered in these models, the approximation with an arithmetic Brownian motion causes no
major bias, but makes to optimization problem easier to handle. See Forsyth, Kennedy, Tse, and Windcliﬀ
(2009) on the (negligible) impact of the approximation on the optimal solution as well as He and Mamaysky
(2005) and Moench (2009) for the use of a geometric Brownian motion. The drift term is usually ignored
by referring to the same argument of a short time horizon. See Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Schied,
Schoeneborn, and Tehranchi (2010) for the analysis of alternative models with non-zero drift. Almgren and
Chriss (2001) show that the drift eﬀect on the optimal solution is minimal.
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Finally, the trade execution models are either formulated in discrete or continuous time.6
The vast majority of models adopts continuous-time approaches, e.g., Hisata and Yamai
(2000), Konishi and Makimoto (2001), Dubil (2002) Almgren (2003), He and Mamaysky
(2005), Schied and Schoeneborn (2009), or Schied, Schoeneborn, and Tehranchi (2010).
Compared to discrete-time models, continuous models often have the advantage of providing
closed-form solutions and acting as limit of discrete-time models. For empirical applications,
however, continuous-time models must be discretized to reﬂect reality.
From the variety of models described above, I chose the discrete-time model of Almgren
and Chriss (2001) as a starting point for my model. Almgren and Chriss (2001) do not make
an assumption on the execution speed, but assume the trading horizon to be exogenously
given. This modeling choice oﬀers me the opportunity to draw conclusions on two dimensions
of the trading strategies. On the one hand, I can study the optimal distribution of trading
volumes over trading periods. On the other hand, I can compare optimal trading strategies
for diﬀerent trading horizons, and thereby determine the optimal length of the trading hori-
zon.7 In contrast to Almgren and Chriss (2001), however, I use a contemporary expected
utility framework for optimization instead of a traditional mean-variance optimization.8
2.2 Model set-up
For the sake of simplicity, all explanations in this section refer to a situation in which an
insider wants to sell a block of shares. Analogous explanations hold for purchase transactions.
The mathematical formulation of the optimization problem, however, covers both directions
of trade. Therefore, I deﬁne D as an indicator for the direction of the trade being +1 for a
stock purchase and -1 for a stock sale.
I assume that a trader wants to sell a block of X > 0 shares (units) of a risky asset within
a ﬁxed time interval [0, T ]. The time horizon T is divided into N equally spaced intervals
with discrete points in time t = 1, . . . , T . The optimal trading strategy is determined in
advance of trading, and thus, only depends on the information available at time t = 0. A
6There are also some models that integrate discrete trading in a continuous-time framework by assuming
execution lags for trades (e.g., Subramanian and Jarrow, 2001).
7Beyond this, trading strategies with a constant trading volume per trading period account for only 10%
of all multiple-day trading strategies. See Section 4.2.
8The model of Schied and Schoeneborn (2009) is the continuous-time equivalent to the discrete-time
model developed in this paper.
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trading strategy n is deﬁned by a sequence of numbers n1, . . . , nT , with nt being the number
of shares traded between times t − 1 and t. I require nt > 0 to ensure that all trading
strategies only involve trades of the same sign, i.e., no additional buying of shares is allowed
during a sell program. X and n1, . . . , nT are related by
X =
T∑
t=1
nt. (II.1)
Stock price dynamics. Following Almgren and Chriss (2001), I assume that the observ-
able transaction price evolves according to two factors - one exogenous and one endogenous
factor. The exogenous factor captures market forces that occur randomly and independently
of the trader's own trading, e.g., the public announcement of company news. The endoge-
nous factor is the trader's own trading. The microstructure literature distinguishes between
a permanent and a temporary eﬀect of trades on stock prices. The temporary price impact
is caused by transitory order imbalances and only aﬀects the current trade. The permanent
price impact is due to new information revealed by the trade, and thus, aﬀects the current
and all future trades. I follow Glosten and Harris (1988) and assume that both endogenous
price impact components are linear in the rate of trading including ﬁxed costs per trade
and variable cost per share traded (linear form with intercept). Thus, both price impact
functions are speciﬁed by two impact parameters, a constant, and a per-share eﬀect.
In particular, the observable transaction price in period t, pt, can be decomposed into
the temporary price impact of a large trade nt and the fundamental asset price mt that
would have occurred in the absence of a large trade:
pt = mt +D (τ1 + τ2nt) . (II.2)
τ1 and τ2 are the price impact coeﬃcients that determine the temporary price impact
function. By deﬁnition, the temporary price impact aﬀects only the current transaction price
pt, but not future transaction prices. The trade direction indicator D implies that the price
impact is positive (negative) in case of a purchase (sale).9
9Note that the price impact formulation diﬀers from Almgren and Chriss (2001) who calculate the trans-
action price pt by adding the temporary price impact to the fundamental asset price at time t − 1, i.e.,
pt = mt−1+D (τ1 + τ2nt). However, Almgren and Chriss (2001)'s price impact formulation is not consistent
with standard price impact models such as Glosten and Harris (1988).
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The fundamental asset price mt is the expected value of the security, conditional on the
information available at time t. Thus, the fundamental value is assumed to be randomly
aﬀected by overall market ﬂuctuations, e.g., changes in the information about the com-
pany or other traders' actions. However, new information also reaches the market through
information-based trades that reveal private information and cause a permanent price im-
pact. Hence, the fundamental value in period t consists of the following components:
mt = mt−1 +D (γ1 + γ2nt) + t (II.3)
with t being a normal random variable with 0 mean and variance σ
2. σ2 is the variance
of changes in the fundamental asset value over the period of a single time period (here a
single trading day). γ1 and γ2 are the ﬁxed and variable permanent price impact coeﬃcients,
respectively.10 They aﬀect the current and all future transaction prices via mt.
Replacing mt−1 recursively yields:
mt = m0 +
t∑
j=1
[D (γ1 + γ2nj) + j ] . (II.4)
With respect to the price process, I assume that the permanent and temporary price
eﬀects are known in advance and constant over time.11
Trading revenues (costs). The total trading revenues (costs) are the sum of the product
of the number of shares nt that the insider sells (buys) in each time interval t times the
eﬀective transaction price per share pt received on that sale (purchase):
12
R = −D
T∑
t=1
ntpt. (II.5)
Recursively replacing pt and mt with equations (II.2) and (II.4), the actual trading rev-
enues (costs) become:
10Note that this permanent price impact function diﬀers from the linear function without intercept used
by Almgren and Chriss (2001).
11Note that time-dependent price impact coeﬃcients can be easily integrated into the model. See Section
4.7 for a discussion.
12I follow Schoeneborn (2008) and ignore discounting or the accumulation of interest since I assume that
the trading horizon is short (usually not longer than a few days).
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R = −Dm0X −D
T∑
t=1
 T∑
j=t
nj
 t
 (II.6)
−
T∑
t=1
 T∑
j=t
nj
 (γ1 + γ2nt)
− T∑
t=1
nt (τ1 + τ2nt)
For a sale transaction, D = −1, equation (II.6) readily yields:
RS = m0X +
T∑
t=1
 T∑
j=t
nj
 t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 1
−
T∑
t=1
 T∑
j=t
nj
 (γ1 + γ2nt)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 2
−
T∑
t=1
nt (τ1 + τ2nt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 3
. (II.7)
The terms in equation (II.7) have the following economic interpretation: m0X is the
paper value of the asset position based on the current fundamental value m0. The three
other terms add up to the total implementation shortfall (Perold, 1988). The ﬁrst term
captures the revenue eﬀect due to the volatility of the stock price over the trading interval
[0, T ] caused by information ﬂow and/or trading of other market participants. The second
and third term represent the decrease in revenues due to permanent and temporary price
eﬀects, respectively, caused by the trader's own trades.
In equation (II.6), t is a random variable following a normal distribution. Thus, the
trading revenues (costs), which incorporate the sum of t as a term, are also a random
variable following a normal distribution.
Optimization problem. I assume that the trader wants to maximize the expected utility
of the time T trading revenues by optimally selling oﬀ the asset position. This expected
utility maximization leads to the following optimization problem:
maxE [u(R)] (II.8)
subject to the constraints
T∑
t=1
nt = X (II.9)
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0 ≤ nt ≤ X for t = 1, . . . , T (II.10)
with (II.9) representing the stock holding constraint and (II.10) deﬁning admissible strate-
gies. u (R) denotes the trader's utility function of the trading revenues (costs).
In the above optimization problem, T , the number of trading periods, is an exogenous
variable. To extend the analyzes beyond an exogenously given T , I endogenize T by applying
the following algorithm: I solve the optimization problem for T = 1, . . . , Tmax where Tmax
is a large number. I then determine the optimal time horizon, T opt, as the value of T that
maximizes the expected utility and identify n∗1, . . . , n
∗
T opt as the optimal trading strategy.
Preferences. The trader has a (negative) exponential utility function deﬁned over the time
T trading revenues R with α > 0 representing the risk tolerance (risk-aversion coeﬃcient) of
the trader:
u(R) = − exp (−αR) . (II.11)
This utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The greater the
value of the parameter α, the more risk-averse the trader in question. Together with the
normally distributed trading revenues (costs), this functional form of the trader's prefer-
ences is particularly convenient for expected utility calculations and is consistent with the
mean-variance optimization frequently used in the theoretical trade execution literature (e.g.,
Almgren and Chriss, 2001).
2.3 Model solution
The explicit functional form for the expected utility of the normally distributed trading
revenues R is a linear function of the mean and variance of the trading revenues:
E [u(R)] = − exp
(
−α
(
E (R)− α
2
V (R)
))
. (II.12)
Hence, by monotonicity, maximizing the expected utility, E [u(R)], is equivalent to max-
imizing the following function:
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M [E (R) ,V (R)] = E (R)− α
2
V (R) . (II.13)
Thus, the objective function is no longer the expected utility E [u(R)], but the function
M [E(R),V(R)] that characterizes the distribution (expectation and risk) of the trading
revenues (costs). It is negative for stock purchases (= trading costs / cash outﬂow for
the trader) and positive for stock sales (= trading revenues / cash inﬂow for the trader).
The function reﬂects the expected revenues (costs) to the trader from optimally liquidating
(purchasing) an asset position as well as the disutility associated with the uncertainty of
the liquidation (execution) process. It can be interpreted as the individual-speciﬁc certainty
equivalent or shadow price for the position of X shares that is the result of the uncertainty
of price movements and the price impact involved in trading the asset position (He and
Mamaysky, 2005).
Given the nature of the price dynamics, I compute the expected value and variance of
the trading revenues (costs) as:
E (R) = −Dm0X − γ1
T∑
t=1
 T∑
j=t
nj
− γ2 T∑
t=1
nt
 T∑
j=t
nj
− τ1 T∑
t=1
nt − τ2
T∑
t=1
n2t , (II.14)
V (R) = E
[
(R− E (R))2
]
= σ2
T∑
t=1
 T∑
j=t
nj
2 . (II.15)
Thus, I obtain the ﬁnal program:
maxM [E (R) ,V (R)] = E (R)− α
2
V (R)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
nt = X
0 ≤ nt ≤ X for t = 1, . . . , T (II.16)
with
∑T
t=1 nt = X representing the stock holding constraint and 0 ≤ nt ≤ X deﬁning
admissible trading strategies.
To solve the constrained optimization problem (II.16), I introduce a Lagrange multiplier
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λ, yielding the following unconstrained problem:
max L (nt, λ) = E (R)− α
2
V (R)− λ
(
X −
T∑
t=1
nt
)
. (II.17)
The parameters λ and n1, ..., nT are the unknowns. I determine the unique global maxi-
mum by setting the partial derivatives of L (nt, λ) with each of the unknown variables equal
to zero. Taking the partial derivatives yields:
∂L
∂λ
= X −
T∑
t=1
nt (II.18)
∂L
∂nk
= −γ1k − 2γ2nk − γ2
[
k−1∑
t=1
nt +
T∑
t=k+1
nt
]
(II.19)
−τ1 − 2τ2nk − ασ2
[
k−1∑
t=1
tnt + knk + k
T∑
t=k+1
nt
]
− λ.
Setting the partial derivatives (II.18) and (II.19) equal to zero and rearranging terms
yields the general form of a system of T + 1 equations with the same number of unknowns.
Proposition. The solution to the optimization problem (II.17) corresponds to the solution
n =
[
n1 n2 . . . nT λ
]T
to the matrix equation
A · n = b (II.20)
with the coeﬃcient matrix
A =

− (2γ2 + 2τ2 + ασ2) − (γ2 + ασ2) . . . − (γ2 + ασ2) −1
− (γ2 + ασ2) − (2γ2 + 2τ2 + 2ασ2) . . . − (γ2 + 2ασ2) −1
...
...
. . .
...
...
− (γ2 + ασ2) − (γ2 + 2ασ2) . . . − (2γ2 + 2τ2 + Tασ2) −1
1 1 1 1 0

(II.21)
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and the constant vector
b =

γ1 + τ1
2γ1 + τ1
.
.
.
Tγ1 + τ1
X

. (II.22)
Some numerical analyses are most suitable to illustrate the shape of the solution to equa-
tions (II.20)-(II.22) given in the above proposition.13 At this point, however, I postpone a
numerical example and comparative statics analysis to Section 4 to ﬁrst empirically calibrate
the model in Section 3.
3 Data and empirical calibration
My empirical analysis requires data on insider trades as well as stock price and stock trading
data. Therefore, I merge data from three diﬀerent sources: Thomson Reuters' Insider Filing
Data Feed (IFDF), the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)'s historical stock
database, and the NYSE's Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. Before I explain how I calibrate
the model of optimal trade execution, I describe the construction of the sample of insider
transactions and provide some descriptive information on actual insider trading sequences.
3.1 Construction of the insider data set
My data source for insider transactions is the IFDF database. I include all
2 open market or private purchases (transaction code P) and sales (transaction code
S) of non-derivative securities,
2 between the 31st of December 2003 and the 4th of January 2010,14
13I solve the system of linear equations by using the SOLVE function in SAS Proc IML.
14Two arguments speak in favor of not extending the time period before 2004. First, disclosure regulation
on insider trades changed in August 2002 due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The disclosure period
for insider trades was shortened from up to 40 days to 2 business days. The insider trading literature has
shown that there exist signiﬁcant disclosure day returns for insider purchases. Thus, the change in disclosure
regulation might be associated with a change in price impact eﬀects relevant for deriving optimal trading
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2 with complete data on CUSIP (cusip6 and cusip2), person identiﬁer (personid),
and transaction date (trandate),
2 which have not been amended (amendment indicator blank),
2 which have been veriﬁed by Thomson Reuter's (cleanse indicator R, H, L, or I),
2 which have been traded in the insider's own interest (ownership code D)15.
Dropping all transactions where an insider trades an identical amount of shares in opposite
directions on the same trading day leaves me with 1,390,742 records. For the time being,
I keep all records with missing data on the transaction price (tprice) and/or the number
of shares traded (shares) to consider all transactions for the identiﬁcation of consecutive
trades (trading strategies).
After excluding all observations of ﬁrms not covered by CRSP, I have 1,245,549 records
in the data set.16 I use CRSP data to remove problematic records. I follow Marin and
Olivier (2008) and Betzer, Gider, Metzger, and Theissen (2010) and delete all records for
which the reported transaction price is not within 20% of the CRSP closing price on that
day or records that involve more than 20% of the number of outstanding shares reported
in CRSP. Furthermore, as Lebedeva, Maug, and Schneider (2009), I delete all transactions
where the reported number of shares traded is larger than the CRSP trading volume on that
day. Since these transactions were probably privately negotiated, they are not of interest for
my analysis. After this ﬁltering process, the sample contains 1,239,786 records.
I then sum up all orders/transactions executed on the same day grouped by the identity
of the ﬁrm and the insider as well as the trade direction (sale and purchase). This data
compression is necessary to use the date-stamped insider data for the calibration of a trade
execution model that assumes the individual trading rounds to correspond to trading days.
strategies. Second, the data availability for the data item ownership from the IFDF database improves
signiﬁcantly with the beginning of 2004. This variable denotes the type of the insider's ownership position
in the shares traded by him. Besides trading shares directly owned by the insiders, insiders frequently trade
shares on behalf of trusts or close family members. These transactions are denoted by indirect ownership
and excluded from the sample.
15I impute 186 missing values on the data item ownership. This procedure consists of two steps: First,
I check for every insider with missing values whether the ownership position of the trades with nonmissing
data is consistent over the complete sample period. For 127 insiders this is the case. Thus, I use the unique
ownership value also for the missing ownership values. Second, I duplicate the remaining 59 observations
with missing values and assign to each one the values D (for direct) and I (indirect).
16The CRSP match is based on the CRSP universe of all common shares (share code 10, 11, or 12).
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At the same time, this data compression makes the insider data comparable across ﬁrms as
some insiders only report the total number of shares traded per day and the volume-weighted
average price while other insiders report the number of shares and the transaction price on
a per-order basis. This compression results in 332,006 daily transaction records in the data
set.17 I continue to refer to these records as transactions or trades even if they consist
of a number of single orders, while I denote a sequence of transactions or trades executed
on consecutive trading days as a trading strategy or trade package. I regard transactions
as belonging to a trading strategy if transactions (1) are executed on consecutive trading
days, (2) by the same insider, and (3) with the same direction of trade (sale or purchase).18
After grouping all trades according to the above deﬁnition into single-day or multiple-
day trading strategies, I use the following six ﬁlters to ﬁnalize the sample: First, I exclude
all single-day trades executed in 2003 or 2010 and all trading strategies starting in 2003 or
ending in 2010. Second, I drop all single-day and multiple-day trades with missing IFDF
data (tprice, shares) and/or missing CRSP data (prc, shrout, vol, cfacpr, cfacshr,
exchcd) over the trading period and the 20 trading days before. Third, I exclude all
observations with capital measures (e.g., stock split or equity oﬀering) or dividend payments
within the trading period and the 20 trading days before.19 Fourth, I exclude problematic
records. I follow Lebedeva, Maug, and Schneider (2009) and exclude all trades and/or trading
strategies with a daily trade volume that is larger than the trade volume reported in CRSP.
Furthermore, I follow Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997) and exclude all observations for
penny stocks (median CRSP price over trading period below $1). Fifth, I drop all trades
and/or trading strategies with a change in the exchange at which the stock is listed within
the trading period and the 20 trading days before. Finally, I follow Marin and Olivier (2008)
and exclude small transactions (single-day trades and trading strategies) where less than 100
shares were traded. This six-step procedure leaves me with a universe of 289,437 records.
My analyses, however, are based on a subset of this IFDF universe. Due to diﬀerent
trading mechanisms and microstructure properties, I limit the sample to stocks listed at
17This step also includes dropping 19 observations from the data set because the trading day as reported
by the insider is a non-trading holiday.
18To correctly identify subsequent trading days, I derive a list of all trading holidays for the sample period
from http://www.chronos-st.org/NYSE_Observed_Holidays-1885-Present.html. This list corresponds to all
missing weekdays, i.e., all weekdays with no trading activity, in daily CRSP ﬁles.
19I identify these observations from changes in the cumulative adjustment factors reported in CRSP.
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NYSE and AMEX.20 Further, I focus on the transactions of the top management (CEOs
and Chairmen) and large shareholders (more than 10% ownership). These insiders own and
trade on average signiﬁcantly higher share volumes than other insiders such as Directors and
Oﬃcers which makes trade execution models more relevant for them.
Panel A in Table II.1 provides summary statistics for this IFDF subsample including
all stocks listed at NYSE and AMEX. This sample covers 2,822 insiders from 1,434 ﬁrms
listed at NYSE and 397 ﬁrms listed at AMEX. The 31,354 records are clustered into 18,780
trading strategies. The summary statistics are grouped by the direction of trade (sales and
purchases) and the length of the trading strategy (ﬁve length categories).
 Insert Table II.1 approximately here 
Panel A in Table II.1 shows that the sample consists of 14,782 sell transactions ($76.0 bil-
lion) and 3,998 purchase transactions ($4.3 billion). Multiple-day transactions are common
for insiders. About 55% of all trading days of sales or purchases are part of multiple-day
transactions. The majority of these multiple-day transactions last between 2-5 days (36%
and 35% of all transaction days for sales and purchases, respectively). Multiple-day trading
strategies that last longer than 20 trading days are rare (41 sale and 13 purchase transac-
tions). However, about 66% of the total value of insider sales are completed within a single
trading day. For purchases the picture is diﬀerent. While 45% of all trading days belong to
single-day trading strategies, these transactions only represent 37% of the total value of in-
siders' purchases. The table also shows that insiders trade signiﬁcant proportions of shares.
The typical insider package has a size of 25,000 (8,000) shares for sales (purchases) and
represents 5.7% (6.5%) of the average daily $ trading volume (if traded at once). Further-
more, the size of the transactions - measured either in the number of shares, in the number
of shares relative to shares outstanding, or in the $ trading volume relative to the average
daily $ trading volume - increases monotonically with the length of the trading strategy.
In particular, single-day strategies are on average much smaller than multiple-day trading
strategies. This univariate relation is consistent with the trade execution literature and the
idea of splitting up large packages into several smaller trades.
20For diﬀerences between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ see the discussion in Chordia, Roll, and Subrah-
manyam (2001) and Huang and Stoll (1996a).
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Based on the numbers presented in Panel A of Table II.1, I limit the sample to trading
strategies that last between 2 and 20 trading days. I do not examine single-day trades,
because the vast majority of these trades would not be classiﬁed as 'large trades' for which
trade execution models are developed. By excluding single-day trades, I furthermore rule
out the possibility that I try to explain the splitting of transactions that are privately exe-
cuted, and thus, also not object of optimal trade execution models. I also follow Keim and
Madhavan (1995, 1997) and exclude all trading strategies that are not completed within a
reasonable window of time (20 trading days). The number of these transactions is negligible.
Beside this, the sample is reduced due to the availability of TAQ data. The total TAQ
sample covers 1,027 insiders from 725 ﬁrms listed at NYSE and 97 ﬁrms listed at AMEX.
The 9,275 records are clustered into 2,863 trading strategies (2,437 sale and 426 purchase
transactions). Panel B in Table II.1 provides summary statistics for this total TAQ sample
and shows that the data requirements imply a tendency toward somewhat larger trades.
3.2 Empirical calibration of the model
To ﬁnd the optimal trading strategies as solution to the system of linear equations (II.20)-
(II.22), I need (1) insider-speciﬁc data on the absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient (α) and the
total number of shares traded (X) as well as (2) asset-speciﬁc microstructure data on the
price impact coeﬃcients (γ1, γ2, τ1, τ2) and stock price volatility (σ
2). Furthermore, I need
the direction of trade (D) and the fundamental asset value at time t = 0 (m0) to compute
the expected trading revenues (costs).
3.2.1 Assumptions on general parameters
Data on the asset position traded (X) and the direction of trade (D) comes from the insider
data set. I obtain X by aggregating the number of shares traded within a trading strategy.
In contrast to these parameters, the fundamental asset value m0 and the level of risk
aversion α are not observable. I proxy for the fundamental asset value m0 with the stock
price at time t = 0 (p0). This is the CRSP closing price from the trading day before the
initiation of the trading strategy. This approximation, however, does not aﬀect the optimal
solution derived from program (II.16), because p0 is not contained in the partial derivatives.
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I only need the stock price at time t = 0 to compute the value of the objective function, i.e.,
the certainty equivalent of the trading revenues (costs).
The absolute risk aversion of the traders, α, is the last unknown parameter. In order
to derive a sensible value range for this parameter, I follow the approach of Baker and Hall
(2004) which is based on Pratt (1964).21 This approach makes use of the fact that the
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) α is equal to the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) divided by the decision maker's accumulated wealth, i.e.,
α =
CRRA
wealth
(II.23)
Thus, I derive the CARA coeﬃcient α by making reasonable assumptions on the CRRA
coeﬃcient and accumulated investor's wealth. In the ﬁeld of executive compensation, a
frequently used range for values of CRRA is about 2 to 3.22 Therefore, I use a value of
2.5 as done in Baker and Hall (2004). However, accumulated wealth is the variable that
predominantly determines the level of the CARA coeﬃcient α. I approximate the investors'
accumulated wealth with the help of the investor's shareholdings in the company's stock
as reported in the insider database. I multiply the stock price at time t = 0 (p0) with
the number of shares held before the initiation of the trading strategy to derive a wealth
estimate.23 Overall, this equity proxy, however, is conservative as it only considers the equity
component of the insider's total accumulated wealth.24
21I also experimented with deriving investor-speciﬁc αs from individual trading strategies. The idea behind
this reverse engineering of α is the following: Find the α for which the optimal length of the trading period
T ∗ equals the observed length of the trading period T . This procedure assumes that the investors chose
the optimal trading horizon which is implied by a certain level of risk aversion. However, this approach is
associated with several problems: First, the optimal length of the trading period T ∗ is constant over an
interval of α values (instead of yielding a point estimate). The trading strategies for the diﬀerent α values
within this interval all have the same optimal horizon, but they (more or less) diﬀer in the trade volume
executed on the individual trading days. Second, due to nonlinearities in the optimization problem, this
reverse engineering often yields two or more intervals for α values for each trading strategy. Thus, using one
speciﬁc α value in the calculations requires an assumption on which value to chose. For insiders for which I
have more than one trading strategy in the sample, this choice also has to consider α intervals that probably
diﬀer between trading strategies. Due to these reasons, I chose an approach to exogenously derive α values.
Also see the paragraph discussing the sensitivity of the optimal solution to changes in α in Section 4.1.
22See, e.g., Dittmann and Maug (2007).
23In order to avoid that the estimates by construction are lower for purchase transactions than for sale
transactions, I add the $ value of the purchase transactions to the value of the equity stake held before the
transaction. The reasoning behind this adjustment is the following: For sale transactions, the equity stake
held before the transaction includes the shares sold shortly afterwards. This is not the case for purchase
transactions. This circumstance would imply systematically lower wealth estimates for purchase transactions,
although the purchases require equivalent cash holdings. If I do not make this adjustment, the main results
remain unchanged.
24I test the robustness of the results with respect to this calibration choice in Section 4.6.
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3.2.2 Estimation of microstructure parameters
In this section, I explain the estimation of the microstructure parameters γ1, γ2, τ1, and τ2
from intraday TAQ data and σ2 from daily CRSP data.
Price impact parameters. I use trades and quotes data from the TAQ database to
estimate the four price impact parameters. The Appendix contains a detailed description of
the data matching and cleaning procedures used for the TAQ data. There is no commonly
used approach in the empirical literature I can follow to calculate the price eﬀect of single
trades and to estimate price impact functions for individual stocks.25 In particular, I proceed
in two steps. First, I compute the price eﬀects for each trade. Second, I estimate the price
impact functions using all trades and their price eﬀects and trade volumes.
In the ﬁrst step, I compute the price impact eﬀects of single trades by using the quote
midpoint from the ﬁrst quote26 at least one second before and after the trade as reference
point to compute the diﬀerent price impact components.27 Following Holthausen, Leftwich,
and Mayers (1990), I deﬁne the total price impact TotalPIi as the change from the pre-
trade quote midpoint to the actual trade price (expressed as percentage of the pre-trade
quote midpoint) and the permanent price impact PermPIi as the change from the pre-trade
to the post-trade midpoint (also expressed as percentage of the pre-trade quote midpoint):
TotalPIi =
pi − qpre
qpre
(II.24)
PermPIi =
qpost − qpre
qpre
. (II.25)
The temporary price impact for trade i, TempPIi, is the diﬀerence between the total
and permanent price impact:
TempPIi = TotalPIi − PermPIi (II.26)
25While computing price impact eﬀects is frequently done in several ways (see, e.g., Holthausen, Leftwich,
and Mayers, 1990, Keim and Madhaven, 1996, or Chan and Lakonishok, 1995), price impact functions, in
particular on an individual stock level, are rarely estimated. One of the few examples is Chen, Stanzl, and
Watanabe (2005).
26See Chen, Stanzl, and Watanabe (2005) for a discussion on using quote midpoints versus transaction
prices.
27For the 1-second rule to match trades with subsequent quotes see Henker and Wang (2006).
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The price impact eﬀects are deﬁned so that positive costs are experienced when both,
the permanent and the total price impact have the same sign as the order ﬂow. Thus, for a
buy order, positive costs mean that the price moves upward, while for a sell order, negative
costs mean that the price moves downward. I expect the average values of the price impact
taken across many orders (separately for buys and sells), to have the same sign as the order
ﬂow. However, I repeatedly observe price impact eﬀects that have the wrong sign (e.g., a
price increase during a large sell order), even after applying commonly used procedures to
discard erroneous trades and quotes (see Appendix). Observations with the wrong sign bias
the estimation of the price impact functions or even cause the price impact coeﬃcients to
have of the wrong sign. I thus exclude observations with a wrong sign for the price eﬀects
from the estimation of the price impact functions in the next step.
In the second step, I estimate the coeﬃcients of the price impact function based on the
price eﬀects calculated before. In particular, I estimate two price impact functions, one for
temporary price eﬀects and one for permanent price eﬀects. I assume a linear functional
form with intercepts and estimate the relevant price impact coeﬃcients with the following
OLS regressions:
TempPIi = τ1 + τ2ni + εi (II.27)
PermPIi = γ1 + γ2ni + εi (II.28)
Here, ni denotes the trading volume of trade imeasured in shares. τ1, τ2, γ1, and γ2 are the
coeﬃcients to be estimated. I run the above regressions separately for buys and sells, because
of asymmetric responses of prices to buys and sells on major US stock exchanges.28 Even after
discarding price impact eﬀects with the wrong sign from the estimation, I repeatedly obtain
price impact coeﬃcients that exhibit the wrong sign, e.g., if the number of trades is very
small (<100). The phenomenon that estimation yields unexpected signs for price impact
coeﬃcients is already documented in the literature (e.g., Sadka, 2006). The unexpected
estimates, however, lead to unreasonable or no optimization results in the trade execution
28See Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990) and Keim and Madhaven (1996) for block trades
and Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) for large institutional trades.
27
model. Thus, I set all observations for which I obtain at least one price impact coeﬃcient
with a wrong sign to missing. Furthermore, I follow Sadka (2006) and estimate the price
impact coeﬃcients from all trades over the 20 trading days preceding the trading period of
interest, while I set all observations with a trading history of <20 trading days to missing.
Daily stock price volatility. I calculate the daily stock price volatility from daily CRSP
return data as squared standard deviation over the 20 trading days prior to trade execution.
Unit of measurement. All microstructure parameters are estimated in relative terms
(%). However, the formulation of the trade execution model implies measurement in abso-
lute terms ($/share). To convert the volatility and price impact parameters expressed as
percentage into $, I scale the estimated variance and price impact coeﬃcients by the stock
price at closing on the day before the initiation of the trading strategy (p0).
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table II.2 provides summary statistics for all calibration parameters in the model grouped
by the direction of trade (sales and purchases).
 Insert Table II.2 approximately here 
Panel A shows the total TAQ sample. It covers 2,437 (426) sale (purchase) strategies
lasting between 2 (2) and 20 (20) trading days with a volume of less than 500 shares to 65.6
(9.3) million shares. The insiders executing these sales (purchases) hold a median equity
stake of $11 ($22) million. The minimum and maximum wealth levels vary between $10,000
and $11.3 billion yielding α values between 2.5 ∗ 10−4 and 2.2 ∗ 10−10, respectively.29
Table II.2 also displays the estimated microstructure parameters γ1, γ2, τ1, τ2, and σ
2.
The estimation of these parameters is based on about 100 to 160,000 transactions (executed
over the estimation period of 20 trading days). The number of transactions is stock-speciﬁc
and is usually larger for sales than for purchases. The price impact parameters in $ terms
are comparable to other empirical estimations (e.g., Sadka, 2006) and larger for sales than
29For the level of accumulated wealth, I replace all zero values and all values below $10,000 with $10,000
in order to avoid that I lose observations due to a missing α value. To derive α, I divide CRRA=2.5 by the
level of accumulated wealth.
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for purchase transactions. However, these $ numbers are derived by multiplying the original
percentage estimates by the stock price p0 to derive the correct unit of measurement for
the trade optimization model. Taking the signiﬁcantly diﬀerent median values for the stock
price p0 into account - $34.53 for sales and $13.75 for purchases - the price impact estimates
for purchases are about twice the size of the estimates for sales. This means that purchases
are more expensive to execute than sales. This asymmetry in price eﬀects for sales and
purchases is consistent with the literature on price eﬀects of (large) institutional trades (e.g.,
Chan and Lakonishok, 1995; Keim and Madhavan, 1997).
Panel B in Table II.2 reports summary statistics for all calibration parameters for the ﬁnal
sample which is a subsample of the total TAQ sample and deﬁned in Section 4.2. The ﬁnal
sample covers trading strategies with a speciﬁc trade pattern and is used in all subsequent
analyses to test the predictive power of the trade execution model. A comparison of Panel
A and B shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the total TAQ sample and the ﬁnal sample
used in my analyses.
4 Empirical results
I divide my empirical analysis into ﬁve parts. In Section 4.1, I commence with a numerical
example and a comparative static analysis using the numbers from the empirical calibra-
tion. These preliminary analyses convey a better understanding of the theoretical solution
provided in the Proposition in Section 2.3 and illustrate the main features of the optimal
trading strategies. Section 4.2 to 4.5 form the main part of the empirical analysis. I start
with inspecting the general shape of actual execution strategies of insiders in Section 4.2. I
then conduct more detailed quantitative analyses to examine the explanatory power of the
model along two dimensions. In a ﬁrst step, I test the model's prediction on the per-period
trade volume for an exogenously given trade horizon T . I refer to this dimension of the model
as trade pattern optimality. To test the trade pattern optimality, I derive the length of
the trade horizon for the optimization from the trade horizon actually chosen by the insider
for the speciﬁc trade. In a second step, I test the model's prediction on the optimal length
of the trading horizon and the decision whether a trade should be split up or not. I refer to
this dimension of the model as trade horizon optimality. In contrast to the ﬁrst step of my
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analysis, I now endogenize T by running a second optimization over diﬀerent trade horizons
T ∈ [1, 20]. Afterwards, I compare the values for the objective function (certainty equiva-
lents) for the diﬀerent T s and determine the optimal trade horizon T opt which maximizes the
objective function. The length of the optimal trade horizon depends the individual input
parameters as described in the sensitivity analysis (Section 4.1). In Section 4.5, I examine
the overall beneﬁt from splitting up large trades by considering the trade pattern and the
trade horizon dimension jointly. Thus, I compute the total optimization potential from op-
timal trade splitting and compare it to the optimization potential realized by insiders with
their actual trading strategies. I conduct several robustness checks in Section 4.6, before I
summarize and discuss the main results in Section 4.7.
4.1 Preliminary analyses
4.1.1 Numerical example
The parameters for this numerical example are derived from my sample. In particular, I use
the median values for sale transactions displayed in Panel B of Table II.2. Consider a trader
with a risk aversion coeﬃcient α = 2.5
$11,375,935
= 2.198 ∗ 10−7 and the case of maximizing the
expected trading revenues from the liquidation of 62,500 shares over T = 3 periods for a
stock currently trading at p0 = $34.53 with the following microstructure parameters:
γ1 = $3.08 ∗ 10−2, γ2 = $0.22 ∗ 10−5, τ1 = $2.38 ∗ 10−2, τ2 = $0.15 ∗ 10−5, σ2 = $0.011 .
To develop some intuition for these parameters, observe that the no-impact cost of selling
62,500 shares at $34.53 is $2,158,125. The immediate liquidation of the share block would
result in a temporary price impact of $7,338 and a permanent price impact of $10,670.
Taking the price movement risk for one day of $5 into account, the certainty equivalent
for selling the asset position becomes $2,140,112. Thus, the full-impact trading revenues of
immediate liquidation are $18,013. Assuming a time period of 3 trading days, the model
predicts optimal trade packages of 26,727, 20,830, and 14,942 shares. With this trading
strategy, the certainty equivalent for the asset position increases to $2,145,185, bringing
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the implementation costs down to $12,940. Using the model to optimize the length of the
trading period results in trading over 5 trading days30 with minimal implementation costs
of $12,777. This is an average improvement of $8.4 cent/share compared to immediate
liquidation and $0.3 cent/share compared to liquidation over 3 trading days. The impact of
the price movement discount is marginal in this example due to the very low risk aversion
coeﬃcient which results from the high level of accumulated wealth of about $11.4 million.
Assuming a wealth level of $1 million increases the price movement discount by factor 10.
4.1.2 Comparative static analysis
The sensitivity analysis is based on the above numerical example for T=3.31 In addition
to the median values for X, γ1, γ2, τ1, τ2, σ
2, and α, I use the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th
percentile for each parameter. In particular, I set all parameters to the median values and
then vary one variable at a time over the percentiles.
To illustrate how the individual parameters aﬀect the optimality of the trading strategies,
I start from the simple baseline or benchmark case which corresponds to the seminal model
developed by Bertsimas and Lo (1998). I consider a risk-neutral trader, α = 0, who does
not care about the risk of the liquidation revenues, but about the expected value of the
liquidation revenues only. Furthermore, consistent with Bertsimas and Lo (1998), I assume
the price impact function to be linear in trade size comprising a temporary and a permanent
component (γ2 > 0 and τ2 > 0). This functional form implies that there are no ﬁxed price
impacts (γ1 = τ1 = 0). Under these parameter assumptions, the optimal trading strategy
for an exogenously determined T is to break up the total number of shares into T identical
packages of size X/T . This optimal execution policy is called naive strategy (Bertsimas
and Lo, 1998) or straight-line trajectory (Almgren and Chriss, 2001). In this benchmark
case, it is not possible to determine the optimal length of the trading interval T , because
traders would always prefer longer to shorter horizons, the limit being an execution policy
of trading one share per day.
30The individual trade packages for the 5 day trading strategy have the following sizes: 24,283, 18,384,
12,494, 6,610, and 728 shares.
31I limit the trade horizon to T=3 periods, because for longer trade horizons I do not obtain optimal
solutions from the model for a large number of parameter settings. For T=3, there is only one case with no
solution. This is for the 10th percentile of the number of shares (see Figure II.6).
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Risk aversion (α). Introducing risk aversion, α > 0, causes the trader to care about the
risk of exogenous price changes within the trading interval T . Thus, the trader balances
the desire to realize the highest (lowest) level of trading revenues (costs) given the price
impact of his sales and the desire to realize some conﬁdence level given the market risk
of the asset. Risk aversion causes trades to be shifted to earlier periods (compared to the
straight-line policy). Risk averse traders sell relatively more upfront, and less in later periods,
incurring higher price impact costs with their early trades, but at the same time reducing
their exposure to random price shocks for their later trades. Figure II.1 shows the shares
traded per period expressed as percentage of the total asset position. The horizontal line
in Figure II.1 shows the optimal straight-line strategy of a risk-neutral trader (benchmark
case, α = 0). The other lines show the sequence of optimal trades for increasing values
of absolute risk aversion. The graph shows that the liquidation speed increases with risk
aversion. Concerning the optimal length of the trading interval T , an increase in the risk
aversion coeﬃcient leads to a shortening of the optimal execution horizon (not graphed).
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Figure II.1: Optimal trading volume and risk aversion (α)
Parameters are T=3, X=62,500 shares, γ2 = $0.22 ∗ 10−5, τ2 = $0.15 ∗ 10−5, σ2 = $0.011, γ1 = τ1 = $0,
and CRRA=2.5. The risk aversion coeﬃcient α is estimated by scaling CRRA by the level of accumulated
wealth. The median wealth level of $11,375,935 as well as the four percentiles are scaled by 100.
The following observation associated with the sensitivity analysis concerning the risk
aversion is notable: The risk aversion coeﬃcients are estimated by scaling CRRA by the
level of accumulated wealth. The typical wealth levels in the sample are, however, very
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large - even though I use conservative estimates - and imply risk aversion coeﬃcients close
to zero. As a result, the trading strategies do not deviate signiﬁcantly from the risk-neutral
straight-line policy and are almost similar even for the most extreme values of α (10th and
90th percentile). To make the eﬀects from changes in the level of risk aversion visible in
the above analysis, I divided all wealth levels by 100 yielding a wealth range of $13,100
(10th percentile) to $1,319,276 (90th percentile). For all wealth levels above this scaled
90th percentile of about $1,000,000, decreases or increases in the level of wealth have no
measurable eﬀect on the optimal trading strategies.
Asset volatility (σ2). An increase in the asset volatility has the same eﬀect on the optimal
trading policy as an increase in the trader's risk aversion. Thus, higher asset volatility causes
traders to redistribute their trades from later to earlier periods or to reduce the optimal
trading horizon, respectively. Risk aversion and asset volatility have the same impact on
trading strategies, because both parameters aﬀect the size of the price movement discount.
Figure II.2 displays the trade policies for increasing asset volatility showing that higher
volatility is associated with trading in earlier trading rounds. Alternatively, higher volatility
results in longer trading horizons. The relation between asset volatility and trade horizon,
however, is not linear.
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Figure II.2: Optimal trading volume and asset volatility (σ2)
Parameters are T=3, X=62,500 shares, γ2 = $0.22 ∗ 10−5, τ2 = $0.15 ∗ 10−5, γ1 = τ1 = $0, CRRA=2.5, and
wealth=$113,759. The risk aversion coeﬃcient α is estimated by scaling CRRA by the level of accumulated
wealth. The median wealth level of $11,375,935 is scaled by 100.
33
Asset volatility and risk aversion enter the same term in the objective function in a
multiplicative way. Thus, extreme values of either variable oﬀset the potential inﬂuence of
the other variable. In particular, very low risk aversion coeﬃcients (caused by very high
levels of accumulated wealth) oﬀset the impact of signiﬁcant changes in the asset volatility.
To make the eﬀects from changes in the asset volatility visible, I scaled the median wealth
level by 100 for the above analysis. Conversely, the comparably high wealth levels in the
sample imply low risk aversion coeﬃcients which neutralize the impact of the asset volatility.
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Figure II.3: Optimal trading volume and variable temporary price impact (τ2)
Parameters are T=3, X=62,500 shares, γ1 = γ2 = τ1 = $0, σ
2 = $0.011, CRRA=2.5, and
wealth=$11,375,935. The risk aversion coeﬃcient α is estimated by scaling CRRA by the level of accu-
mulated wealth. The median wealth level of $11,375,935 is scaled by 100.
Variable price impact (γ2 and τ2). An increase in γ2 and τ2 indicates that the negative
price eﬀects of each unit traded get larger. There is, however, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the two parameters. The temporary price eﬀect τ2 has no impact on futures prices, and thus,
on trades carried out in subsequent trading periods. As every traded unit incurs a price
discount of τ2, the total temporary price eﬀect is not aﬀected by the size of the individual
trade packages. Varying the size of τ2 yet has an impact on the optimal trading strategy,
because the trader trades oﬀ the total temporary price impact against the risk of price
changes. Figure II.3 shows that the importance of the risk aversion decreases with the size
of the temporary price eﬀect. In case of a large temporary price impact, the optimal trading
strategy is almost equal to the straight-line policy under risk neutrality, while for a small
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temporary price impact the risk aversion implies a front-loaded strategy.
In contrast to the temporary price impact τ2, the variable permanent price impact γ2
aﬀects all subsequent trades via a change in the stock price. Figure II.4 shows the trade
patterns for varying permanent price eﬀects. A larger unit impact implies that traders
prefer to trade smaller quantities in earlier periods. Thus, the larger the variable permanent
price eﬀect γ2, the closer the trading strategies to the straight-line policy. Alternatively, the
optimal number of trading days rises as a consequence of increasing unit price impacts, while
keeping all other parameters constant (not graphed).
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Figure II.4: Optimal trading volume and variable permanent price impact (γ2)
Parameters are T=3, X=62,500 shares, τ2 = $0.15 ∗ 10−5, γ1 = τ1 = $0, σ2 = $0.011, CRRA=2.5,
and wealth=$11,375,935. The risk aversion coeﬃcient α is estimated by scaling CRRA by the level of
accumulated wealth. The median wealth level of $11,375,935 is scaled by 100.
Fixed price impact (γ1 and τ1). So far, the comparative static analysis did not include
ﬁxed price eﬀects (γ1 = τ1 = 0). Introducing ﬁxed price impact costs every time an order
takes place, diminishes the incentive to engage in multiple transactions over longer trading
horizons. The larger the per-transaction costs, the larger the lots sold in each trading
round and the smaller the number of trading rounds. This eﬀect stems exclusively from the
permanent component of the ﬁxed price impact, γ1. To see this, note that the temporary
ﬁxed price impact is represented by the constant term τ1 that is not related to the decision
variables n1, ..., nT in equation (II.19). Thus, changes in τ1 do not alter the pattern of the
optimal trading strategy, but rather aﬀect the level of the objective function, and thus, the
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certainty equivalent of the trading revenues (costs). Figure II.5 shows the optimal trading
strategies for diﬀerent values of permanent ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Figure II.5: Optimal trading volume and ﬁxed permanent price impact (γ1)
Parameters are T=3, X=62,500 shares, τ1 = $2.38 ∗ 10−2, τ2 = $0.15 ∗ 10−5, γ2 = $0.22 ∗ 10−5, σ2 = $0.011,
CRRA=2.5, and wealth=$11,375,935. The risk aversion coeﬃcient α is estimated by scaling CRRA by the
level of accumulated wealth. The median wealth level of $11,375,935 is scaled by 100.
Introducing ﬁxed eﬀects in the linear speciﬁcation of price impact eﬀects results in non-
linear total price impact costs. This modiﬁcation has a positive side eﬀect concerning the
scaling behavior of trading strategies. For γ1 = τ1 = 0, the optimal trading strategies are
scalable which means that the sale of 10,000 shares is executed with exactly the same selling
speed as the sale of 1,000 shares. The optimal trade packages for 10,000 shares can be derived
by multiplying the optimal trade packages for 1,000 shares by factor 10. However, this scaling
behavior is inconsistent with the intuition that large asset positions are eﬀectively less liquid,
and hence, should be liquidated less rapidly than small positions. One way to model a more
intuitive scaling behavior is to modify the price impact functions to be non-linear, e.g., by
introducing ﬁxed price eﬀects γ1 and τ1.
Number of shares traded (X). Under the assumption of no ﬁxed price eﬀects, γ1 =
τ1 = 0, there is no monotonic relation between the size of the asset position X and the
liquidation speed, because the liquidation speed is constant (scaling behavior).
Intuitively, one would expect that larger asset positions are sold over longer trading
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horizons and with a lower liquidation rate. Figure II.6 shows that for γ1, τ1 6= 0 an increase
in the asset position implies such a decrease in execution speed. Again, however, the relation
is not linear. As Schied and Schoeneborn (2009) show, an increase in the asset position is
associated with two counteracting eﬀects which both can set the direction of the overall eﬀect.
On the one hand, an increase in the asset position implies larger price eﬀects, which would
result in longer trading horizons or lower trading speed. On the other hand, an increase in
the asset position increases the risk associated with the position, which would imply shorter
trading horizons and higher execution speed. Which eﬀect dominates at a time depends
on the case-speciﬁc parameter constellation of price impact parameters, asset volatility, risk
aversion, and size of the asset position.
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Figure II.6: Optimal trading volume and size of the asset position (X)
Parameters are T=3, X=62,500 shares, τ1 = $2.38 ∗ 10−2, τ2 = $0.15 ∗ 10−5, γ2 = $3.08 ∗ 10−2, γ2 =
$0.22∗10−5, σ2 = $0.011, CRRA=2.5, and wealth=$11,375,935. The risk aversion coeﬃcient α is estimated
by scaling CRRA by the level of accumulated wealth. The median wealth level of $11,375,935 is scaled by
100. For the 10th percentile (X=8,000 shares), the model provides no admissable solution.
In summary, the comparative static analysis shows two things: First, the optimal trad-
ing strategies have a universal form. In particular, the daily trade volume declines at a
decreasing rate over the trading horizon. All trade execution models assuming risk aver-
sion, no intertemporal updating, and no stock price drift, predict a decreasing and convex
trade pattern which varies only in the degree of convexity. Thus, the optimal trading strate-
gies derived in this paper represent a whole class of trade execution models. Second, the
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optimal trading strategies are the result of the complex interplay of diﬀerent exogenous pa-
rameters and comprise non-monotonic relations, which cannot be tested in cross-sectional
regressions.32 Thus, I test the model via calibration which is also a more stringent test.
4.2 Trade pattern shape
Before I quantitatively examine the optimality of the actually observed trade patterns and
trading horizons, I inspect the general shape of the actual trading strategies. Therefore, I
distinguish four general trade patterns: "Straight" stands for the straight-line policy where
an equal number of shares is traded each day. "Increase" ("Decrease") indicates a trading
strategy where the volume traded per day increases (decreases) continuously over the indi-
vidual days of the trading horizon. "Other" comprises all remaining non-monotonic trade
patterns. As I do not require TAQ data for this analysis, I investigate the frequency of these
trade patterns for the total NYSE & AMEX sample as well as the ﬁnal sample.
Table II.3 shows the frequency distribution of trading strategies by length and trade
pattern grouped by the direction of trade (sales and purchases). Panel A displays the results
for the total NYSE & AMEX sample. Panel B reports the results for the ﬁnal sample.
 Insert Table II.3 approximately here 
The proportions of the diﬀerent trade patterns are approximately equal for all samples
and for sale and purchase transactions. Straight-line policies account for about 10% of all
multiple-day strategies. The other three types of trading strategies - decreasing, increasing,
and non-monotone - are almost equally widespread and account for about 30%, 25%, and 35%
of all multiple-day trading strategies, respectively. The table also shows that straight-line
and non-monotone trade patterns are predominant for trades with a trading horizon longer
than six days. In particular, non-monotone trade patterns are common for longer trading
horizons. Strictly decreasing or increasing patterns are only observed for strategies that do
not last longer than ﬁve trading days. Based on Table II.3, I reject the trade execution model
for more than two-thirds of all multiple-day trading strategies. The model seems to have
only predictive power for multiple-day trades with a short trading horizon, i.e., transactions
32See also the sensitivity analysis in Schied and Schoeneborn (2009) for non-monotonic relations.
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that last between two and ﬁve trading days. This observation ﬁts well with the static nature
of the model. Static strategies are determined before trading starts and not updated over
the course of trading in response to sign and size of stock price changes. Such static trade
behavior is, in general, more adequate for shorter trading horizons.33
I now turn to the question whether the trade patterns not predicted by the model can
be explained with other models and/or assumptions. Alternative models in the trade execu-
tion literature make predictions that may better ﬁt with these alternative trading patterns.
Straight-line policies are optimal for traders who are assumed to be risk neutral (Bertsi-
mas and Lo, 1998). Risk neutrality implies a drop of the trade-oﬀ between execution risk
and price impact costs. The optimal risk-neutral strategy solely minimizes the price impact
which is to trade equally sized packages in each trading interval (Bertsimas and Lo, 1998).
Non-monotone and/or increasing trade patterns require models with additional features and
assumptions, which are largely uninvestigated in the theoretical trade execution literature.34
Therefore, such models are not within the scope of this paper.
Result 1: An examination of the actual trade patterns of insiders shows that the explana-
tory power of the trade execution model is limited to about 30% of all multiple-day trading
strategies which exhibit a decreasing trade pattern and do not last longer than 5 trading days.
For about 70% of the actual trading strategies the CARA model is rejected. These trading
strategies exhibit increasing, straight-line, or non-monotone trade patterns and might only
be explained with trade execution models incorporating alternative risk preferences and in-
tertemporal updating. Models of this type are less common and developed, and thus, not
subject of this paper.
In the next step of my empirical analysis, I focus on the trading strategies which are
within the scope of the model used here. This means I focus on decreasing trading strategies.
All other trading strategies - increasing, non-monotone, and straight-line strategies - are
excluded from the forthcoming analyses.
33However, Schied and Schoeneborn (2009) show that dynamic trading strategies only generate added
utility for traders with non-constant absolute risk aversion. This means that, in general, static trading
strategies are optimal for traders with CARA utility, independent from the length of the trade horizon. See
Section 4.7 for a discussion.
34A notable example is Schied and Schoeneborn (2009). See also Schoeneborn (2008) for a discrete-time
version.
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4.3 Trade pattern optimality
I examine the optimality of the lots distribution over individual trading days by assuming
that the trading horizon chosen by the insider is exogenously determined. Thus, I calculate
the optimal trading strategy for the observed length of the trading strategy and then compare
the actually implemented trading strategy and the optimal policy derived from the model.
The model, however, does not yield an admissible trading strategy for all exogenously given
trade horizons. In particular, the non-negativity constraint 0 ≤ nt ≤ X is frequently binding
for longer trade horizons and/or lower levels of risk aversion.
I compare the optimal and the implemented trading strategy with the help of two mea-
sures. The most intuitive measure is the value of the objective function M [E (R) ,V (R)] =
E (R)− α
2
V (R), which can be thought of as a certainty equivalent for the total asset position
X. If the value of the objective function is scaled by the size of the trading strategy X, the
resulting ﬁgure corresponds to the shadow revenues (costs) per share. The diﬀerence in this
measure between the optimal and actual trading strategy captures the ﬁnancial implications
from deviating from the optimal trading strategy. I express the diﬀerence in percentage
terms by scaling it with the value of the optimal trading strategy. I denote this measure
FDEV (Financial DEViation) and use the following formula to calculate it:
FDEV =
Mopt −M
|M | ∗ 100 (II.29)
where M opt (M) is the value of the objective function for the optimal (actual) trading
strategy. Taking the absolute value of the objective function in the denominator is necessary
to get deviations that all have the same (positive) sign as the value of the objective function
is negative for purchase transactions (cash outﬂow) and positive for sale transactions (cash
inﬂow). FDEV represents the return per share forfeited due to a non-optimal trade pattern.
The magnitude of this deviation measure depends on the extent to which the actual daily
trade volumes deviate from the optimal trade volumes, the magnitude of the microstructure
parameters (price impact and volatility), and the size of the asset position.
To capture the mere extent of deviations in trade volumes, I use a second more ad-hoc
measure to compare optimal and actual trading strategies. To calculate this measure, I
compute the deviation in share volumes between the optimal and actual trading strategy
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for each trading day, scale this diﬀerence with the size of the total asset position, and sum
up the daily percentages over all trading days. Finally, I divide the sum by two to limit the
measure to the interval [0%, 100%]. I denote this measure NDEV (nt DEViation) and use
the following formula to compute it:
NDEV =
1
2
∗
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣noptt − nt∣∣∣
X
∗ 100 (II.30)
where noptt (nt) is the optimal (actual) trading volume in shares in period t and X is
the total asset position to be traded. NDEV represents the average share volume deviation
between the optimal and actual trading strategy.
Before I analyze these deviation measures for the whole sample, I look at two trading
strategies and the corresponding deviation measures. First, I consider the 3-day buying
strategy of Steve Creamer, CEO of EnergySolutions Inc., who bought 1,000,000 shares in
packages of 450,000, 319,200, and 230,800 shares in November 2008. The face value of the
asset position (X ∗p0) is $4.42 million. The optimal trading policy derived from the model is
slightly less front-loaded than the actual trading strategy and comprises three lots of 357,618,
330,963, and 311,419 shares. The average trade volume deviation NDEV is 9.2%, while the
sample median is 13.6%. The FDEV measure yields a value of 0.11% which corresponds
to an absolute value of $5,276. For FDEV the sample median is slightly lower (0.02%).
Second, I look at the3-day selling strategy of Arif Shakeel, COO of Western Digital Corp,
who sold 482,391 shares in packages of 472,400, 5,000, and 4,991 shares in February 2005.
The face value of the asset position (X ∗ p0) is $5.20 million. The optimal trading strategy
for 3 trading days derived from the model is 179,537, 160,519, 142,335 shares. The average
trade volume deviation NDEV is large with 60.7% compared to the sample median of 14.9%.
This trade volume deviation results in a ﬁnancial deviation FDEV of 0.75% ($38,305) which
is signiﬁcantly higher than the sample median 0.02%.
Table II.4 displays the main distribution characteristics for the two deviation measures
FDEV (Panel A) and NDEV (Panel B) for the sample of 766 transactions for which the
model provides an optimal trading strategy for the actual trade horizon.
 Insert Table II.4 approximately here 
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If the model would perfectly capture reality and all parameter estimates would be free of
any bias, then the deviation measures would be zero for all observations in the sample. Thus,
my analysis focuses on the distribution of the deviations, and in particular, the following
distribution characteristics displayed in Table II.4: the number of zero values (zeros), the
95th percentile value (p95), and the degree of positive skewness (skew). The number of zero
values shows for how many observations there is no deviation. The 95th percentile marks
the upper bound for deviations while excluding extreme observations. Finally, the positive
skewness indicates how much the distribution tail is pushed towards the ideal value of zero
which indicates a perfect ﬁt of the model.
For 242 of the 766 strategies - 213 sale and 29 purchase transactions - I ﬁnd a FDEV value
of zero (rounded to 2 digits). This means the model perfectly predicts 32% of the trading
strategies. The 95th percentile improvement associated with the optimal trading strategy
is 0.75% (0.79%) for sales (purchases) which shows that the potential for improvement is
limited. The percentage numbers correspond to absolute values for the whole asset position
X of $38,305 and $9,459 respectively. Finally, the skewness values are positive and indicate
that the deviation values tend to cluster towards the lower end of the scale (zero deviation).
To determine the signiﬁcance of the positive skewness, I calculate the standard error of
skewness which can be approximated by the square root of 6/sample size.35 Multiplying the
standard error of skewness by ±2.58 (1.96) yields the 99% (95%) conﬁdence interval for the
skewness. If the skewness is outside the conﬁdence interval, the distribution is signiﬁcantly
skewed. I obtain a standard error of skewness of 0.005 for sales and of 0.024 for purchases.
Thus, the distribution of deviations for sales and purchases is signiﬁcantly skewed at the
1% level. Overall, the mean and median values for FDEV indicate that the potential of
ﬁnancial optimization is larger for purchase than for sale transactions.
I now turn to the second deviation measure NDEV . This measure captures diﬀerences
in the daily trade volumes and is, in contrast to FDEV , not aﬀected by diﬀerences in the
microstructure parameters and their impact on the ﬁnancial deviation. Thus, NDEV is a
more direct measure to compare optimal and actual trading strategies. Furthermore, the
results for this deviation measure are more precise than for FDEV , because the FDEV
35See Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), p. 72.
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measure is based on US dollar and rounded to 2 digits. Thus, it is not surprising that I do
not ﬁnd any perfect matches (zeros) for NDEV . This implies, that even for the trading
strategies with no deviation in FDEV , the daily trade volumes do not perfectly correspond
to the trade volumes predicted by the model. The 95th percentile values with 41.9% for
sales and 40.2% for purchases are much higher than for FDEV . The skewness toward zero
values is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level for sales and purchases. Also note that the mean and
median deviations in trade volumes are somewhat larger for sales than for purchases. Thus,
the model has a slightly higher predictive power for purchases than for sales in terms of the
mere trading volume. However, after considering the larger price impact eﬀects and volatility
for purchase transactions displayed in Table II.2, the median ﬁnancial implications associated
with deviations from the optimal trading strategies (FDEV ) are larger for purchases than
for sales.36 This means that smaller adjustments in trading volumes have larger ﬁnancial
implications for purchases than for sales.
For 92 transactions - 75 sales and 17 purchases - of the 858 multiple-day trading strategies
with a decreasing trade pattern, the model ﬁnds no optimal trading strategy for the given
length of the trading interval. The optimal solutions I obtain for these trading strategies do
not meet the requirement that a sale (purchase) program does not include any additional
buys (sales). These 92 transactions are comparably small measured in the number of shares,
and in particular, when measured as percentage of average daily $ trading volume. The model
predicts for these transactions an optimal horizon which is shorter than the trading horizon
actually chosen by the insider. More speciﬁcally, the model predicts immediate execution
within one day for 83 of the 92 transactions. I did not include these 92 transactions in
the above analysis of optimal trade patterns, although the deviation measures FDEV and
NDEV could be calculated, because the analysis of optimal trade horizons is subject of the
next section. Thus, I postpone the examination of these transactions to the next section for
consistency reasons.
36This conclusion seems to be inconsistent with the mean value for sales and purchases in Panel A of Table
II.4. However, the mean ﬁgures for sales are biased due to one extreme observation with FDEV=277.97
(see Panel A in Table II.2, column maximum value). Excluding this extreme observation yields a mean
value that is lower than the mean value of 0.22 for purchases.
43
Result 2: Taking the actually observed trading horizons of insiders as given, the model
provides for 11% of the transactions with decreasing trading strategies no optimal solution,
but instead favors immediate execution or execution over shorter than actual trade horizons.
For the remaining 89% of the transactions with an optimal solution, the average deviation
in the number of shares traded per period is 17.6% for sale transactions and 16.8% for
purchase transactions. Thus, the model's explanatory power in terms of shares traded does
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer for purchase and sale transactions. For about 32% of all transactions
with an optimal solution, the deviations in trade volumes are only marginal and/or price
impact eﬀects and volatility are low, implying that the ﬁnancial deviations between actual
and optimal trading strategies are 0% (when rounded to 2 digits). The ﬁnancial deviations
for the remaining strategies are of measurable size. The deviations, however, are for less
than 5% of the transactions larger than 1%. In particular, the median ﬁnancial deviation is
0.02% for sale transactions and 0.03% for purchase transactions.
4.4 Trade horizon optimality
I now investigate the optimality of the length of the trading horizon. In this step of the
empirical analysis, I give up the assumption that the length of the trading period as actually
observed is optimal. Instead, I use the model to derive the optimal length of the trading
strategy. The model, however, does not directly aim at making predictions about this
feature of the trading strategies. Thus, I use the following method to endogenize the trading
horizon T within my modeling framework: I calculate optimal trading strategies for the grid
of values T ∈ [1, 20] and then determine the optimal trade horizon T opt by selecting the
horizon that gives the largest value for the objective function.37 I deﬁne the metric TDEV
as the diﬀerence between the length of the trading periods:
TDEV = T opt − T (II.31)
where T opt (T ) represents the optimal (actual) length of the trading period. Thus,
TDEV > 0 (TDEV < 0) indicates that the optimal trading interval should be longer
37I round the results for the optimization function to full $. In case that (due to this rounding) several
trading strategies with diﬀerent trading horizons yield the same value for the objective function, I pick the
trading strategy with the minimal T opt.
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(shorter) than actually chosen by the insider. The TDEV metric replaces the NDEV
measure. Beside this, I also use the FDEV metric to examine the ﬁnancial implications as-
sociated with deviations in the length of the trading horizon. However, as the optimization
of the trading horizon always comprises an optimization of the trade pattern, the FDEV
measure is the sum of the ﬁnancial deviations from both optimizations. In contrast, TDEV
is a measure of the mere deviations in the trading horizon, and thus, better suited to analyze
the predictive power of the model with respect to the trading horizon.
Table II.5 displays the main distribution characteristics for the two deviation measures
FDEV (Panel A) and TDEV (Panel B) for the complete sample of 858 transactions that
exhibit a decreasing trade pattern.
 Insert Table II.5 approximately here 
Panel A in Table II.5 reports the ﬁnancial implications that are associated with the
deviations in the trading horizon. The 95th percentile improvement associated with the
optimal trading horizon is 2.09% (2.30%) for sales (purchases). A comparison of the mean
and median FDEV ﬁgures in Table II.4 and II.5 shows that the ﬁnancial deviations are larger
for the optimization of the trade horizon than for the optimization of the mere trade pattern
within a given horizon as done in the last section. This result is consistent with the fact
that the trading strategies optimized with respect to the trading horizon are also optimized
with respect to the trade pattern. Thus, the ﬁnancial deviations displayed in Panel A in
Table II.5 include both optimization potentials. A separation of the ﬁnancial eﬀects from
the two optimizations is impossible, because the trade horizon optimization always implies
an optimization of the trade pattern. Panel A shows that for 111 (13%) of 858 trading
strategies there is no ﬁnancial improvement for switching from the actual to the optimal
trade horizon and trade pattern as predicted by the model. Put in other words, 13% of all
decreasing trading strategies are well predicted by the model. These 111 execution strategies
are part of the 242 transactions identiﬁed in Table II.4 that exhibit an almost perfect trade
pattern if the trading horizon is exogenously given. For the remaining 131 trading strategies
with only marginal deviations in the trade pattern for the actually observed trade horizon,
the model predicts a trading horizon of a diﬀerent length to be optimal.
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Panel B in Table II.5 shows that for 125 (15%) of 858 trading strategies - 97 sales and 28
purchases - the actual trading horizon corresponds to the optimal trading horizon. Beyond
this, the positive median value in TDEV indicates that the majority of the trading horizon
deviations is positive. A positive value means that the optimal trading horizon is longer than
the actual horizon. The maximum trading horizon is 20 trading days which corresponds to
the maximum value of the grid values used for optimization.38 For 96 transactions (11%) of
the 858 trading strategies - 79 sales and 17 purchases - the optimal trading horizon is shorter
than the horizon actually observed (results not tabulated). For 87 of the 96 transactions, the
model predicts immediate execution within one day while the insiders actually traded over
two to four trading days. Thus, in these cases, the insiders traded in a way which would have
been predicted by the model for less risk averse insiders. For all remaining trading strategies
(74%), the trading horizon predicted by the model is longer than the trading horizon chosen
by the insiders. Thus, insiders in these cases actually seem to be more risk averse than
assumed in my model. Overall, the median and mean deviations in trading horizons are
somewhat larger for sales than for purchase transactions indicating that the optimization
potential for purchase transactions is lower. Put diﬀerently, the explanatory power of the
model with respect to the trading horizon is larger for purchases than for sales.
Result 3: Allowing for an optimization over the trade horizon in addition to the trade
pattern, the model correctly predicts the trading horizon for about 15% of the actual trading
strategies. For the vast majority of the trading strategies (74%), the model predicts a longer
trading horizon. For the remaining 11% of the transactions, most of which are small trades,
the trading horizon predicted by the model is shorter than the acutal trading horizon.
Due to the fact that trading strategies optimized with respect to the trade horizon are also
optimized with respect to the trade pattern, the overall ﬁnancial deviations are larger than for
the mere optimization of trade patterns. For about 13% of all trading strategies, the policies
predicted by the model match almost perfectly with the actual trading strategies along both
optimization dimensions, i.e., with respect to the trade horizon as well as the trade pattern.
38Thus, for these transactions the optimal trading horizon could be even longer than 20 trading days.
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4.5 Overall beneﬁt from trade splitting
I conclude my empirical analysis with an examination of the overall beneﬁt from splitting
up large trades. So far, the theoretical trade execution literature focuses on the development
of diﬀerent models, but neglects the question what the overall ﬁnancial impact of breaking
up large trades - as predicted by these models - is. This is mainly due to the fact that
these models are rarely applied to real data. In contrast to previous work, I use my large
cross-sectional sample to shed light on the question how large the optimization potential of
splitting up large trades is. This analysis also allows me to examine which percentage of
the total optimization potential is realized by insiders with their actual trading strategies.
I calculate the overall optimization potential by comparing immediate execution strategies
with strategies that are optimized with respect to the trading horizon and the trade pattern.
I consider both eﬀects to get an estimate of the total magnitude of optimization. For this
analysis, I exclude the 87 execution strategies from the sample for which immediate execution
is optimal, because splitting up these trades oﬀers no optimization potential.
Table II.6 reports summary statistics for the diﬀerence in the certainty equivalents (objec-
tive function) between immediate execution and optimal execution (expressed as percentage
of the immediate execution value) grouped by size portfolios and the direction of the trade
(sales and purchases). The size portfolios are terciles formed over all sale and purchase trans-
actions. The size of the transactions is measured in $ trading volume expressed as percentage
of the average daily $ trading volume over the 20 trading days prior to the transaction. The
mean ﬁnancial improvement is 1.56% (1.45%) for sale (purchase) transactions, while the
median value is somewhat lower with 0.25% (0.42%). These mean values are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. However, the 95th percentile shows that the optimiza-
tion potential is usually limited to typical maximum values of around 5%. The ﬁgures for
the size terciles also show that the ﬁnancial improvement is positively associated with trade
size. This is consistent with the microstructure literature and the intuition that splitting
up trades is more favorable for large trade volumes. The last column in Table II.6 shows
the median improvement percentage scaled by the median trade size percentage. This ratio
can be used as multiple to estimate the improvement potential based on the trade volume
measured as percentage of the average daily trade volume. The trading size multiples for
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the total sample are 1.70x for sales and 1.60x for purchases. These numbers show that the
optimization potential is also economically signiﬁcant.
 Insert Table II.6 approximately here 
While Table II.6 focuses on the maximum impact from trade optimization, Table II.7
reports which percentage of the overall improvement potential is captured by insiders with
their actual trading strategies. More speciﬁcally, Table II.7 shows which portion of the op-
timization potential remains on the table, because insiders do not completely optimize their
trading strategies as predicted by the model. The two columns in Table II.7 display how the
total optimization potential is split between switching from immediate to actual execution
and switching from actual to optimal execution. While actual purchase transactions exhaust
about 72% of the total optimization potential, the percentage for sales is slightly lower with
67%. Thus, about one third of the total improvement potential is forfeited by insider's ac-
tual trading strategies. While diﬀerences between sales and purchases are negligible, the
percentages realized and forfeited vary systematically with the size of the transaction. The
percentage of the optimization potential forfeited increases continuously as the overall trans-
action size gets larger. These numbers can be interpreted in two ways: One way of thinking
is that the model has higher predictive power for smaller trades. An alternative way sug-
gests that insiders execute larger trades less optimally. Both interpretations, however, might
result from the fact that the ﬁndings for large trades are biased by a certain number of block
transactions which where not executed in the open market. While I use a trade size ﬁlter
in the construction of the sample, I can not fully rule out the possibility that in particular
some of the very large trades where not executed in the open market. Trading in the up-
stairs market is per deﬁnition less associated with trade splitting. This potential bias works
against positive ﬁndings for the model, because it increases the percentage of improvement
forfeited. Taking this fact into consideration, the numbers in Table II.7 show the model in
an even more positive light.
Result 4: The overall eﬀect from optimally breaking up large trades is statistically and
economically signiﬁcant. On average, the improvement in the certainty equivalent by breaking
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up large trades is 1.7x the trade size for sales and 1.6x for purchase transactions. Independent
of the trade direction, the optimization potential is positively related to the trade volume as
the price impact from own trading depends on the trade size.
Insiders with their actual trading strategies utilize slightly more than two thirds of the
overall optimization potential from optimal trade splitting, while about one third of the po-
tential is forfeited. The fact that such a large portion of the overall optimization potential
is realized by insiders provides further evidence in support of the model and shows that the
deviations in the trade horizon and trade pattern detected in the previous sections are within
a range that does not question the overall validity of the trade execution model.
4.6 Robustness checks
In this section, I check the robustness of my main results derived in the previous sections.
During these analyses I keep the same modeling framework as before. Thus, the general
shape of the trade patterns of the optimal trading strategies is not aﬀected. All predicted
trading strategies are decreasing and convex. However, the alternative speciﬁcations tested
in this robustness section might aﬀect the degree of convexity as well as the length of the
optimal trading horizon. The critical parameters in the model are the level of risk aversion
as well as the price impact functions and parameters.
Level of risk aversion. The level of risk aversion aﬀects the trader's preference for exe-
cuting trades in earlier trading rounds, and thus, his/her preference for splitting up trades.
The level of risk aversion is mainly determined by the wealth estimates which vary between
$10,000 and $11.2 billion (see Panel B in Table II.2), even though I used a conservative
wealth level estimate based on the equity holdings around the transaction. Very high wealth
estimates bring the risk aversion coeﬃcient close to zero which implies risk neutral behavior.
Risk neutral behavior means that the trader does not care about the risk of the liquidation
revenues, but only about the expected value of the liquidation revenues. In contrast, very
low wealth estimates imply high risk version coeﬃcients, and thus, a strong preference to
execute trades immediately, because the risk of the liquidation revenues has more weight.
To check the robustness of the wealth level estimates, I use three alternative proxies
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for the insider's accumulated level of wealth. First, I censor the wealth variable at the
25th and 75th percentile, setting extreme values to the 25th percentile ($4,006,181) and
the 75th percentile ($37,999,924), respectively. Second, I assume a constant wealth level
of $11,210,768 for all insiders which corresponds to the median wealth level including sales
and purchases. However, these variations are all above the threshold level of about $1
million which I identiﬁed in the sensitivity analysis to cause recognizable changes in trading
patterns. Thus, I ﬁnally use for all traders a constant wealth level of $500,000 which is
well below this threshold. Table II.8 reports the key indicators from Table II.4 to II.7 for
the three scenarios used to test the robustness of the results. Column (1) summarizes the
results from my previous calculations. The remaining three columns show the results for the
robustness checks.
 Insert Table II.8 approximately here 
As expected, robustness check 1 - wealth censored at the 25th and 75th percentile - and
robustness check 2 - median wealth - only reveal minimal changes in the results. Even for
robustness check 3 - constant wealth of $500,000 - the changes are comparably small. The
ﬁt of the trade patterns and the length of the trading horizon is slightly better as indicated
by the mean and median deviation measures and the slightly higher positive skewness in
Panel A and B. Furthermore, Panel C displays that the overall beneﬁt from trade splitting
is smaller due to the higher risk aversion implied by the lower wealth level.
Overall, the robustness checks with respect to risk aversion emphasize the stability of
my main results. Only assuming signiﬁcantly lower levels of wealth, and thus much higher
risk aversion, would imply signiﬁcant changes in the optimal trading strategies with a trend
towards no trade splitting.
Price impact functions and parameters. The robustness checks concerning the price
impact comprise the estimation of the price impact coeﬃcients as well as the assumed linear
form of the price impact function.
I start with two robustness checks examining the impact of variations in the price impact
parameters. First, I replace the stock- and time-speciﬁc price impact estimates with median
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values (across sales and purchases). I derive the median values by multiplying the median
percentage parameters with the individual stock prices prior to the transaction. With this
robustness check, I address the fact that price impact functions are frequently estimated
across stocks (e.g., Obizhaeva, 2007; Chen, Stanzl, and Watanabe, 2005) and purchases and
sales (e.g., Glosten and Harris, 1988). Second, I address the issue of systematic changes
in liquidity during the course of a trading day. Empirical studies provide evidence that
stock market illiquidity at NYSE follows a U-shaped or reversed J-shaped pattern with
the highest liquidity during the central hours and the early afternoon (e.g., McInish and
Van Ness, 2002). Assuming that traders execute their trades during the most liquid trading
hours, I re-estimate the price impact parameters from trades occurring between 11:00am to
3:00pm (instead of using full trading hours from 9:30am to 4:00pm).
Finally, I use an alternative functional form for the price impact function. In partic-
ular, I drop the intercept in the linear permanent price impact function making the slope
parameter γ the sole parameter that speciﬁes the permanent price impact function. I test
this alternative functional form, because theoretical literature on the topic argues that this
is the only speciﬁcation that fulﬁlls no arbitrage arguments (Huberman and Stanzl, 2004).39
Nevertheless, my main calculations are not based on this functional form, because empirical
studies on price impact eﬀects fail to ﬁnd evidence in support of this functional form (e.g.,
Obizhaeva, 2007). Meanwhile, my assumption of no buys (sells) during a sell (buy) transac-
tion avoides that traders in my model can proﬁt from the potential arbitrage opportunities
associated with this functional form of the permanent price impact function.
Table II.9 displays the key characteristics from Table II.4 to II.7 for the three scenarios
used to test the robustness of the results with respect to the price impact. Column (1)
summarizes the results from my main calculations. The remaining three columns show
the results for the robustness checks. Note that, in contrast to Table II.8, the number of
observations varies for the last two robustness checks, because I re-estimate the price impact
parameters and exclude observations with negative coeﬃcient estimates. Table II.10 reports
means and medians for the calibration parameters used in the robustness checks.
39Almgren and Chriss (2001) also use a linear functional form without intercept for the permanent price
impact function in their seminal paper.
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 Insert Table II.9 approximately here 
 Insert Table II.10 approximately here 
Column (2) in Table II.10 displays summary statistics for the parameter values when
stock speciﬁc values are replaced by median values. As I use median percentage values and
scale them by the individual stock prices, the parameter estimates vary over observations
when measured in $ terms. In particular, the sample medians of the price impact parameters
for sales (purchases) are slightly higher (lower) than in the main calculations. For instance,
the median ﬁxed permanent price impact for sales is now $3.71 ∗ 10−5 compared to $2.93 ∗
10−5 in my main calculations. The optimization results for these price impact parameters
are displayed in column (2) in Table II.9. While the results are slightly worse for sale
transactions, the results for purchase transactions improve considerably. Panel A shows that
the percentage of strategies with zero ﬁnancial deviation rises from 24% to 37% for purchases
and the positive skewness increases from 5.0 to 5.7. Furthermore, as displayed in Panel B, the
accuracy of the prediction concerning the trade horizon is improved increasing the percentage
of strategies with zero ﬁnancial deviation from 11% to 16% for purchase transactions, while
remaining constant for sale transactions. Overall, using median price impact parameters
yields a more balanced picture with regard to purchase and sale transactions. One possible
interpretation of this result is that less speciﬁc estimates for price impact parameters - no
diﬀerentiation between sales and purchases and no stock-speciﬁc estimation - are used in
real world applications of trade execution models. Finally, looking at Panel C in Table II.9,
the overall beneﬁt from trade splitting is reduced. This is due to the fact that the relation
from ﬁxed to variable price eﬀects increased. As a result, the incentive to split up positions
into several trades is lowered, and thus, diminishes the value created from trade splitting.
In addition, robustness check 2 displayed in column (3) in Table II.10 indicates that the
(median) price impact parameters estimated for trading hours 11:00am to 3:00pm tend to
be equal or lower than the parameter estimates for full trading hours. Such lower estimates
are in line with other empirical ﬁndings demonstrating that liquidity is highest during the
central trading hours within a day. As shown in the sensitivity analysis, lower price impact
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coeﬃcients give more weight to a traders' risk aversion. For high levels of risk aversion, lower
price impact eﬀects result in more front-loaded trading or shorter optimal trading horizons.
For low levels of risk aversion, the optimal trading strategies get closer to the straight-line
policy with a preference for longer trade horizons. Comparing the optimal trading strategies
from this robustness check to the optimal trading strategies in my main calculations, yields
two results (not tabulated): First, the mean of the optimal trading horizon increases for
sales (purchases) from 5.3 (4.9) days to 5.8 (5.7) days. Second, the optimal trading strategies
become less convex as the mean deviation from straight-line trading decreases.40 The results
of comparing these optimal trading strategies with the actual trading strategies are displayed
in column (3) in Table II.9. Overall, the numbers show that the predictive power of the model
decreases for the lower price impact parameters. In particular, in Panel A and B most means
and medians for the diﬀerent deviation measures increase. Moreover, the positive skewness
comes down which is an indicator for less clustering towards the lower end of the tail (zero
deviation). Taken together, these results suggest that the more straight-line optimal trading
policies are less descriptive of insider's actual trading behavior. Note, however, that my
sample only includes actual trading strategies with a decreasing trade pattern, while about
10% of the total transactions exhibit a straight-line pattern and are not included.
Column (4) in Table II.10 describes the price impact parameters used for the last robust-
ness check. The ﬁxed permanent price impact is zero by deﬁnition. As a result, the variable
permanent price impacts are about six times larger than the coeﬃcients obtained in a re-
gression with intercept. As discussed in the sensitivity analysis, no ﬁxed price impact and a
larger variable price impact causes trades to be split more evenly over the trading horizon
and results in longer optimal trading horizons. To see this straight-line splitting eﬀect in the
optimal trading strategies, the level of risk aversion needs to be low, as it is the case in my
sample. Otherwise, high risk aversion would outweigh the incentive from the variable price
impact eﬀects to split trades evenly. As expected, the optimal trading strategies for this
alternative price impact speciﬁcation show the following properties (results not tabulated):
First, the convex decline in the trade volumes of the optimal trading strategies is almost neg-
40To assess the convexity of the optimal trading patterns in comparison to straight-line policies, I computed
the NDEV measure from Section 4.3 using nstraightt instead of n
opt
t . The mean NDEV decreases from 8.9%
(9.8%) to 8.0% (9.1%) for sales (purchases).
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ligible. The optimal trading strategies are more or less straight-line policies. In particular,
the NDEV measure using straight-line policies as reference point has a mean value of 0.0%
(0.3%) for sales (purchases) compared to 8.9% (9.8%) in my main calculations. Consistent
with this evidence, the mean optimal trading horizon increases to 19.7 (19.0) days for sales
(purchases) from previously 5.3 (4.9) days. This fact implies that the model predicts an
optimal trading horizon of 20 days for the majority of the transactions. However, 20 trading
days is the maximum grid value used in my analysis. For the given parameter constellation,
traders would even like to trade over longer horizons.
The strong change in the price impact parameters also has a huge impact on the results
displayed in column (4) of Table II.9. All mean and median values for deviation measures
reported in Panel A and B increase signiﬁcantly, indicating that the predictive power of the
model is poor. At the same time, the skewness values decrease, some even become negative,
indicating that non-zero deviations get numerous. In particular, the trade horizon dimension
shows a poor ﬁt. The larger variable price impact eﬀects are associated with an increase in
the overall beneﬁt from the trade splitting. Panel C presents the respective ﬁgures showing
a signiﬁcant increase for sales and purchases. The signiﬁcantly lower ﬁt of this calibration
is also reﬂected in the ﬁgures of Panel D. For the ﬁrst time, the percentage of the forfeited
optimization potential is larger than the realized proportion of the improvement eﬀects.
Taken together, the robustness checks show two things: First, the results of my main
analyses are robust along reasonable variations in the crucial parameters. Second, the op-
timization results are sensible to major assumptions, e.g., with regard to the price impact
functions. Optimization under these assumptions, however, results in implausible ﬁndings.
4.7 Summary and discussion of main results
In summary, I began my empirical analysis (result 1) by documenting that splitting up large
trades over several trading days is a phenomenon frequently seen for trades executed by
corporate insiders. More speciﬁcally, about 55% of all daily trade observations are part of
trading sequences that last several, usually two to ﬁve, days. The trading patterns within
these sequences, i.e., the development of the daily trade volumes, can be grouped into four
general categories: increasing, decreasing, constant, and all remaining others. Trade sched-
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ules with a constant trade volume account for about 10% of all trading strategies, while the
three other trade schedules each account for 30%. Capturing these diverse trade patterns in
trade execution models requires diverging assumptions. Therefore, in my analysis, I focus
on trades characterized by decreasing trade patterns, as these represent standard trade exe-
cution models. In consequence, the explanatory power of my model is limited to about one
third of all multiple-day trading strategies. Nevertheless, for certain parameter values, the
model predicts trading patterns which are almost constant. Thus, the model calibrated in
this paper can explain up to 40% of all multiple-day trading strategies.
The main assumptions of my model are that traders are presumed to show constant
absolute risk aversion and price impact functions are deﬁned to be of linear form consisting
of a ﬁxed and variable component as well as temporary and permanent eﬀects. In a ﬁrst step
(result 2), I compute the optimal trading strategies for the trading horizon actually chosen
by the insider. For about 10% of the observations, the model fails to provide an admissible
solution for the given horizon. For the remaining observations, the model predicts trading
strategies which are less declining than the actually observed trading strategies. The ﬁnancial
implications of these diverging trading strategies, however, are on average low (around 0.02-
0.03%) due to the small dimension of the price impact parameters. For about 32% of the
observations, the ﬁnancial deviation expressed as percentage of the certainty equivalent of
the chosen trading strategy is even smaller than 0.00%. Thus, while minor deviations from
the optimal solution seem to exist in daily trade volumes, the resulting ﬁnancial implications
from further optimization are small.
Going beyond this analysis, in a second step (result 3), I compute the optimal trading
strategies for the range of 2 to 20 trading days and subsequently determine the trading
horizon that maximizes the trading proceeds. This use of the model widens its original scope,
as models of this type are originally developed for exogenously given trade horizons. This
additional analysis allows me to examine the optimality of the trade horizon chosen by the
insiders. Doing so reveals that the model correctly predicts about 15% of the actual trading
horizons. For the vast majority of the transactions (about 75%), however, the predicted
trading horizon is on average about 3 days longer than the actual trading horizon. To make
a statement concerning the comparison of the model's predictive power regarding the trade
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pattern and trade horizon dimension is impossible, because the trade horizon optimization
always comprises also a trade pattern optimization. Both dimensions are closely linked in
as much as that predicting less declining trade patterns and longer trade horizons are two
sides of the same coin. For about 13% of all observations, the optimal trading strategies are
congruent to the actually observed trading strategies.
Third, I use my large cross-sectional data set to evaluate the overall beneﬁt from trade
splitting (result 4). This analysis is of interest as my previous analyses only provided evidence
of a rather low improvement potential for the optimization of the actual trading strategies.
I ﬁnd that the overall eﬀect of breaking up large trades is economically and statistically
signiﬁcant. The percentage improvement in the certainty equivalent is on average more
than 1.5 times the trade size (measured in $ trading volume expressed as percentage of the
average daily $ trading volume over the 20 trading days prior to the transaction). Insiders
realize slightly more than two thirds of this overall improvement potential with their actual
trading strategies. This realization ratio provides additional evidence in support of the
model, because it shows that the identiﬁed deviations in the trade pattern and trade horizon
are of minor importance for the overall improvement potential. Thus, these deviations do
not question the overall validity of the model.
Finally, my robustness checks with regard to the risk aversion of the traders and price
impact parameters yield the following important insights: The risk version estimated by using
conservative wealth levels is very low. As shown in the sensitivity analysis, low risk aversion
implies a tendency towards straight-line trading strategies. Even for a considerably higher
level of risk aversion, the steepness of the trade volume decline improves only marginally.
This is a ﬁrst indication of the minor importance of the level of risk aversion for the degree of
convexity of the trading strategies in a real world setting. The robustness checks with regard
to the functional form of the permanent price impact parameters provide further support for
this conjecture. Banishing ﬁxed permanent price eﬀects results in trading strategies almost
congruent to straight-line policies. The previously included ﬁxed price eﬀect provides an
incentive not to break up large trades over too many periods. Thus, the pattern of declining
trade volumes in my calibration of the model is not primarily caused by high risk aversion
of the traders, but is due to the assumed functional form of the price impact function which
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includes ﬁxed eﬀects. To improve the predictive power of the model further, the average
steepness of the predicted trade patterns needs to be increased. Parameters aﬀecting the
steepness are the functional form of the price impact function and the level of risk aversion.
To adequately assess the obtained results, they need to be put in perspective to the main
properties and assumptions of the applied trade execution model as well as the insider data
used. As previously described, I analyze the complex trade execution decision of insiders
with a stylized model. The model's main focus lies in examining the actual trading behavior
of insiders with respect to splitting up larges trades over several days. For this purpose, the
model is stylized with respect to the following dimensions: First, it is of static nature by
assuming that trading strategies have to be deﬁned before trading is started. Thus, changes
in market conditions, for instance, do not cause revision, replacement, or cancellation of the
commenced trading strategies. Within this static framework, however, the assumption of
constant absolute risk aversion as used here stands out against alternatives of non-constant
absolute risk aversion, because only under the ﬁrst assumption statically determined strate-
gies are also optimal in a dynamic setting (Schied, Schoeneborn, and Tehranchi, 2010). Put
diﬀerently, allowing for intertemporal updating in the model adds no additional insights for
CARA investors.41 Second, the model assumes constant or time-invariant liquidity over the
execution period. Time-varying liquidity parameters can be easily incorporated in the model
by replacing γ1, γ2, τ1, and τ2 with parameters γ1,t, γ2,t, τ1,t, and τ2,t.
42 This results in optimal
trading strategies that trade larger volumes during more liquid trading hours (Huberman
and Stanzl, 2005). The main issue in using time-varying price impact parameters arises from
the necessity to forecast and/or estimate these parameters. A potential approach could be
the estimation of price impact parameters by trading day, given that liquidity is usually
lower on Mondays and Fridays compared to the other days of the week. Because the model
requires all price impact parameters to be known before trading starts, however, a rolling
estimation of price impact parameters over a certain period of trading days done prior to
each trading day within a trading sequence is not covered by the model.43 Third, the model
41Only a few papers developing and solving theoretical trade execution models consider dynamic strategies.
See, e.g., Subramanian and Jarrow (2001) and He and Mamaysky (2005).
42See Almgren and Chriss (2001), Moench, 2009, and Jondeau, Perilla, and Rockinger, 2010.
43See Almgren and Chriss (2001). This is also an issue of time-consistency and dynamic optimization.
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assumes a minimum trading period of one day, partly owing to the insider data used.44 The
choice of this minimum trade period seems to be at a large scale on ﬁrst sight, especially, as
some trade execution papers optimize trading over 30-minute intervals within trading days
(e.g., Moench, 2009, Jondeau, Perilla, and Rockinger, 2010). Zooming into trading days and
probably trying to explain intraday trading strategies based on algorithmic trading, however,
is not the focus of stylized trade execution models. Therefore, the minimum trading period
of one trading day is a simplifying, but reasonable compromise to investigate the main idea
of splitting up large trades into several packages.
The limitations and opportunities inherent in the insider data are a second issue to
be considered when assessing the overall results of this paper. On the one hand, insider
transactions are particularly well suited to examine strategies to break up large trades,
because insiders often own and trade quite signiﬁcant asset positions in their own company.
Furthermore, as large shareholders become insiders by deﬁnition as soon as they own more
than 10% of the ﬁrm's equity45, it might be hard to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant number of other
individuals who trade suﬃciently large asset positions. On the other hand, insider data also
has some shortcomings and limitations. First, insiders have access to non-public information
and even with insider trading laws in place, their trading behavior might be aﬀected by this
information. Second, the disclosure rules concerning insider trading do not allow limiting the
sample to open market transactions only. Thus, the data set might also include transactions
that are privately negotiated. This is in particular relevant with respect to the fact that there
is a limit to the volume that is instantaneously executable in the open market. Therefore, I
exclude transactions with extremely large trade volumes above certain thresholds from my
analysis, but there is no common rule or understanding which asset positions are executable
in the open market. Overall, the potential eﬀect of these insider data limitations is hardly
quantiﬁable without analyzing proprietary trading data of other individuals.
44See also Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Dubil (2002) for the use of trading days.
45See the deﬁnition in Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act.
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5 Conclusion
By empirically calibrating a stylized trade execution model, I analyze the frequently observ-
able practice of corporate insiders to break up large asset positions into several trades. To
the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical and structural test of such a model. The
model adopted in this paper utilizes an expected utility framework and assumes traders to
be risk averse and price impact functions to be linear. It generates optimal trading strategies
of decreasing and convex form which are representative for standard trade execution models.
The empirical calibration of the model provides evidence on how asset-speciﬁc microstruc-
ture parameters such as price impact and price volatility as well as individual-speciﬁc risk
aversion aﬀect the execution behavior for large trades. The key insight of the analysis is that
trade execution models predicting decreasing trading strategies are a promising candidate
for analyzing the trade execution of large asset positions. Given the simplicity of the model
and the complexity of the individual's trading decision, the predictive power of the model is
commendable. The results, however, are sensitive to the functional form of the price impact
functions and the level of absolute risk aversion of the trader as well as their interplay. So far,
little research is available on the estimation of price impact functions for individual stocks
and their functional form. Such research, however, is a necessary prerequisite for successfully
calibrating theoretical trade execution models with empirical data.
The results in this paper can be interpreted in two ways, but both lines of reasoning
imply searching for and applying richer trade execution models that better capture real
world insider trading behavior. On the one hand, based on the obtained results, it can
be argued that insiders do not fully optimize the way in which they trade shares of their
own company. However, top managers and large shareholder, the insiders considered in this
paper, are usually well-educated and highly rational individuals with manifold experience
in share trading. Thus, it is unlikely that they deviate from actions that could make them
better oﬀ. A potential explanation for less than optimal trading behavior may be found
in fundamental human behavioral biases, such as loss aversion. In this respect, leaving
behind the expected utility framework that is traditionally used in the theoretical trade
execution literature promises to be an enlightening path for future theoretical and empirical
research. In contrast to this interpretation, it is also possible to question the stylized trade
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execution model used in this paper due to its limited explanatory power for actual insider
trading behavior. Addressing this concern within the basic framework adopted in this paper,
alternative non-linear price impact functions such as square root and power functions would
provide a topic of future inquiry. Furthermore, future trade execution models should target
increasing or non-monotone trading patterns. To explain these patterns, models would
need to incorporate alternative assumptions on the insider's risk attitude (e.g., increasing
or decreasing risk aversion) as well as additional assumptions on the stock price process
(e.g., drift) and the possibility of intertemporal updating of trading strategies. Although the
theoretical trade execution literature has tentatively begun to develop models that exhibit
these features, their empirical calibration will be a challenging task for future research.
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Appendix
Procedures of data matching and cleaning for TAQ data
A. Matching of trades and quotes and identifying buy and sell orders
A matching of trades and quotes is required for the computation of the price impact variables and
the identiﬁcation of the direction of the trade (buy vs. sell). The most widely used method to match
trades and quotes and infer a buy and sell classiﬁcation of trades is the Lee-Ready algorithm (Lee
and Ready, 1991). The algorithm consists of a quote-rule and a tick-rule used as a tie-breaker for
mid-quote trades. The quote rule applies information about the proximity to prevailing quotes in
order to infer trade direction. Trades at prices above the midpoint of the bid and ask are classiﬁed
as buys. Trades below the midpoint are classiﬁed as sells. However, some trades are executed
at the bid-ask midpoint. These trades can be either ignored by removing such trades or can be
handled by the tick-rule. The tick-rule classiﬁes a midpoint trade as a buy if it is executed at a
higher price than the previous trade (i.e., if it is an uptick") and as a sell if it is executed at a
lower price (downtick"). To apply this Lee-Ready algorithm one needs to match trades data with
quotes information. Lee and Ready (1991) suggest matching trade prices with 5-second old quotes
because prior to the computerization of the trade process, new quotes were often reported prior to
the prices of trades that generated them. Henker and Wang (2006) have investigated what time
lag is appropriate in recent days for NYSE.46 I follow Henker and Wang (2006) and use a 1-second
quote delay (also for matching trades with subsequent quotes) and do not apply the tick-rule by
discarding trades executed at the midpoint from my calculations.
B. Cleaning of raw data
Before matching trades and quotes with the above procedure, I ﬁlter out invalid trades and quotes
from TAQ raw data by excluding all observations that do not fulﬁll the following conditions:
2 Trades and quotes occur during regular trading hours (9:30am to 4:00pm) and have a positive
size (trades), depth (quotes), and price (trades and quotes).
2 For trades, I additionally require that:
(1) TAQ's CORR ﬁeld (correction indicator) is equal to 0, 1, or 2 (good trades).
(2) TAQ's COND ﬁeld (sale condition) is not O, Z, B, T, L, G, W, J, K, or Q (i.e., deleting
trades with special sale conditions).
2 For quotes, I additionally require that:
(1) TAQ's MODE ﬁeld (quote condition) is equal to 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18, or
21-26 (i.e., omitting quotes indicated to be associated with trading halts or designated order
imbalances or to be non-ﬁrm quotes).
(2) The ask price is higher than the bid price.
(3) The diﬀerence between the bid and ask price is 510% of the quote midpoint (i.e., elimi-
nating erroneous quotes, see Huang and Stoll, 1996a).
2 In the presence of multiple trades or quotes at the same time, I proceed as follows:
(1) For trades, I aggregate the trade volumes and calculate a volume-weighted average price
(see Engle and Russell, 1998).
(2) For quotes, I average all quote midpoints (arbitrary choice, because no guidance in the
literature which quote should be selected).
2 The ﬁrst trade and quote after opening each day is discarded (i.e., avoiding after hours
liquidity eﬀects, see Barclay and Hendershott, 2004).
46Alternative suggestions are 2 seconds (Vergote, 2005) and 0 seconds (Peterson and Sirri, 2003).
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Table II.1: Summary statistics insider trading activity
This table reports key characteristics for insider trades grouped by direction of the trade (sales and purchases)
and the length of the trading strategy (ﬁve length categories). Panel A displays the total NYSE & AMEX
sample from the IFDF database. Panel B displays the ﬁnal sample that is limited to trading strategies
with a length of 2-20 trading days for which TAQ data is available. The length of the trading strategies is
measured in trading days. The number of shares outstanding is measured at the day before the initiation of
the trading strategy. The average daily $ trading volume is computed over the 20 trading days prior to the
initiation of the trading strategy.
Length of trading strategy (trading days)
1 2-5 6-10 11-20 >20 Total
Panel A: Total NYSE & AMEX sample
Sales
Number of trading strategies 10,995 3,371 282 93 41 14,782
Number of trading days 10,995 8,786 2,076 1,359 1,490 24,706
45% 36% 8% 6% 6%
Total $ trading volume ($ million) 50,312 16,566 3,525 4,235 1,403 76,040
66% 22% 5% 6% 2%
Median number of shares (000) 20 48 100 210 521 25
Median $ trading volume ($ 000) 0.6 1.4 3.0 5.3 25.2 0.8
Median number of shares to shares outstanding (%) 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 0.0%
Median $ trading volume to average daily $ trading volume (%) 3.7% 17.8% 60.6% 65.5% 143.5% 5.7%
Median duration (trading days) 1 2 7 14 28 1
Purchases
Number of trading strategies 2,987 904 72 22 13 3,998
Number of trading days 2,987 2,318 516 306 521 6,648
45% 35% 8% 5% 8%
Total $ trading volume ($ million) 1,595 1,172 896 396 279 4,339
37% 27% 21% 9% 6%
Median number of shares (000) 5 20 167 355 644 8
Median $ trading volume ($ 000) 0.04 0.1 2.8 3.0 12.5 0.1
Median number of shares to shares outstanding (%) 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.9% 1.7% 0.0%
Median $ trading volume to average daily $ trading volume (%) 3.1% 30.9% 144.7% 298.8% 557.9% 6.5%
Median duration (trading days) 1 2 7 12 30 1
Panel B: Total TAQ sample
Sales
Number of trading strategies 2,201 184 52 2,437
Number of trading days 5,707 1,371 740 7,818
73% 18% 9%
Total $ trading volume ($ million) 12,395 1,754 978 15,128
82% 12% 6%
Median number of shares (000) 57 132 218 63
Median $ trading volume ($ 000) 2.0 3.8 5.7 2.2
Median number of shares to shares outstanding (%) 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1%
Median $ trading volume to average daily $ trading volume (%) 14.3% 58.5% 56.7% 15.6%
Median duration (trading days) 2 7 14 2
Purchases
Number of trading strategies 368 48 10 426
Number of trading days 954 351 152 1,457
65% 24% 10%
Total $ trading volume ($ million) 829 685 212 1,726
48% 40% 12%
Median number of shares (000) 45 223 932 52
Median $ trading volume ($ 000) 0.4 4.7 14.1 0.6
Median number of shares to shares outstanding (%) 0.1% 0.5% 1.8% 0.1%
Median $ trading volume to average daily $ trading volume (%) 20.8% 128.1% 330.1% 28.4%
Median duration (trading days) 2 7 15 2
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Table II.2: Summary statistics calibration parameters
This table displays the number of observations, minimum, mean, median, maximum, standard deviation
(sd), and the 25th and 75th percentiles (p25 and p75) of the nine parameters necessary to calibrate the trade
execution model grouped by the direction of the trade (sales and purchases). Price impact is abbreviated as
PI.
Variable Symbol N min p25 mean median p75 max sd
Panel A: Total TAQ Sample
Sales
Number of shares (000) X 2,437 0 23 196 63 162 65,600 1,520
Trading horizon (days) T 2,437 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.0 3.0 20.0 2.3
Fixed permanent PI ($/share) γ1*10−2 2,437 0.18 1.92 4.54 3.08 5.14 165.84 7.92
Variable permanent PI ($/share) γ2*10−5 2,437 0.00 0.08 0.80 0.22 0.55 138.24 4.78
Fixed temporary PI ($/share) τ1*10−2 2,437 0.36 1.55 3.49 2.38 3.80 114.47 6.23
Variable temporary PI ($/share) τ2*10−5 2,437 0.00 0.06 0.53 0.15 0.39 153.36 3.78
Asset volatility ($/share)/day σ2 2,437 0.000 0.006 0.021 0.011 0.022 0.839 0.046
Stock price at t=0 ($/share) p0 2,437 0.99 20.88 40.19 34.53 48.57 791.25 51.15
Wealth ($ million) wealth 2,437 0 4 237 11 35 11,300 1,150
Purchases
Number of shares (000) X 426 0 19 221 52 174 9,260 630
Trading horizon (days) T 426 2.0 2.0 3.4 2.0 4.0 20.0 2.6
Fixed permanent PI ($/share) γ1*10−2 426 0.17 1.41 3.21 2.19 3.72 74.08 4.38
Variable permanent PI ($/share) γ2*10−5 426 0.00 0.06 0.53 0.16 0.47 14.74 1.21
Fixed temporary PI ($/share) τ1*10−2 426 0.35 1.18 2.60 1.74 2.80 65.23 3.77
Variable temporary PI ($/share) τ2*10−5 426 0.00 0.03 0.38 0.10 0.29 19.60 1.27
Asset volatility ($/share)/day σ2 426 0.000 0.004 0.024 0.010 0.026 0.966 0.061
Stock price at t=0 ($/share) p0 426 0.44 6.26 18.23 13.75 24.15 436.70 25.60
Wealth ($ million) wealth 426 0 3 215 22 205 3,840 479
Panel B: Final sample
Sales
Number of shares (000) X 718 0 22 245 60 130 65,600 2,497
Trading horizon (days) T 718 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 5.0 0.4
Fixed permanent PI ($/share) γ1*10−2 718 0.18 1.92 4.03 2.93 4.95 100.73 4.85
Variable permanent PI ($/share) γ2*10−5 718 0.00 0.07 0.49 0.19 0.49 16.38 1.16
Fixed temporary PI ($/share) τ1*10−2 718 0.45 1.50 2.98 2.23 3.68 75.32 3.57
Variable temporary PI ($/share) τ2*10−5 718 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.13 0.31 12.53 0.73
Asset volatility ($/share)/day σ2 718 0.000 0.005 0.019 0.011 0.021 0.322 0.025
Stock price at t=0 ($/share) p0 718 0.99 20.55 37.27 34.28 49.71 686.00 31.85
Wealth ($ million) wealth 718 0 4 235 11 34 11,200 1,180
Purchases
Number of shares (000) X 140 0 20 120 41 109 1,906 238
Trading horizon (days) T 140 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 4.0 0.4
Fixed permanent PI ($/share) γ1*10−2 140 0.28 1.36 3.49 2.00 3.86 74.08 6.55
Variable permanent PI ($/share) γ2*10−5 140 0.00 0.04 0.58 0.15 0.50 14.74 1.53
Fixed temporary PI ($/share) τ1*10−2 140 0.35 1.13 2.96 1.82 3.01 65.23 5.69
Variable temporary PI ($/share) τ2*10−5 140 0.00 0.02 0.46 0.10 0.30 19.60 1.76
Asset volatility ($/share)/day σ2 140 0.001 0.005 0.025 0.011 0.024 0.598 0.057
Stock price at t=0 ($/share) p0 140 0.44 5.67 18.24 11.82 21.07 436.70 37.96
Wealth ($ million) wealth 140 0 2 174 13 117 3,690 500
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Table II.3: Trade pattern shape
This table displays the frequency distribution of trading strategies by the length of the trading strategy and
the shape of the trade pattern grouped by the direction of the trade (sales and purchases). Panel A (B)
reports the ﬁgures for the total NYSE & AMEX (Final) sample limited to trading strategies with a length
of 2-20 trading days. The length of the trading strategies is measured in trading days. The deﬁnition of the
trade patterns is the following: "Straight" stands for straight-line policy where an equal number of shares
is traded each day. "Increase" ("Decrease") indicates trading strategies where the volume traded per day
increases (decreases) continuously over the individual days of the trading horizon. "Other" comprises all
other non-monotonic trade patterns.
Length of trading Trade pattern
strategy (days) Decrease Increase Straight Other Total
Panel A: Total NYSE & AMEX sample
Sales
2-5 1.107 920 356 988 3.371
6-10 19 263 282
11-20 10 83 93
Total 1.107 920 385 1.334 3.746
30% 25% 10% 36%
Purchases
2-5 318 248 106 232 904
6-10 1 71 72
11-20 2 20 22
Total 318 248 109 323 998
32% 25% 11% 32%
Panel B: Total TAQ sample
Sales
2-5 718 594 263 626 2201
6-10 16 168 184
11-20 3 49 52
Total 718 594 282 843 2.437
29% 24% 12% 35%
Purchases
2-5 140 89 44 95 368
6-10 1 47 48
11-20 10 10
Total 140 89 45 152 426
33% 21% 11% 36%
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Table II.4: Trade pattern optimality
This table shows the minimum, mean, median, maximum, standard deviation (sd), skewness (skew), the
number of zeros (zero), and the 5th and 95th percentiles (p5 and p95) for two metrics designed to measure
to what extent the theoretical model predicts the trade patterns actually observed. Panel A (B) reports the
ﬁgures for FDEV (NDEV ). FDEV represents the return per share forfeited due to a non-optimal trade
pattern. It is the diﬀerence in the certainty equivalent between the optimal and the actual trading strategy
(expressed as percentage of the value for the actual strategy). NDEV is the average share volume deviation
between the optimal and actual trading strategy. It is the sum of the absolute percentage deviations over
all trading days scaled by two. The sample in this table includes 766 observations (out of 858). For these
observations the model provides an admissible solution for the exogenously given trade horizon.
Length of trading
strategy (days) N min p5 mean median p95 max skew zeros
Panel A: FDEV (%)
Sales
2 559 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.02 0.78 277.97 22.6 192
3 77 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.03 0.75 10.93 8.1 19
4 6 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.46 0.46 0.7 2
5 1 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.0 0
Total 643 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.75 277.97 24.2 213
Purchases
2 101 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.74 2.36 3.3 27
3 22 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.06 1.43 4.23 3.5 2
4
5
Total 123 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.79 4.23 5.0 29
Panel B: NDEV (%)
Sales
2 559 0.1 1.1 17.4 14.8 42.0 48.1 0.6 0
3 77 2.4 3.0 18.3 14.6 46.9 60.7 1.1 0
4 6 3.6 3.6 20.9 19.8 36.7 36.7 0.1 0
5 1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 0.0 0
Total 643 0.1 1.2 17.6 14.9 41.9 60.7 0.6 0
Purchases
2 101 0.0 0.7 17.1 14.6 40.6 47.2 0.6 0
3 22 2.5 4.0 15.0 11.5 31.7 33.2 0.5 0
4
5
Total 123 0.0 1.0 16.8 13.6 40.2 47.2 0.6 0
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Table II.5: Trade horizon optimality
This table displays the minimum, mean, median, maximum, standard deviation (sd), skewness (skew), the
number of zeros (zeros), and the 5th and 95th percentiles (p5 and p95) for two metrics designed to measure
to what extent the theoretical model predicts the length of the trading horizon actually observed. Panel
A (B) reports the ﬁgures for FDEV (TDEV ). FDEV represents the return per share forfeited due to a
non-optimal trade pattern. It is the diﬀerence in the certainty equivalent between the optimal and the actual
trading strategy (expressed as percentage of the value for the actual strategy). TDEV is the diﬀerence in
the length of the trading period between the optimal and the actual trading strategy (measured in trading
days). TDEV>0 (TDEV<0) indicates that the optimal trading interval should be longer (shorter) than
actually chosen by the insider. The sample in this table includes all 858 observations with a decreasing trade
pattern (see Table II.3).
Length of trading
strategy (days) N min p5 mean median p95 max skew zeros
Panel A: FDEV (%)
Sales
2 621 0.00 0.00 1.95 0.06 2.32 704.27 23.4 83
3 87 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.09 1.08 12.87 8.0 11
4 8 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.06 0.61 0.61 1.3 1
5 2 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.19 0.37 0.37 0.0 0
Total 718 0.00 0.00 1.74 0.06 2.09 704.27 25.2 95
Purchases
2 115 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.08 2.12 6.26 3.5 16
3 24 0.01 0.01 0.94 0.20 4.30 9.34 3.4 0
4 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0
5
Total 140 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.08 2.30 9.34 4.5 16
Panel B: TDEV (trading days)
Sales
2 621 -1.0 -1.0 3.1 2.0 12.0 18.0 1.7 82
3 87 -2.0 -2.0 3.2 3.0 10.0 17.0 1.0 13
4 8 -3.0 -3.0 1.9 2.0 6.0 6.0 -0.2 1
5 2 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1
Total 718 -3.0 -1.0 3.1 2.0 12.0 18.0 1.6 97
Purchases
2 115 -1.0 -1.0 2.4 1.0 8.0 18.0 1.8 25
3 24 -1.0 -1.0 4.3 3.0 17.0 17.0 1.4 3
4 1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0
5
Total 140 -1.0 -1.0 2.7 1.5 10.0 18.0 1.9 28
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Table II.6: Total optimization beneﬁt from trade splitting
This table displays the minimum, mean, median, maximum, and the 5th and 95th percentiles (p5 and p95)
for the improvement in the certainty equivalent due to switching from immediate execution in a single trade
to optimal execution. The improvement is expressed as percentage of the certainty equivalent for immediate
execution. In order to avoid distortions in the calculation of the sample mean, the percentage improvement
is set to the maximum value of 100% whenever the actual value is larger. Overall, three sales transactions
are subject to this cut-oﬀ rule. The results are grouped by the direction of the trade (sales and purchases)
and by size portfolios. The portfolios are formed as size terciles of over all sales and purchases for which the
optimal trade horizon is 2 days or longer. The size of the transactions is measured in terms of the $ trading
volume relative to the average daily $ trading volume over the 20 trading days prior to the transaction. The
sample in this table includes 771 observations (out of 858). I exclude all observations from this analysis for
which the model predicts immediate execution to be optimal, i.e., there is no beneﬁt from trade splitting.
$ trading volume % improvement
to average daily Improvement in certainty equivalent to % trading
$ trading volume (%) optimal vs. immediate execution (%) volume
Size group N mean median min p5 mean median p95 max (medians)
Sales
small 226 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.48 1.40 1.72
medium 223 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.74 0.34 2.36 12.39 2.21
large 196 1.31 0.49 0.00 0.04 4.13 0.92 12.37 100.00 1.87
Total 645 0.47 0.15 0.00 0.01 1.56 0.25 4.49 100.00 1.70
Purchases
small 31 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.85 1.02 3.25
medium 34 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.64 0.32 2.58 3.86 2.07
large 61 0.85 0.56 0.02 0.04 2.52 1.54 8.09 18.28 2.77
Total 126 0.47 0.26 0.00 0.01 1.45 0.42 5.50 18.28 1.61
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Table II.7: Realized optimization beneﬁt from trade splitting
This table displays which proportion of the total improvement potential due to trade splitting is realized
and forfeited, respectively, by insiders with their actual trade execution strategies. The total improvement
potential is the improvement in the certainty equivalent due to switching from immediate execution in a
single trade to optimal execution. The realized improvement potential is the improvement for switching from
immediate to actual execution (expressed as percentage of total improvement potential), while the forfeited
improvement potential is the improvement for switching from actual to optimal execution (expressed as
percentage of total improvement potential) not captured with the actual execution strategy. The results are
grouped by the direction of the trade (sales and purchases) and by size portfolios. The portfolios are formed
as size terciles of over all sales and purchases for which the optimal trade horizon is 2 days or longer. The
size of the transactions is measured in terms of the $ trading volume relative to the average daily $ trading
volume over the 20 trading days prior to the transaction. The sample in this table includes 771 observations
(out of 858). I exclude all observations from this analysis for which the model predicts immediate execution
to be optimal, i.e., there is no beneﬁt from trade splitting.
$ trading volume Median improvement in certainty equivalent
to average daily optimal vs. immediate execution (%)
$ trading volume (%) Realized with Forfeited with
Size group N mean median actual execution actual execution
Sales
small 226 0.05 0.05 75.5 24.6
medium 223 0.16 0.15 67.3 32.7
large 196 1.31 0.49 61.1 38.9
Total 645 0.47 0.15 67.3 32.7
Purchases
small 31 0.04 0.03 84.0 16.0
medium 34 0.17 0.15 75.8 24.2
large 61 0.85 0.56 63.8 36.2
Total 126 0.47 0.26 71.9 28.2
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Table II.8: Robustness checks risk aversion
This table summarizes the key indicators from Table II.4-II.7 (Panel A-D) for my base line calculations
(column 1) and three robustness checks concerning the risk aversion parameter (column 2, 3, and 4). The
risk aversion is estimated by scaling the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coeﬃcient of 2.5 by the level
of accumulated wealth. For the robustness checks, I vary the level of accumulated wealth in the following
way: In column (2), I censor the wealth variable to the 25th and 75th percentile ($4 million and $37 million).
In column (2), I use the median wealth level of $11.2 million. In column (3), I use a constant wealth level
of $0.5 million. For a deﬁnition of FDEV , NDEV , and TDEV see the relevant Tables II.4 and II.5. Bold
(italic) ﬁgures in column (2), (3), and (4) indicate numbers that are higher (lower) than numbers in column
(1).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wealth estimated Wealth censored at Wealth set to Wealth set to
from equity 25th and 75th sample constant value
holdings percentile median of $500,000
Sales Repurchases Sales Repurchases Sales Repurchases Sales Repurchases
Panel A: Trade pattern optimality (Table 4)
N 643 123 643 123 643 123 643 123
FDEV
mean 0.71 0.22 0.71 0.23 0.71 0.23 0.76 0.21
median 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
skew 24.2 5.0 24.2 5.0 24.2 5.0 24.6 4.7
zeros (#) 213 29 213 30 212 29 213 30
zeros (%) 33% 24% 33% 24% 33% 24% 33% 24%
NDEV
mean 17.6 16.8 17.6 16.8 17.6 16.8 17.2 16.3
median 14.9 13.6 14.9 13.1 14.9 13.3 14.4 13.7
skew 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.59
zeros (#) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
zeros (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Panel B: Trade horizon optimality (Table 5)
N 718 140 718 140 718 140 718 140
FDEV
mean 1.74 0.55 1.74 0.55 1.73 0.55 1.73 0.50
median 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08
skew 25.2 4.5 25.2 4.5 25.2 4.4 25.8 3.9
zeros (#) 97 16 96 17 95 16 98 18
zeros (%) 14% 11% 13% 12% 13% 11% 14% 13%
TDEV
mean 3.12 2.72 3.12 2.74 3.12 2.72 2.93 2.46
median 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
skew 1.63 1.87 1.63 1.89 1.63 1.86 1.60 1.84
zeros (#) 97 28 99 26 98 27 100 29
zeros (%) 14% 20% 14% 19% 14% 19% 14% 21%
Panel C: Overall beneﬁt from trade splitting (Table 6)
N 645 126 645 126 645 126 645 126
mean 1.56 1.45 1.56 1.45 1.56 1.45 1.51 1.38
median 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.42
p95 4.49 5.50 4.49 5.50 4.48 5.49 4.39 5.36
Panel D: Realized optimization potential from trade splitting (Table 7)
N 645 126 645 126 645 126 645 126
Realized 67.3 71.9 67.2 72.2 67.2 72.2 68.3 71.9
Forfeited 32.7 28.2 32.8 27.9 32.8 27.9 31.7 28.2
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Table II.9: Robustness checks price impact
This table summarizes the key indicators from Table II.4 to II.7 for my main calculations (column 1) and
three robustness checks concerning the price impact parameters (column 2 and 3) and the type of the price
impact function (column 4). The robustness checks cover the following cases: In column (2), I use the median
price impact parameters instead of the stock- and time-speciﬁc parameters. Therefore, I scale the median
percentage price impact parameters with the individual stock prices. In column (3), I use price impact
parameters estimated during the most liquid trading hours of the day (11:00am to 3:00pm). In column (4),
I use a linear price impact function without intercept for the permanent price eﬀect. Bold (italic) ﬁgures in
column (2), (3), and (4) indicate numbers that are higher (lower) than numbers in column (1). Price impact
is abbreviated as PI.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γ1 yes no
PI Values Stock-speciﬁc Sample median Stock-speciﬁc Stock-speciﬁc
Trading hours 9:30am-4:00pm 9:30am-4:00pm 11:00am-3:00pm 9:30am-4:00pm
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
Panel A: Trade pattern optimality (Table 4)
N 643 123 642 125 571 102 718 140
FDEV
mean 0.71 0.22 0.47 0.12 0.61 0.24 1.72 0.59
median 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.09 0.16
skew 24.2 5.0 24.0 5.7 17.7 3.7 19.2 2.9
zeros (#) 213 29 207 46 190 24 107 17
zeros (%) 33% 24% 32% 37% 33% 24% 15% 12%
NDEV
mean 17.6 16.8 17.4 15.8 18.1 17.8 22.4 21.6
median 14.9 13.6 14.5 14.0 15.6 17.7 21.4 21.5
skew 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.82 0.60 0.45 0.32 0.25
zeros (#) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
zeros (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Panel B: Trade horizon optimality (Table 5)
N 718 140 718 140 616 111 718 140
FDEV
mean 1.74 0.55 1.34 0.29 1.27 0.64 5.56 2.63
median 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.7 1.3
skew 25.2 4.5 25.5 5.6 13.2 3.2 19.6 1.8
zeros (#) 97 16 112 23 80 11 0 4
zeros (%) 14% 11% 16% 16% 13% 10% 0% 3%
TDEV
mean 3.12 2.72 2.80 2.26 3.62 3.57 17.54 16.83
median 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 18.0 18.0
skew 1.63 1.87 1.86 1.89 1.39 1.37 -6.39 -3.38
zeros (#) 97 28 110 28 73 18 0 0
zeros (%) 14% 20% 15% 20% 12% 16% 0% 0%
Panel C: Overall beneﬁt from trade splitting (Table 6)
N 645 126 653 125 571 102 717 140
mean 1.56 1.45 1.35 0.69 4.64 1.55 4.57 4.67
median 0.25 0.42 0.28 0.14 1.11 0.56 1.25 2.31
p95 4.49 5.50 3.20 3.23 11.48 5.59 19.91 18.54
Panel D: Realized optimization potential from trade splitting (Table 7)
N 645 126 653 125 571 102 717 140
Realized 67.3 71.9 65.1 75.6 64.5 66.2 46.8 47.0
Forfeited 32.7 28.2 34.9 24.4 35.5 33.9 53.2 53.1
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Table II.10: Summary statistics calibration parameters for robustness checks
This table displays the number of observations, mean, and median of the nine parameters necessary to
calibrate the trade execution model grouped by the direction of the trade (sales and purchases). Column
(1) displays the numbers for my main calculation as previously reported in Panel B in Table II.2. Column
(2), (3), and (4) displays the parameters for the three scenarios used to check the robustness of my main
calculations with respect to the price impact parameters. The corresponding optimization results are reported
in column (2), (3), and (4) in Table II.9. Bold (italic) ﬁgures in column (2), (3), and (4) indicate numbers
that are higher (lower) than numbers in column (1). Price impact is abbreviated as PI. For the symbol of
the parameters see Table II.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γ1 yes no
PI Values Stock-speciﬁc Sample median Stock-speciﬁc Stock-speciﬁc
Trading hours 9:30am-4:00pm 9:30am-4:00pm 11:00am-3:00pm 9:30am-4:00pm
Variable mean median mean median mean median mean median
Sales
N 718 718 718 718 616 616 718 718
Number of shares (000) 245 60 245 60 263 63 245 60
Trading horizon (days) 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.0
Fixed perm. PI ($/share) 4.03 2.93 4.04 3.71 3.57 2.49 - -
Variable perm. PI ($/share) 0.49 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.49 0.18 2.76 1.17
Fixed temp. PI ($/share) 2.98 2.23 3.00 2.75 2.55 1.89 2.98 2.23
Variable temp. PI ($/share) 0.33 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.13
Asset volatility ($/share)/day 0.019 0.011 0.019 0.011 0.019 0.012 0.019 0.011
Stock price at t=0 ($/share) 37.27 34.28 37.27 34.28 38.56 35.31 37.27 34.28
Wealth ($ million) 235 11 235 11 271 12 235 11
Purchases
N 140 140 140 140 111 111 140 140
Number of shares (000) 120 41 120 401 135 43 120,426 41
Trading horizon (days) 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0
Fixed perm. PI ($/share) 3.49 2.00 1.97 1.28 3.24 1.83 - -
Variable perm. PI ($/share) 0.58 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.68 0.20 4.22 0.94
Fixed temp. PI ($/share) 2.96 1.82 1.47 0.95 2.73 1.48 2.96 1.82
Variable temp. PI ($/share) 0.46 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.49 0.08 0.46 0.10
Asset volatility ($/share)/day 0.025 0.011 0.025 0.011 0.028 0.013 0.025 0.011
Stock price at t=0 ($/share) 18.24 11.82 18.24 11.82 20.20 13.03 18.24 11.82
Wealth ($ million) 174 13 174 13 208 13 174 13
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Chapter III
Repurchasing Shares in the Open Stock
Market:
Beneﬁcial or Harmful to Stock Market
Liquidity?
1 Introduction
The annual volume of stock repurchase programs increased tremendously since the intro-
duction of SEC Rule 10b-18 providing safe harbor guidelines1 in 1982. These days, share
repurchases have surpassed cash dividends as the dominant payout channel.2 The most
popular repurchase method are open market repurchases (OMRs) where ﬁrms anonymously
reacquire their shares at stock exchanges.3 Compared to other traders, the repurchasing
ﬁrms usually trade very large volumes and the managers who execute the repurchase pro-
grams possess non-public information about the ﬁrm. The combination of these two facts
raises the question whether and how open market share repurchases aﬀect a stock's market
1SEC Rule 10b-18 sets forth conditions concerning the manner, timing, volume, and price of share repur-
chases with which issuers must comply in order to obtain a safe harbor from liability for market manipulation.
2See, e.g., Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2008).
3Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) report that less than 10% of the total market volume of all share repurchase
programs is attributable to self-tender oﬀers or privately negotiated transactions. Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle
(2008) also report that about 90% of all repurchases are executed via the open market. The data set used
in this study supports this evidence.
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liquidity, which is inversely related to a ﬁrms' cost of capital. By answering this question, the
paper contributes to the long debate about the liquidity impact of open market repurchases.
It is the ﬁrst study that is based on actual repurchase data and covers a sizable cross-section.
The ﬁndings show that open market share repurchases are not associated with previously
unrecognized liquidity costs that stem from adverse selection related to an increase in the
fraction of informed market participants.
I use a novel data set to test two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses proposed by Bar-
clay and Smith (1988). The competing market maker hypothesis predicts that stock market
liquidity will improve if ﬁrms submit price stabilizing buy limit orders and thereby compete
with the specialist making the market. In contrast, the information asymmetry hypothesis
predicts that liquidity will deteriorate if managers are better informed as well as willing and
able to trade on inside information during repurchases. Beside making diﬀerent predictions
about the ﬁnal liquidity impact of share repurchases, the competing hypotheses also diﬀer
with respect to the main transmission channels of the liquidity eﬀect. There are two pri-
mary mechanisms through which open market repurchases can aﬀect ﬁrms' market liquidity:
altering the ﬁrms trading characteristics or changing its information environment. The ﬁrst
channel captures (real) order processing and inventory holding costs, while the second chan-
nel captures adverse selection costs. Stoll (2000) refers to the ﬁrst channel as real friction and
to the second channel as informational friction. The information asymmetry hypothesis pre-
dicts an increase in the probability of informed trading that deteriorates liquidity, and thus,
refers to the informational friction component of liquidity. In contrast, the competing mar-
ket maker hypothesis predicts an increase in trading volume and a reduction in stock price
volatility, and thus, refers to the real friction component of liquidity. However, disentangling
real and informational friction eﬀects is diﬃcult, in particular due to measurement problems
of the non-real (informational) frictions. Thus, choosing a method to disentangle real and
informational components and testing the competing hypotheses are inseparable problems.
For this reason, I focus on real friction eﬀects which are easier to measure and follow the
suggestion of Stoll (2000) to approximate informational eﬀects by the diﬀerence between
total and real eﬀects. I validate the results obtained with this procedure by examining the
change in informational proxies.
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The empirical analysis is based on newly available data on quarterly share repurchases
of ﬁrms. Until 2004, US ﬁrms did not have to disclose information on their actual share
repurchases. Since then, all repurchasing ﬁrms are obliged by the SEC to report on a
monthly basis the total number of shares repurchased, the average price paid per share,
the number of shares that were purchased as part of a publicly announced repurchase plan,
and the maximum number (or dollar value) of shares remaining under public plans. This
regulation applies to all quarterly and annual ﬁlings for periods ending on or after March
15, 2004. This change in corporate disclosure allows me to analyze actual share repurchase
data for the ﬁrst time. Previous US evidence is limited to share repurchase announcements
or estimates of repurchase volumes.4 I obtain actual repurchase ﬁgures from COMPUSTAT
where monthly repurchase volumes are summarized on a quarterly basis.5
I divide the empirical analysis in four main sections. In the ﬁrst section, I examine the
impact of OMRs on ﬁrm's real friction costs - inventory holding and order processing costs
- proxied by trading activity and risk variables (turnover, number of trades, volatility). I
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in share turnover and number of trades during OMRs relative to
periods without OMRs. In the second section, I investigate the relation between OMRs and
ﬁrm's total liquidity, including bid-ask spreads and depth as measures of total liquidity. I
ﬁnd a beneﬁcial liquidity eﬀect, which reveals in lower bid-ask spreads and larger (bid-side)
depths. Any beneﬁcial or harmful liquidity eﬀect, however, disappears after controlling for
the observed positive real friction eﬀects. This means I ﬁnd no evidence for an impact
of OMRs on informational frictions. In the third section, I validate the indirectly obtained
results on informational frictions by using three alternative proxies for adverse selection costs.
These analyses conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings as I do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between
OMRs and the probability of informed trading and adverse selection costs, respectively. In
the last section, I investigate the persistence of the observed liquidity eﬀects. Consistent
with expectations, I ﬁnd that the beneﬁcial liquidity eﬀects are transitory and limited to
actual repurchase periods.
4Barclay and Smith (1988), Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamurti (1994), Wiggins (1994), Franz, Rao, and
Tripathy (1995), Miller and McConnell (1995) examine repurchase announcements, while Kim (2005) esti-
mates repurchase volumes from ﬁrms' cash ﬂow statements.
5For a study that uses hand-collected monthly data from S&P 500 ﬁrms' 10-K and 10-Q ﬁlings see Ben-
Rephael, Oded, and Wohl (2011). They examine the timing ability of managers and returns in the course of
open market repurchases.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I provide an overview
on the related empirical literature and explain the US regulation concerning the execution
and disclosure of open market repurchases. In Section 3, I lay out the main hypotheses.
In Section 4, I describe the construction of the data set and the deﬁnition of the variables.
In Section 5, I present and interpret the empirical ﬁndings, before I conclude in Section 6
with a brief summary and discussion of future areas of research. The Appendix contains a
deﬁnition of all variables used in the empirical analysis (Appendix A) and a description of
the data matching and cleaning procedures for the TAQ database (Appendix B).
2 Background and related literature
Previous studies that empirically test the liquidity eﬀect of share repurchases are rare and
their results inconclusive. The topic is very much uninvestigated due to the fact that only a
few countries very recently obliged ﬁrms to disclose details of their repurchase activities.
2.1 International evidence and diﬀerences to the US
Most suitable for empirical analysis are countries with a strict disclosure regulation where
ﬁrms are obliged to disclose and report their repurchase activity on a daily basis and without
delay. Brockman and Chung (2001) are the ﬁrst who use a data set of daily repurchase data
to examine the liquidity impact of share repurchases for ﬁrms listed at the Hong Kong
stock exchange. They ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on market liquidity for repurchase days, which
is consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis. Ginglinger and Hamon (2007)
ﬁnd similar results for French ﬁrms buying back shares at the Paris stock exchange, while
for Italy De Cesari, Espenlaub, and Khurshed (2008), for Sweden De Ridder and Rasbrant
(2009), and for Canada McNally and Smith (2011) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant improvement in market
liquidity in the course of open market share repurchases.
The empirical results from non-US countries are not applicable to the US due to sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences in the regulatory environment concerning share repurchases. The US is
the country with the longest history of share repurchases, but the laxest share repurchase
regulation. Repurchase programs usually require an authorization by the board of directors.
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With such an authorization, companies may repurchase their own shares for various pur-
poses without limits on the equity proportion or buyback period. In contrast, in most other
countries share repurchases are much more regulated. For instance, in countries from the
European Union or in Hong Kong, share repurchase programs have to be approved by the an-
nual shareholder meeting. These repurchase authorizations are usually only valid for about
12-24 months and limited to a maximum of 10% of the outstanding capital. Furthermore,
often rules are in place that set an upper bound on the repurchase quantity within a calen-
dar month (e.g., 25% of previous month's trading volume). Finally, additional restrictions
frequently prohibit trading in periods before regular events of information disclosure and/or
limit trading to non-aﬃliated outsiders or non-blockholders. These regulatory diﬀerences
between countries might aﬀect the liquidity changes associated with repurchase programs
via the actual repurchase volume and via the repurchase behavior of managers.
Diﬀerences in share repurchase regulation between the US and other countries are ac-
companied by diﬀerences in disclosure requirements. Since 2004, US ﬁrms are required to
disclose their actual share repurchase activity in their quarterly reports. In other countries,
the disclosure requirements concerning actual share repurchases are much stricter. In Hong
Kong and Sweden, for instance, ﬁrms have to disclose the price and volume of their share
repurchase transactions by the morning of the following business day. In Canada, companies
must report their repurchases with date, price, and quantities of shares acquired within 10
days after the trade, while companies in France are required to publicly report the number
of shares repurchased during the previous month at the beginning of the following month.
Finally, in Italy repurchase activity is disclosed on an annual basis. However, the timeliness
and aggregation level of the disclosure information potentially aﬀects market liquidity via
the information level of investors and the market maker, but also via the repurchase behavior
of managers. If there is no timely disclosure regime, other traders may not learn about a
ﬁrms' repurchases until several months later or traders have to infer from order ﬂows that
ﬁrms are conducting repurchases. At the same time, such a noninstant monitoring regime
makes it easier for managers to proﬁt from trading on their private information.
Taken together, these regulatory diﬀerences regarding the execution and disclosure of
open market repurchases speak in favor of a US-speciﬁc analysis, which I conduct here.
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2.2 US evidence
As disclosure on actual share repurchase activity was not mandatory before 2004, previous US
studies were limited to announcements of share repurchase programs to study the liquidity
eﬀects of share repurchases.6 Barclay and Smith (1988), the ﬁrst who address the liquid-
ity issue, ﬁnd that spreads widen after repurchase announcements, i.e., liquidity decreases.
Several papers reﬁne and extend Barclay and Smith's (1988) study, but derive conﬂicting
results. Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamurti (1994) and Miller and McConnell (1995) conclude
that repurchase announcements do not aﬀect liquidity, while Wiggins (1994) and Franz, Rao,
and Tripathy (1995) ﬁnd an increase in liquidity after repurchase announcements.
Announcements of repurchase programs are a disclosure requirement of all major US
stock exchanges (e.g., NYSE and NASDAQ) and typically specify a maximum repurchase
volume (either stated in terms of US dollars or number of shares), all authorized forms
of repurchases (e.g., open market, and/or privately negotiated, and/or tender oﬀer), and
a date of expiry. However, ﬁrms are not bound to these repurchase announcements. The
actual implementation of the repurchase programs is left to their discretion. This leads to
the fact that some ﬁrms make overlapping and/or continuously ongoing share repurchase
announcements. As a result, announcements are just an indication that ﬁrms may be buyers
in the open market, but are not necessarily tied to actual share repurchase activity. Indeed,
actual repurchase rates and repurchase durations vary considerably.7 Thus, the question
whether share repurchases aﬀect liquidity can only be convincingly addressed if actual share
repurchase data is available. The change in SEC disclose rules by the end of 2003 makes
6The exceptions being Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004), Kim (2005), Ahn, Cao, and Choe (2001), as
well as Nayar, Singh, and Zebedee (2008). Ahn, Cao, and Choe (2001) and Nayar, Singh, and Zebedee (2008)
circumvent the data-availability problem by studying self-tender oﬀers. For this type of share repurchases,
the timing, quantity and price of the shares repurchased are known. They ﬁnd a positive, but transitory
liquidity eﬀect, which is limited to the relatively short tender oﬀer period, but the long-term liquidity is
not enhanced by this form of repurchases. Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004) and Kim (2005) analyze
open market share repurchases. Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004) are the ﬁrst who use actual repurchase
data gathered via a survey among 500 ﬁrms. Their ﬁnal sample comprises 64 ﬁrms listed on the NYSE
and NASDAQ. They ﬁnd no support for the idea that repurchase trading is motivated by the opportunity
to proﬁt from proprietary information. However, this result is not surprising against the background of a
potential self-selection bias in their surveyed data. Kim (2005) uses rough estimates of ﬁrms' actual share
repurchases calculated from ﬁrms' cash ﬂow statement. He ﬁnds no evidence for a liquidity change in the
course of open market share repurchase programs. However, these estimates of actual repurchase activity
are not without problems (Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle, 2008).
7See Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), and Bonaimé (2010).
However, in all these papers the actual share repurchase volume is only estimated from cash ﬂows and/or
other ﬁgures.
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it now possible to address this liquidity question in an US environment considering the
country-speciﬁc execution and disclosure regulation for share repurchase programs.
3 Hypotheses
The main hypotheses on the liquidity eﬀect of corporate share repurchases go back to Barclay
and Smith (1988). They propose two diﬀerent, but non-mutually exclusive hypotheses: the
competing market maker hypothesis and the information asymmetry hypothesis.
The competing market maker hypothesis assumes that ﬁrms repurchase shares without
regard to private information and thereby compete with the market maker of the security. By
placing limit orders, the repurchasing ﬁrm establishes a lower bound on the stock price (bid
price). This has the eﬀect of systematically reducing stock price volatility by temporarily
fading out a part of the lower tail of the return distribution. Because bid-ask spreads are
a positive function of return volatility, a systematic reduction in volatility could have the
eﬀect of reducing bid-ask spreads at the time of the share repurchase. At the same time, the
price support might attract other traders, and thus, result in an increased trading activity.
Trading activity is negatively associated with spreads, and thus, an increase in trading
levels should imply lower spreads. By placing limit orders (and supporting the price), the
repurchase activity also improves the depth at the bid-side (and the ask-side). Overall, under
this hypothesis the share repurchase should improve the stock's liquidity.
The information asymmetry hypothesis assumes that managers have inside information
and are willing (and able) to trade on this information. The main prediction under this
hypothesis is that the market maker increases spreads as reaction to OMRs due to the in-
creased probability of trading with informed managers. At the same time, trading activity
is a negative function of the number of potentially informed traders in the market, and thus,
an increase in the probability of informed trading might imply a lower level of trading activ-
ity. Overall, under this hypothesis the share repurchase should reduce the stock's liquidity.
However, SEC Rule 10b-18 covering share repurchases aims to protect non-informed market
participants by restricting the ﬁrm's opportunity to beneﬁt from private information in their
trading. In particular, ﬁrms can only post buy limit orders with a price that is equal or
higher than the current bid (or the last independent trade if higher than the current bid).
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The above arguments lead to the following hypotheses that relate open market repur-
chases to changes in equity liquidity:
Hypothesis 1 (Competing market maker): OMRs are associated with an increase
in equity liquidity (narrower spreads and larger depths).
Hypothesis 2 (Information asymmetry): OMRs are associated with a decrease in
equity liquidity (wider spreads and lower depths).
Based on the above hypotheses on the overall liquidity eﬀect, I derive and test the
following hypotheses concerning the speciﬁc determinants of the changes in equity liquidity:
Hypothesis 1a (Competing market maker): OMRs are associated with an increase
in trading activity.
Hypothesis 1b (Competing market maker): OMRs are associated with a decrease
in return volatility.
Hypothesis 2a (Information asymmetry): OMRs are associated with a decrease
in trading activity.
Hypothesis 2b (Information asymmetry): OMRs are associated with an increase
in adverse selection costs.
Barclay and Smith (1988)'s hypotheses diﬀer with regard to the mechanism through
which open market repurchases aﬀect stock market liquidity measured with transaction
costs. The information asymmetry hypothesis relies on informational arguments, while the
competing market maker hypothesis relies on real trading costs. Stoll (2000) refers to the
ﬁrst mechanism as an informational cost eﬀect and to the second mechanism as a real cost
eﬀect. Both eﬀects add up to total transaction costs. The higher the total transaction cost,
the lower the stock's market liquidity. Distinguishing the two cost components, however, is
diﬃcult due to measurement problems and their partial interdependence.
The real cost eﬀect captures costs related to order processing and inventory holding.
The order processing costs depend on the level of trading activity (e.g., turnover, number of
trades), while the inventory holding costs are related to the risk of adverse price changes of the
security (e.g., return volatility). Previous empirical studies in the ﬁeld of market microstruc-
ture provide evidence for the negative relation between trading activity and transaction costs
and the positive relation between the risk of price changes and transaction costs.8
8See Benston and Hagerman (1974), Stoll (1978), and Ho and Stoll (1981).
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The informational cost eﬀect is less tangible, and thus, is usually measured as the diﬀer-
ence between total and real transaction costs. This cost component compensates the traders
for potential losses from trading against better informed market participants (e.g., insiders).
Previous research shows that transaction costs rise in the presence of informed traders.9 The
impact of open market repurchases on the informational cost component depends on the
managers' possibility to use private information while trading against uninformed traders.
The regulation in SEC Rule 10b-18 as well as the obligation to publicly announce repurchase
authorizations aim at restricting such informed trading.
Because each of the two hypotheses corresponds to a change in one of the cost compo-
nents, the diﬀerentiation between real and informational cost eﬀects is crucial to testing the
hypotheses of Barclay and Smith (1988). I thereby follow the idea of Stoll (2000) to consider
informational friction eﬀects as a plug variable that is equivalent to the gap between real
friction eﬀects and total transaction costs. I check the robustness of the results obtained
with this approach by also directly measuring informational friction eﬀects with the help of
available proxy variables.10
4 Data sources, sample selection, and variable deﬁnitions
In this section I describe the sample selection procedure, data sources, and the construction
of the main variables. I also provide summary statistics on the data set.
4.1 Construction of the data set
The initial sample includes all ﬁrms from the NYSE Composite Index, which covers ap-
proximately 2,000 stocks.11 The index consists of all common stocks listed at the NYSE,
including listings of foreign corporations. From this initial sample, I exclude all non-US ﬁrms
having a primary listing in a foreign country (ADRs), all ﬁrms not incorporated in the US
(non-US ﬁrms), all ﬁrms with more than one class of publicly listed common stock (dual
9See Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
10For this procedure see also Brockman, Chung, and Yan (2009). They use this approach to examine the
liquidity eﬀects associated with block ownership.
11I include only ﬁrms listed at the NYSE. I exclude ﬁrms listed at NASDAQ because of structural diﬀer-
ences between these exchanges which are reﬂected in ﬁrm's liquidity characteristics. See the discussion in
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Huang and Stoll (1996b).
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common class ﬁrms), and all ﬁrms from the ﬁnancial sector (SIC codes 6000-6999). The
sample period covers 5 years and includes all ﬁscal quarters ending between March 2004 and
December 2008.
The data for this study comes from multiple sources: I obtain accounting and actual
repurchase data from COMPUSTAT, share repurchase announcement data from the Securi-
ties Data Corporation's (SDC) Merger & Acquisitions database, and intraday trading data
from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database. I use identiﬁer data from CRSP (historical
CUSIPs) for merging these databases. I supplement the data set with I/B/E/S data on
analyst coverage and daily CRSP data on the cumulative adjustment factors for the number
of shares and stock prices. I use these adjustment factors for data from CRSP, TAQ, and
SDC to make the number of shares and stock prices comparable over time by adjusting them
for stock splits and other capital measures. The ﬁnal universe of observations comprises all
ﬁrm-quarters in the intersection of these data sources with four or more (consecutive) quar-
ters of non-missing data.12 This universe represents approximately 65% of the total market
capitalization of the NYSE Composite Index and about 87% of the market capitalization of
the relevant subsample of ﬁrms (excluding ADRs, non-US ﬁrms, ﬁnancial ﬁrms, etc.).
The universe of observations is an unbalanced panel, which consists of 13,396 quarterly
observations for 829 ﬁrms, an average of about 16.2 quarters per ﬁrm. The minimum number
of quarters per ﬁrm is 4, while the maximum number of quarters per ﬁrm is 20, consistent
with a 5 year sample period. Of the 13,396 ﬁrm-quarters, 5,825 observations are repurchase
quarters (43%). Of the 829 ﬁrms in the ﬁnal sample, 191 ﬁrms never repurchase shares in the
open market during the sample period (non-repurchaser). For the 638 ﬁrms that repurchase
12To keep the maximum number of observations in the sample, (1) I impute missing data with the help
of several algorithms based on data cross relationships within databases and (2) I hand-collected missing
data on actual share repurchases. Firstly, I complete the quarterly COMPUSTAT data set with the help
of quarterly year-to-date and annual data, both from the COMPUSTAT database. In particular, I apply
the following algorithms to all relevant items from the Income and Cash Flow Statement: If quarterly data
is missing for one quarter within a ﬁscal year, I use annual COMPUSTAT data and replace the missing
values with the diﬀerence between the annual value and the sum of the three available quarters. If quarterly
year-to-date data for the last quarter of a ﬁscal year is missing, I use annual COMPUSTAT data to replace
the missing values. Finally, if quarterly year-to-date data exhibits a zero value for the last ﬁscal quarter
within a year, I plug in zero values for all subsequent quarters within the same ﬁscal year. Secondly, I hand-
collect missing data on actual share repurchases from ﬁrms' 10-Q and 10-K forms downloaded from the SEC
website (www.sec.gov) or NYSE website (www.nyse.com). The data retrieved from these 10-Q and 10-K
ﬁlings includes the number of shares repurchased and the average repurchase price. I limit this procedure
of manual data collection to all ﬁrms with only one quarter of missing data (219 ﬁrms and ﬁrm-quarters,
respectively) to keep the amount of data gathering manageable. Overall, I obtain the necessary data for 110
of the 219 ﬁrms (randomly selected) and thereby increase the sample by 2,218 ﬁrm-quarter observation.
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shares in the open market during at least one quarter of the sample period (repurchaser),
I have 10,767 quarterly observations. Out of the 638 ﬁrms that conduct repurchases in at
least one quarter, 72 ﬁrms repurchase shares over all quarters of the sample period (1,112
ﬁrm-quarter observations).
Due to the speciﬁc research question of this paper, I restrict the analysis to the sample of
ﬁrms that exhibit a varying repurchase activity. I exclude all ﬁrms that never or continuously
repurchase shares over the complete sample period, because I cannot observe changes in
repurchase activity and possibly related liquidity eﬀects for these ﬁrms. This within-ﬁrm-
variance sample covers 566 ﬁrms with 9,655 ﬁrm-quarters (thereof 4,713 repurchase quarters,
49%) and allows me to make speciﬁc inferences about repurchasing ﬁrms while circumventing
a potential self-selection bias in cross-sectional regressions that might stem from the fact that
repurchasing ﬁrms are a non-random draw from the overall population of ﬁrms.
Based on the within-ﬁrm-variance sample, I deﬁne a second sample that focuses on
repurchase events, and in particular, the beginning of repurchase activities. This initiation-
event sample is made up of all non-repurchase quarters that are directly followed by a
repurchase quarter. This sample covers 538 ﬁrms and 2,258 ﬁrm-quarter observations, which
belong to 1,129 initiation events. This subsample oﬀers the cleanest setting to study the
liquidity impact of share repurchases, because it compares subsequent non-repurchase and
repurchase quarters at the cost of dropping a certain number of ﬁrm-quarter observations.
4.2 Deﬁnition of variables
Measure of share repurchase activity. I obtain data on actual share repurchase vol-
umes from COMPUSTAT (item cshopq). The COMPUSTAT ﬁgures are gathered from
the section Issuer Purchases of Equity Securities of ﬁrm's 10-Q and 10-K ﬁlings. The re-
ported ﬁgures include all types of repurchases. To derive the number of shares repurchased in
the open market (RepIntens), I reduce the total number of shares repurchased (as reported
in COMPUSTAT) by the number of shares repurchased via self-tender oﬀers or privately
negotiated transactions (as reported in SDC). This construction of the RepIntens variable
limits the noise associated with non-open market transactions, but fails to make the vari-
able free of any bias. This is due to two facts. First, the SDC database is not complete
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with respect to all non-open market repurchases. SDC covers self-tender oﬀers and privately
negotiated transactions, but coverage is incomplete.13 Furthermore, the SDC database does
not cover share repurchases from employees who frequently sell shares to their company to
oﬀset tax withholding obligations that occur upon vesting of restricted shares or other stock
incentive awards. Second, ﬁrms from time to time enter special repurchase agreements with
investment banks such as accelerated share repurchase transactions or put warrants where
the reporting of the transaction and actual execution in the open market do not take place
at the same time. These transactions also bias the RepIntens variable.
In order to control for potential liquidity eﬀects from other repurchases, in particular
self-tender oﬀers, I construct a second repurchase variable (RepOtherIntens) that proxies
for the number of shares repurchased via non-open market transactions as stated in SDC.14
Measures of market liquidity. The ﬁrst set of dependent variables covers diﬀerent di-
mensions of stock market liquidity. The main measure of stock market liquidity are bid-ask
spreads, which measure the price dimension of liquidity. Additionally, I compute quoted
depths that represent the quantity dimension of liquidity. Spreads and depths are both
measures of total trading frictions. This implies that changes in these variables might re-
sult either from changes in real and/or informational frictions. All variables are calculated
from TAQ data by averaging daily values over all days within a ﬁscal quarter. Appendix B
contains a description of the data matching and cleaning procedures for the TAQ data.
I use two bid-ask spread measures: quoted absolute spreads and eﬀective absolute spreads.
Quoted spreads (QSPREAD) are the absolute diﬀerence between the quoted bid and ask
price. Eﬀective spreads (ESPREAD) are twice the absolute diﬀerence between the trade
price and the midpoint of the quoted bid and ask price. Eﬀective (quoted) spreads measure
the round trip cost if trades are executed at actual (quoted) prices. The higher the spreads,
the lower the liquidity in the market. Thus, larger values of spreads represent illiquidity.
The depth measures I use are total depth (DEPTH), bid-side depth (BDEPTH), and
ask-side depth (ADEPTH). Depth at the bid (ask) is calculated as the daily average number
of shares quoted at the highest (lowest) bid (ask) price. I calculate the average over all quotes
13See Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008).
14Ahn, Cao, and Choe (2001) and Nayar, Singh, and Zebedee (2008) show that for self-tender oﬀers there
is a transitory liquidity eﬀect during the tender oﬀer period.
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matched to trades. Total depth is the sum of bid and ask depth. The larger the depths, the
larger the number of shares the market maker or limit order traders are willing to trade and
the more liquid the market in the stock.
Proxies for real friction costs. The second set of dependent and independent variables
corresponds to real friction eﬀects. I follow the microstructure literature, e.g., Stoll (2000),
and use a standard set of three variables.15 To account for order processing costs I use
two trading activity variables: TURNOV ER represents the average daily trading volume
measured in shares. TRADES represents the average daily number of trades executed. Both
variables are assumed to be negatively associated with spreads. Both variables also proxy
for the riskiness of accepting inventory, and thus, inventory holding costs. I additionally
measure the risk of adverse stock price changes to account for inventory holding costs. V OLA
represents the daily return variance within the ﬁscal quarter. This variable is assumed to be
positively related to bid-ask spreads.
Proxies for informational friction costs. The above liquidity and real friction variables
oﬀer the opportunity to indirectly test the information asymmetry hypothesis by examining
the eﬀect of open market repurchases on bid-ask spreads and depths (dependent variables)
while controlling for real friction eﬀects (independent variables). A more direct test requires
an approximation of the informational friction costs. The market microstructure literature
developed such more direct measures of adverse selection costs based on stock market activity.
The calculation of these measures requires intraday trading data from the TAQ database.
Ideally, I would like to directly measure the change in the probability of trading with
informed managers. Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996) developed an estimate of
the market makers beliefs of informed trading based on the actual order ﬂow. The Probability
of Informed Trading (PIN) represents the percentage of trades that are expected to be
information-based. However, despite of its popularity in empirical research in ﬁnance and
accounting, its reliability is controversially discussed in the literature.16 For this reason,
15For a systematic review of the variable speciﬁcations used in seminal papers see Bollen, Smith, and
Whaley (2004).
16Other papers that use the PIN measure are, e.g., Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004), Ellul and Pagano
(2006), Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2009). For a controversial discussion of the measure see, e.g., Aktas,
de Bodt, Declerck, and Van Oppens (2007).
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I only use this measure to check the robustness of the results obtained via the indirect
approach. For the same reason, I also rely on two alternative proxies for the change in
adverse selection costs: the Adverse Selection Component (ADSC) proposed by Lin, Sanger,
and Booth (1995) and the Information Component (InfComp) proposed by Stoll (2000).
Both variables measures the percentage component of spreads that is due to adverse selection
costs.17 The calculation of these measures capturing informational frictions is explained in
detail in Appendix A. However, the Adverse Selection Component uses eﬀective spreads as a
reference point, while the Information Component refers to quoted spreads. To account for
diﬀerences in absolute spreads, I multiply the percentages values with quoted and eﬀective
absolute spreads, respectively.
Other company characteristics. I also use a few other variables such as ﬁrm size, S&P
500 index inclusion, ownership structure, leverage, and analyst coverage as controls in the
regressions. These are all standard control variables in the ﬁnance and accounting literature.
I explain the rationale for their inclusion later in the relevant sections. Appendix A provides
detailed deﬁnitions and the data sources for all these variables.
4.3 Summary statistics
Table III.1 reports summary statistics for the within-ﬁrm-variance sample (Panel A) and
the initiation-event sample (Panel B).
 Please insert Table III.1 here 
The repurchase ﬁgures in Panel A show that the size of open market share repurchases
varies between 0 million and 121.4 million shares per quarter with an average of 1.0 million
shares per quarter. Turning to total market liquidity measures, the table displays that the
average quoted (eﬀective) spread is $0.193 ($0.078). As known from the microstructure
literature, eﬀective spreads are lower than quoted spreads. The average quoted total (ask
and bid) depth is 1,840 (1,010 and 830) shares. Next, the table contains summary statistics
for real friction proxies: The average daily turnover is 1.01 million shares. The average
17For a study on the relation between the Probability of Informed Trading and Adverse Selection Compo-
nents see Chung and Li (2003).
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number of trades per day is 1,800. The daily return volatility during the quarter is 0.21%.
The real friction proxies are followed by informational friction proxies: The Probability
of Informed Trading varies between 0% and 100% and is on average 11.8%. The adverse
selection (information) component is on average 74.7% (69.7%). Finally, Panel A in Table
III.1 shows that sample ﬁrms have on average a market capitalization of $4,865 million, a
share price of $32.71, analyst coverage of 8.5 analysts, and leverage of 37.3%. On average,
ﬁrms are owned by 20.8 million shareholders and issue 1.5 million shares per quarter. Figures
displayed in Panel B for the initiation-event sample are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
ﬁgures presented in Panel A.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Univariate tests
The most intuitive way to test the hypotheses on the liquidity eﬀect of share repurchases is to
compare the liquidity between non-repurchase and repurchase periods. I use a paired t-test
and a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test to test for diﬀerences in liquidity measures
between repurchase and non-repurchase periods. The null hypothesis in these tests is that
the mean and median change in the liquidity measures is zero, respectively. The results for
these tests are reported in Table III.2. Panel A (B) in Table III.2 display the results for the
within-ﬁrm-variance (initiation-event) sample.
 Please insert Table III.2 here 
I start with examining the changes in spreads and depths as measures of total liquidity.
Table III.2 shows that spreads (QSPREAD and ESPREAD) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
in repurchase and non-repurchase periods, while the change is always positive (with one
exception). This result holds across means and medians and is independent from the sample
considered, and thus, the unit of aggregation (ﬁrms vs. repurchase events). The change in
depth is always negative, but changes are only signiﬁcant for medians. A reduction in depth
is consistent with an increase in spreads, implying an adverse liquidity eﬀect.
87
Next, I look at the real friction proxies turnover, number of trades, and return volatility.
The average number of TRADES and the TURNOV ER volume is signiﬁcantly larger
during repurchase periods (the exception being TURNOV ER in Panel A). For V OLA, the
results are less clear. In mean tests I ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly lower volatility, while in median
tests the diﬀerence is signiﬁcantly positive. In the microstructure literature, higher trading
activity (turnover and trades) and lower volatility are associated with lower real friction
eﬀects and higher liquidity. Thus, the signiﬁcant improvements in real friction proxies and
the non-signiﬁcant changes in overall liquidity are a puzzling result. One explanation for
this ﬁnding could be that informational friction eﬀects oﬀset real friction eﬀects, implying no
change in overall liquidity. An alternative explanation for this result could be that market
makers do not adjust spreads in response to temporary changes in real friction proxies caused
by repurchases. The univariate results for the real friction proxies are consistent with the
competing market maker hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a and 1b).
Finally, I examine changes in the informational friction proxies Probability of Informed
Trading, Adverse Selection Component, and Information Component. I ﬁnd a positive ef-
fect (lower adverse selection costs) for PIN and ADSC, while for InfComp the change is
negative (higher adverse selection cost). For the initiation event sample, only the change in
InfComp is signiﬁcant. However, analyzing InfComp expressed in $ terms (=InfComp *
QSPREAD) the signiﬁcant results disappear. This indicates that the information compo-
nent expressed as percentage of quoted spreads changes, while at the same time the quoted
spreads expressed in $ changes in a way that the information component expressed in $
remains unchanged. Overall, for informational friction proxies I ﬁnd only little evidence for
a signiﬁcant change during repurchase periods. The univariate results for the informational
friction proxies reject the information asymmetry hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b).
Finally, Table III.2 also shows the percentage of positive sign changes which varies be-
tween 39-67% (depending on the sample and variable considered). This shows that the
direction of the variable changes is heterogeneous across ﬁrms as all positive and negative
changes are inside the middle third (close to 50%). Consistent over both samples, TRADES
is the variable with largest proportion of positive sign changes (64% in Panel A and 67% in
Panel B), while the lowest proportion of positive sign changes is observable for ADEPTH
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(39% in Panel A and 40% in Panel B).
Overall, the univariate results have limited explanatory power. The results provide evi-
dence for a positive change in real friction proxies, while informational friction proxies and
total liquidity measures show no signiﬁcant changes. The complex interplay of real and
informational friction eﬀects requires a multivariate analysis of the overall liquidity eﬀects.
5.2 Real friction eﬀects
In this section I examine the impact of open market repurchases on the real friction prox-
ies turnover, number of trades, and return volatility in a multivariate setting. The main
regression speciﬁcation is a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression based on quarterly obser-
vations. Subscripts i and t indicate ﬁrm i and quarter t, respectively. The regression model
is speciﬁed as follows:
log (REAL_FRICTIONit) = α + β0 ∗ log (RepIntensit)
+γ0 log (RepOtherIntensit) + γ1 log (SIZEit) + γ2 log (SHAREHOLDERSit)
+γ3 log (ISSUANCEit) + γ4SP500Dummyi + δ log (Xit) + εit.
RepIntens is the main variable of interest. The real friction proxies (REAL_FRICTION)
include TURNOV ER, the number of TRADES, and V OLA. General control variables are
ﬁrm size (SIZE), concentration of ownership (SHAREHOLDERS), and S&P 500 index
inclusion (SP500Dummy). I include SIZE and SP500Dummy to control for diﬀerences in
ﬁrm size as well as public attention, respectively. With the variable SHAREHOLDERS I
control for diﬀerences in block ownership which aﬀect the secondary market liquidity as block
ownership restricts the free ﬂoat. Furthermore, I control for non-open market repurchase
activities (RepOtherIntens) and simultaneous equity issuance activities (ISSUANCE).18
X represents control variables that are speciﬁc to the diﬀerent dependent variables. For the
trading activity variables TURNOV ER and TRADES, I control additionally for return
18I control for non-open market repurchase activities, because Ahn, Cao, and Choe (2001) and Nayar,
Singh, and Zebedee (2008) show that repurchase tender oﬀers have a positive liquidity eﬀect. Furthermore,
I control for the simultaneous issuance of equity which might oﬀset the open market share repurchases.
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volatility. For the risk variable V OLA, I control additionally for changes in leverage.19 I
follow Petersen (2009) and cluster standard errors at the ﬁrm level to account for correla-
tion in the repurchase decision variable across time within a ﬁrm. The coeﬃcient estimates
resulting from this log-log speciﬁcation can be interpreted as elasticities.
 Please insert Table III.3 here 
Column (1) in Table III.3 reports the regression results using the logarithm of TURNOV ER
as dependent variable. The RepIntens coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant in both sam-
ples. This result is consistent with the univariate results displayed in Table III.2. It sup-
ports the competing market maker hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) and rejects the information
asymmetry hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a). The result is also economically signiﬁcant: a one-
standard-deviation increase in repurchase activity (3.5 million shares as reported in Panel B
of Table III.1) leads to a 13.9% increase in share turnover. The signs of the coeﬃcients on
the control variables are consistent with expectations.
Column (2) in Table III.3 reports the regression results using the logarithm of the number
of TRADES as dependent variable. The results are similar to TURNOV ER. Open market
repurchase activity positively aﬀects the number of trades. This eﬀect is again signiﬁcant in
both samples. Additional regressions (not tabulated) with average trade size as dependent
variable reveal a positive, but insigniﬁcant relation between repurchase activity and trade
size. Thus, the source of the increase in turnover is an increase in the number of trades as
opposed to an increase in the average trade size.
Column (3) in Table III.3 reports the regression results using the logarithm of V OLA as
dependent variable. The coeﬃcients have the expected negative sign (Hypothesis 1b). The
results for the initiation-event sample, however, are insigniﬁcant, meaning that open market
repurchases result in a decrease in return volatility, which is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, the results in Table III.3 show a favorable eﬀect of open market repurchases on
real friction proxies. Open market share repurchases increase the turnover and the number of
trades and reduce the volatility compared to non-repurchase quarters. However, the decrease
19I control for leverage, because share repurchases reduce the equity-debt-ratio by lowering shareholder's
equity (and in case of a debt-ﬁnance repurchase by additionally increasing the ﬁnancial liabilities). An
increase in leverage makes the equity riskier and returns more volatile. See Kim (2007) for an empirical
study on return volatility decline in the course of open market repurchase announcements.
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in return volatility predicted under the competing market maker hypothesis is insigniﬁcant
(Hypothesis 1b). The positive trading activity eﬀects are consistent with the competing
market maker hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) and reject the information asymmetry hypothesis
(Hypothesis 2a). The beneﬁcial impact of repurchases on real friction proxies should ceteris
paribus be associated with an improvement in total stock market liquidity measured with
spreads and depth if there are no negative eﬀects from informational frictions.
5.3 Liquidity eﬀects
After examining the real friction eﬀects, I examine the impact of open market repurchases
on the change in total liquidity. I ﬁrst examine whether OMRs impact the ﬁrm's total
liquidity. Therefore, I regress diﬀerent spread and depth measures on RepIntens. I then
determine whether the impact of open market repurchases is due to real friction eﬀects, or
informational friction eﬀects, or both. I do so by including real friction proxies as additional
control variables in the spread and depth regressions. If share repurchases impact liquidity
via informational friction eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on RepIntens should remain signiﬁcant after
controlling for real friction eﬀects. And to provide support for the information asymmetry
hypothesis, the coeﬃcient estimate should have a positive sign.
The baseline regression speciﬁcation is as follows:
log (LIQUIDITYit) = α + β0 ∗ log (RepIntensit)
+µ0 log (TURNOV ERit) + µ1 log (TRADES) + µ2 log (V OLAit)
+γ0 log (RepOtherIntensit) + γ1 log (SIZEit) + γ2 log (SHAREHOLDERSit)
+γ3 log (ISSUANCEit) + γ4SP500Dummyi + εit.
For each liquidity measures (LIQUIDITYit), I ﬁt two regressions: The ﬁrst regression
only includes the RepIntens variable (and the general control variables). The second re-
gression additionally includes the logarithm of the real friction proxies TURNOV ER, the
number of TRADES, and V OLA. This two-step procedure allows me, on the one hand,
to examine the impact of repurchases on ﬁrm's market liquidity, and on the other hand, to
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disentangle the real friction and informational friction eﬀects.
Table III.4 reports the regression results for the dependent variable spreads. Quoted
spreads are displayed in columns (1) and (2) and eﬀective spreads in column (3) and (4). In
the regression on spreads, I substitute the control variable market capitalization (SIZE) by
the average share price (PRICE) as spreads are measured on a per share basis.
 Please insert Table III.4 here 
The RepIntens coeﬃcients in column (1) and (3) are negative and signiﬁcant in both
samples, implying that open market repurchases lead to a reduction in spreads, and thus, an
increase in ﬁrms' market liquidity. This result corresponds to the ﬁndings of other studies
that are based on actual data.20 The result is also economically signiﬁcant: a one-standard-
deviation increase in repurchase activity (3.5 million shares as reported in Panel B of Table
III.1) leads to a 16.3% and 13.2% decrease in quoted and eﬀective spreads, respectively. The
coeﬃcients for the control variables in the regression mostly have the expected sign. For
example, larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with diverse ownership exhibit lower spreads.
However, after controlling for the real friction eﬀects in column (2) and (4), the favorable
reduction in spreads becomes signiﬁcantly smaller in Panel A and disappears and becomes
insigniﬁcant in Panel B. Put it diﬀerently, after controlling for the changes in real friction
eﬀects - approximated by turnover, the number of trades, and return volatility - I do not ﬁnd
a considerable eﬀect of open market repurchases on stock market liquidity. The diﬀerence
in the results between Panel A and B indicates that an appropriate sample deﬁnition has an
impact on the obtained results. The results in Panel A seem to be biased by eﬀects which
are not related to open-market share repurchases. Beside this, the coeﬃcient estimates for
the real friction proxies in most cases have the expected sign and are highly signiﬁcant. Only
the positive eﬀect of turnover on quoted spreads is somewhat surprising and not consistent
with microstructure theory, but not unusual in empirical studies (e.g., Stoll, 2000).
Table III.5 reports the regression results for the dependent variable depth. This liquidity
measure represent the quantity dimension of liquidity.
20In particular, Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004) and Ben-Rephael, Oded, and Wohl (2011) ﬁnd narrower
spreads during repurchase periods. Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004) use a sample of 64 ﬁrms for which
they gather actual repurchase data via a questionnaire. In contrast, Ben-Rephael, Oded, and Wohl (2011)
cover a large cross-section (S&P 500 Index) and hand-collect actual repurchase data on a monthly basis from
ﬁrms' 10-Q and 10-K ﬁlings.
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 Please insert Table III.5 here 
The RepIntens coeﬃcients are positive in all regressions. The results in column (1), (3),
and (5) are highly signiﬁcant with only one exception, implying higher quoted quantities
during repurchase periods. This result of improved liquidity is consistent with the result of
lower spreads from Table III.4. Furthermore, the positive liquidity eﬀect is still signiﬁcant
after controlling for the real friction eﬀects in Panel A (columns 2, 4, and 6). However,
in Panel B, this only holds for the positive liquidity eﬀect on bid-side depth (column 6).
This evidence in Panel B is consistent with the competing market maker hypothesis which
predicts that the buy limit orders of the repurchasing ﬁrms increase (asymmetrically) the
bid-side of depth. Again, the diﬀerence in the results between Panel A and B is related to
a proper deﬁnition of the sample. Panel A is the broader sample and the results seem to
be driven by eﬀects not associated with open-market repurchases. Finally, the coeﬃcient
estimates for the real friction proxies in both Panels in most cases have the expected sign
and are highly signiﬁcant.
Overall, the results in Tables III.4 and III.5 paint a coherent picture regarding the total
liquidity eﬀect of open market share repurchases: market liquidity improves in the price
dimension (spreads) as well as the quantity dimension (depths). This result supports the
competing market maker hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) and rejects the information asymmetry
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). Even after disentangling real and informational friction eﬀects
(by controlling for real friction eﬀects), I ﬁnd no evidence for negative informational eﬀects
which have been predicted by the information asymmetry hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b).
Taken together, the results in Tables III.3, III.4, and III.5 indicate that repurchasing
shares in the open market has a positive impact on a ﬁrm's liquidity via reduced real friction
costs. The reduction in real friction costs is implied by an increase in trading activity.
I ﬁnd little evidence that open market share repurchases cause a change in informational
friction costs. If share repurchases had been responsible for a change in informational friction
costs, then I would have found signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the repurchase variable even after
controlling for the real friction eﬀects. These ﬁndings support Barclay and Smith (1988)'s
competing market maker hypothesis, which predicts an improvement in market liquidity.
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5.4 Informational friction eﬀects
In this section, I validate the previous ﬁndings by directly examining the impact of open
market repurchases on variables proxying for informational frictions. If OMRs exacerbate
higher informational friction costs (that counteract lower real friction costs), I should ﬁnd a
positive eﬀect of share repurchases on these proxies for informational frictions.
To conduct this test, I use the following baseline regression:
log (INF_FRICTIONit) = α + β0 ∗ log (RepIntensit)
+µ0 log (TURNOV ERit) + µ1 log (TRADES) + µ2 log (V OLAit)
+γ0 log (RepOtherIntensit) + γ1 log (SIZEit) + γ2 log (SHAREHOLDERSit)
+γ3 log (ISSUANCEit) + γ4SP500Dummyi + γ5 log (ANALY STit) + εit.
I use three proxies for informational frictions (INF_FRICTION) in this regression:
The ﬁrst dependent variable is the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN). The other
two dependent variables are the Adverse Selection Component (ADSC) and Information
Component (InfComp). Both variables measure the percentage component of spreads that
is attributable to adverse selection costs. However, the Adverse Selection Component refers
to eﬀective spreads, while the Information Component refers to quoted spreads. Therefore,
I multiply both variables with the absolute eﬀective and quoted spreads respectively to
derive the dependent variables for the above regression. As in the regressions on spreads
before, I substitute the control variable market capitalization (SIZE) by the average share
price (PRICE) in these regressions. Beyond this, I use the same control variables as in the
previous regressions. However, I additionally control for the general information environment
of the company. In the literature, SIZE and analyst coverage (ANALY ST ) are common
proxies for the general degree of information asymmetry. Thus, I include analyst coverage
as an additional control variable in the regressions. As in the previous section, I ﬁt two
regressions for each dependent variable, one with real friction controls and one without.21
I report the results for the informational friction regressions in Table III.6.
21Controlling for real frictions in regressions on informational frictions is necessary, because of an inverse
relation between real frictions and informational frictions. See, e.g., Stoll (2000).
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 Please insert Table III.6 here 
For the PIN variable in column (1), I ﬁnd negative coeﬃcients in both samples. However,
only the coeﬃcient in the initiation-event sample is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. After con-
trolling for the known real friction eﬀects in column (2), the coeﬃcient in Panel B becomes
insigniﬁcant, implying that share repurchases are not associated with signiﬁcant changes in
the probability of informed trading. The results for the spread-based measures of adverse
selection costs are similar. Signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in column (3) and (5) become insigniﬁcant
and close to zero after controlling for real friction eﬀects in column (4) and (6). The coeﬃ-
cients for the control variables mostly have the expected sign. For example, larger analyst
coverage is associated with a lower probability of informed trading and lower informational
spread components.
Taken together, the results in Table III.6 support the previous ﬁndings from Table III.4.
The improvement in the ﬁrm's liquidity is entirely attributable to real friction eﬀects of
share repurchases. Table III.6 shows that share repurchases do not aﬀect the informational
cost component (after controlling for real friction eﬀects). These ﬁndings again reject the
information asymmetry hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b). All results provide evidence in support
of the competing market maker hypothesis.
5.5 Persistence of the liquidity eﬀects
In this section I investigate the persistence of the observed liquidity eﬀects. In particu-
lar, I address the questions: Does the liquidity eﬀects disappear with the discontinuation
of an open market repurchase program? Or is an aftermath or long-term liquidity eﬀect
observable? The previous analyses do not explicitly address these questions. The within-
ﬁrm-variance sample allows me to analyze changes in liquidity between repurchase and non
-repurchase periods. However, it is not clear which non-repurchase periods - before or after a
repurchase, or both - drive the results in this sample. With the initiation-event sample I ex-
amine the liquidity eﬀects at the beginning (or resumption) of a repurchase period, because
I compare liquidity between initial repurchase quarters and preceding non-repurchase quar-
ters. Following the same line of reasoning, I now deﬁne a corresponding discontinuation-event
sample. This sample only includes ﬁnal repurchase quarters and subsequent non-repurchase
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quarters and allows me to investigate the liquidity eﬀects at the end (or interruption) of a
repurchase program. If open market share repurchases change liquidity beyond the actual
repurchase period, I would expect to ﬁnd for the discontinuation-event sample insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient estimates in the regressions previously run on the initiation-event sample.
Table III.7 displays the results for the complete set of regressions presented in Tables
III.3-III.6 for the discontinuation-event sample.
 Please insert Table III.7 here 
The results in Table III.7 are similar to the results found for the initiation-event sample,
indicating that the observed liquidity eﬀects disappear with the conclusion (or interruption)
of the open market share repurchase program. This means that the observed improvement
in liquidity is transitory and limited to actual repurchase periods.
6 Summary and conclusion
This paper investigates the question whether actual open market share repurchases inﬂuence
a ﬁrm's stock liquidity. It extends the previous literature on liquidity eﬀects of open market
share repurchases by using newly available data on actual share repurchase volumes instead of
investigating liquidity eﬀects around non-binding share repurchase announcements or using
estimates of repurchase volumes. In particular, I test two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses
on the liquidity eﬀect of open market repurchases. The competing market maker hypothesis
predicts that stock market liquidity will improve. In contrast, the information asymmetry
hypothesis predicts that liquidity will deteriorate if managers are better informed and willing
(and able) to trade on inside information. Beside making diﬀerent predictions about the
overall liquidity impact of share repurchases, the hypotheses also diﬀer with respect to the
main transmission channels. The competing market maker hypothesis predicts a positive
eﬀect via real friction eﬀects, while the information asymmetry hypothesis predicts a negative
eﬀect via informational friction eﬀects.
The analyses reveal that open market share repurchases signiﬁcantly increase depth and
reduce bid-ask spreads. The beneﬁcial spread eﬀect is attributable to a reduction in the real
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friction component of spreads. The real friction costs decrease due to an increase in trading
activity (turnover and number of trades). This increase in trading activity is primarily
due to an increase in the number of trades rather than an increase in the average trade
size. After controlling for these real friction eﬀects, I ﬁnd no evidence that open market
repurchases have a negative impact on spreads via informational friction eﬀects. Thus, ﬁrms
don't have to consider previously unrecognized liquidity costs when making the decision
to repurchase shares in the open market. The lack of a negative relation between open
market repurchases and informational frictions suggests that SEC Rule 10b-18 is an eﬀective
way to protect uninformed market participants against trading of informed managers. In
summary, the results are consistent with Barclay and Smith (1988)'s competing market
maker hypothesis which predicts a beneﬁcial liquidity eﬀect. I ﬁnd no evidence for a harmful
liquidity eﬀect of open market repurchases. Consistent with expectations, the liquidity
improvement associated with open market repurchases is transitory and limited to actual
repurchase periods. I ﬁnd no evidence for a long-term liquidity eﬀect.
This paper is the ﬁrst attempt to examine the impact of actual share repurchases for
US ﬁrms as opposed to repurchase announcements or estimates of repurchase activity used
in previous US studies. However, actual repurchase data provided by COMPUSTAT only
utilizes a minimum amount of information on repurchases provided in ﬁrms' 10-Q and 10-
K ﬁlings. COMPUSTAT provides aggregated quarterly ﬁgures while ﬁrms report monthly
numbers in their annual and quarterly reports. Often ﬁrms only repurchase during one or
two months within a quarter or the repurchase volume varies considerably over the months
within a quarter. Furthermore, ﬁrms usually explain how they repurchase the shares, e.g.,
via privately negotiated transactions, self-tender oﬀers, open market transactions, or other
special and individual repurchase agreements. Making use of this additional information by
collecting data from 10-K and 10-Q ﬁlings would researchers allow to signiﬁcantly improve
the data basis. Such hand-collected data has much greater precision concerning the exact
timing and volume of open market repurchases. Another extension of this study which is
also related to data availability is the inclusion of share repurchase motives into the analysis
of liquidity changes. This seems to be a promising area of future research as in particular
diﬀerences in the information policy regarding share repurchase motives as well as diﬀering
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motives for share repurchases might have an impact on the informational eﬀects. A priori,
there is no reason to assume that changes in the information environment around OMRs
are the same across ﬁrms. However, the coverage of repurchase authorizations (and their
motives) in the SDC M&A database is incomplete. Thus, these kinds of analyses also require
additional collecting of data from ﬁrms' press releases. Finally, the evidence provided in this
paper could be extended by comparing the liquidity eﬀect of open market repurchases for
diﬀerent types of stock exchanges, e.g., NYSE versus NASDAQ.
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Appendix
A. Variable deﬁnitions and data sources
Variable Description Source
RepIntens Open market repurchase volume measured in million shares over ﬁscal
quarters. Computed from the quarterly COMPUSTAT item cshopq
which states the total number of shares repurchased. Non-open market
repurchases as stated in SDC are subtracted. The variable is adjusted
for capital measures using CRSP share adjustment factors (FACSHR)
at the end of ﬁscal quarter.**
COMPUSTAT
SDC
RepOtherIntens Non-open market repurchase volume measured in million shares over
ﬁscal quarters. Computed from the SDC item common shares
acquired which states the number of shares repurchased. Includes all
transactions which are not categorized as open market purchase. The
variable is adjusted for capital measures using CRSP share adjustment
factors (FACSHR) at the end of ﬁscal quarter.**
SDC
QSPREAD Quoted absolute spread measured in $ as average over all tradings days
within the ﬁscal quarter. Per trading day, the quoted spread is
calculated as the (equally-weighted) average of Bt −At over all quotes
matched to trades where At is the quoted ask price and Bt is the
quoted bid price. Subscript t denotes transaction t within a day. The
variable is adjusted for capital measures using CRSP price adjustment
factors (FACPR) on a daily basis.*
TAQ
ESPREAD Eﬀective absolute spread measured in $ as average over all tradings
days within the ﬁscal quarter. Per trading day, the eﬀective spread is
calculated as the (equally-weighted) average of 2 ∗ |Pt −Qt| over all
quotes matched to trades where Pt is the price at which the transaction
is executed and Qt is the quote midpoint calculated as
Qt = (At +Bt)/2 where At is the quoted ask price and Bt is the
quoted bid price. Subscript t denotes transaction t within a day. The
variable is adjusted for capital measures using CRSP price adjustment
factors (FACPR) on a daily basis.*
TAQ
DEPTH Total average number of shares quoted at the bid and ask price
measured in 000 shares and calculated as ADEPTH + BDEPTH.*
TAQ
ADEPTH Ask-side depth measured in 000 shares as average over all trading days
within the ﬁscal quarter. Per trading day, the ask depth is calculated
as average over all quotes matched to trades. The variable is adjusted
for capital measures using CRSP share adjustment factors (FACSHR)
on a daily basis.*
TAQ
BDEPTH Bid-side depth measured in 000 shares as average over all trading days
within the ﬁscal quarter. The variable is adjusted for capital measures
using CRSP share adjustment factors (FACSHR) on a daily basis.*
TAQ
* Only calculated when more than 50 trading days per ﬁscal quarter available. Otherwise set to missing. ** Log transfor-
mation for regressions based on 1 plus variable of interest.
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Variable Description Source
TURNOV ER Average daily trading volume measured in million shares over all
trading days within the ﬁscal quarter. The daily trading volume is
calculated as the sum of the trading volume of all trades during the
day. The variable is adjusted for capital measures using CRSP share
adjustment factors (FACSHR) on a daily basis.*
TAQ
TRADES Average daily number of 000 trades computed over all trading days
within the ﬁscal quarter. The variable is adjusted for capital measures
using CRSP share adjustment factors (FACSHR) on a daily basis.*
TAQ
V OLA Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the ﬁscal quarter
multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days per ﬁrm
within the ﬁscal quarter. Daily returns are calculated from average
daily stock prices with the following formula:
rt = log
(
1 +
(AvgPd −AvgPd−1)
AvgPd−1
)
Average daily stock prices are deﬁned as the average of the
(equally-weighted) transaction prices Pt within a day. Subscript d
denotes day d within the quarter.*
TAQ
PIN Probability of Informed Trading based on Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and
Paperman (1996). PIN represents the percentage of trades that are
expected to be information-based each day. It is deﬁned to be a
number between zero and one. Maximum likelihood estimation is based
on the daily number of buys and sells over ﬁscal quarters using the
NLMIXED procedure in SAS. Quarterly observations out of range [0,1]
are set to missing.*/**
TAQ
ADSC Adverse Selection Component of the eﬀective spread based on Lin,
Sanger, and Booth (1995). ADSC is measured in % and computed as
the average over all daily values within the ﬁscal quarter. Daily adverse
selection components are estimated from all trades within a trading
day as a coeﬃcient from the regression of the change in quotes on the
half-signed eﬀective spread. In particular, the following regression is
estimated without an intercept:
log (Qt)− log (Qt−1) = ADSCt ∗ (log (Pt−1)− log (Qt−1)) + εt
where Pt−1 is the price at which the previous transaction is executed
and Qt is the quote midpoint calculated as Qt = (At +Bt)/2 where At
is the quoted ask price and Bt is the quoted bid price. Subscript t
denotes transaction t within a day. Daily observations out of range [0,1]
are set to missing values before the quarterly average is calculated.*/**
TAQ
SP500Dummy S&P 500 index inclusion. Dummy has the value of 1 if the company is
part of the S&P 500 Index at least during the sample period (for
available quarterly observations), and 0 otherwise. Computed from the
monthly CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged data item S&P Major Index
Code - Historical (spmim).
COMPUSTAT
* Only calculated when more than 50 trading days per ﬁscal quarter available. Otherwise set to missing. ** Log transfor-
mation for regressions based on 1 plus variable of interest.
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Variable Description Source
InfComp Information Component of the quoted spread based on Stoll (2000).
InfComp is measured in % and computed as the average over all
daily values within the ﬁscal quarter. Daily values are calculated as:
InfCompd = 1− Traded Spreadd
Quoted Spreadd
with subscript d denoting the day within the quarter. Traded
Spread = 1m
∑m
t=1
(
PAt
)− 1n∑nt=1 (PBt ) and Quoted Spread =
1
T
∑T
t=1 (At −Bt) with T denoting the total number of transactions
per day, m denoting the transactions at the ask price PAt , and n
denoting the transactions at the bid price PBt . At (Bt) is the
quoted ask (bid) price. Daily observations out of the range [0,1] are
set to missing values before the quarterly average is calculated.*/**
TAQ
SIZE Market capitalization of the common/ordinary equity measured in
million $ at the end of the ﬁscal quarter. Computed from the
quarterly COMPUSTAT items common shares outstanding
(cshoq) and the stock price at the ﬁscal quarter end (prccq).
COMPUSTAT
PRICE Stock price measured in $ at the end of the ﬁscal quarter.
Computed from the quarterly COMPUSTAT item price at ﬁscal
quarter end (prccq). Adjusted for capital measures with CRSP
price adjustment factors (FACPR) on a quarter end basis.
COMPUSTAT
SHAREHOLDERS Number of shareholders measured in millions at the end of the ﬁscal
quarter. Computed from the annual COMPUSTAT item number of
shareholders (cshr) at the end of the current and previous year by
using straight-line adjustment for ﬁscal quarters.
COMPUSTAT
ISSUANCE Equity issuance measured in million shares over ﬁscal quarters.
Computed as the sum of RepIntens, RepOtherIntens, and the
change in the number of outstanding shares calculated from the
quarterly COMPUSTAT item common shares outstanding (cshoq)
by subtracting the value at the beginning of the quarter from the
value at the end of the quarter.**
COMPUSTAT
ANALY ST Average number of analysts following the security. Computed as the
3 month average over the ﬁscal quarter. Monthly values are
computed by using the detail history ﬁle and counting the number
of analysts that made EPS forecasts over the one year period ending
six months prior to the end of the ﬁscal quarter.**
I/B/E/S
LEV ERAGE Market leverage measured in % at the ﬁscal quarter end. Computed
by scaling the quarterly COMPUSTAT item total liabilities (lt) by
the sum of the quarterly COMPUSTAT items total assets (at),
market value of common equity (mvce), total common/ordinary
equity (ceq), and balance sheet deferred taxes (txdb).
COMPUSTAT
* Only calculated when more than 50 trading days per ﬁscal quarter available. Otherwise set to missing. ** Log transfor-
mation for regressions based on 1 plus variable of interest.
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B. Procedures of data matching and cleaning for TAQ
B.1 Matching of trades and quotes and identifying buy and sell orders
A matching of trades and quotes is required for the computation of the liquidity measures listed
above. The most widely used method to match trades and quotes and infer a buy and sell clas-
siﬁcation of trades is the Lee-Ready algorithm (Lee and Ready, 1991). The algorithm consists of
a quote-rule and a tick-rule used as a tie-breaker for mid-quote trades. The quote rule applies
information about the proximity to prevailing quotes in order to infer trade direction. Trades at
prices above the midpoint of the bid and ask are classiﬁed as buys. Trades below the midpoint are
classiﬁed as sells. However, some trades are executed at the bid-ask midpoint. These trades can be
either ignored by removing such trades or can be handled by the tick-rule. The tick-rule classiﬁes
a midpoint trade as a buy if it is executed at a higher price than the previous trade (i.e., if it is
an uptick") and as a sell if it is executed at a lower price (downtick"). To apply this Lee-Ready
algorithm one needs to match trade price data with quotes. Lee and Ready (1991) suggest matching
trade prices with 5-second old quotes because prior to the computerization of the trade process,
new quotes were often reported prior to the prices of trades that generated them. Because of the
very recent TAQ sample (2004-2008), I follow Henker and Wang (2006) and use a 1-second quote
delay.
B.2 Cleaning of raw data
Before matching trades and quotes with the above procedure, I ﬁlter out invalid trades and quotes
from TAQ raw data by excluding all observations that do not fulﬁll the following conditions:
2 Trades and quotes occur during regular trading hours (9:30am to 4:00pm) and have a positive
size, depth, and price.
2 For trades, I additionally require that:
(1) TAQ's CORR ﬁeld (correction indicator) is equal to 0, 1, or 2 (regular trades, original
trade which was later corrected, or symbol correction).
(2) TAQ's COND ﬁeld (sale condition) is either blank or equal to *, @, E, J, K, (regular
trade, NYSE Direct trade, Rule 127 trade, or Rule 155 trade, i.e., omitting trades
indicated to be exchange acquisitions or distributions or to involve nonstandard settlement
conditions).
(3) The absolute price change to the previous trade is less than 50%.
2 For quotes, I additionally require that:
(1) TAQ's MODE ﬁeld (quote condition) is equal to 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18, or
21-26 (i.e., omitting quotes indicated to be associated with trading halts or designated order
imbalances or to be non-ﬁrm quotes).
(2) The ask price is higher than the bid price, but not larger than 150% of the bid price.
Finally, following Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996), Huang and Stoll (1997), and Henker
and Wang (2006), I bunch all consecutive trades executed at the same price with no intervening
quote revisions. The trade volume for the bunched trade is the sum of all the trades bunched
together.
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Table III.1: Summary statistics
This table shows the mean, median, standard deviation (sd), minimum, and maximum for repurchase,
liquidity, and control variables. The sample includes ﬁrm quarters with non-missing data ending between
March 2004 and December 2008 for ﬁrms listed at NYSE. Panel A (B) shows the results for the within-
ﬁrm-variance (initiation-event) sample. For a deﬁnition of the diﬀerent subsamples see Section 4.1. For a
deﬁnition of the variables and a description of the data sources see Appendix A.
Variables N mean median sd min max
Panel A: Within-ﬁrm-variance sample
Repurchase Variables
RepIntens (million shares per quarter) 9,655 1.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 121.4
RepOtherIntens (million shares per quarter) 9,655 0.1 0.0 2.2 0.0 121.9
Liquidity Variables
QSPREAD ($) 9,655 0.193 0.125 0.409 0.011 19.338
ESPREAD ($) 9,655 0.078 0.051 0.191 0.009 5.341
DEPTH ('000 shares) 9,655 1.84 1.11 4.56 0.20 141.64
ADEPTH ('000 shares) 9,655 1.01 0.59 2.61 0.11 85.90
BDEPTH ('000 shares) 9,655 0.83 0.51 1.99 0.08 58.56
TURNOVER (million shares per day) 9,655 1.01 0.42 2.10 0.00 45.60
TRADES ('000 per day) 9,655 1.8 1.2 2.2 0.0 30.2
VOLA (% per day over quarter) 9,655 0.21 0.14 0.27 0.01 4.19
PIN (%) 9,655 11.8 10.6 7.5 0.0 100.0
ADSC (%) 9,655 74.7 76.4 9.9 16.4 93.2
ADSC*ESPREAD ($) 9,655 0.059 0.038 0.139 0.002 4.211
InfComp (%) 9,655 69.7 70.1 9.1 34.6 94.1
InfComp*QSPREAD ($) 9,655 0.143 0.087 0.310 0.005 15.465
Control variables
SIZE (million $) 9,655 4,865 1,698 11,683 16 256,906
PRICE ($) 9,655 32.71 26.41 47.39 0.88 936.22
SHAREHOLDERS (million) 9,655 20.8 3.5 94.3 0.0 2,600.0
ISSUANCE (million shares per quarter) 9,655 1.5 0.2 27.1 0.0 2,435.0
ANALYST (#) 9,655 8.5 7.0 6.4 0.0 38.0
LEVERAGE (%) 9,655 37.3 36.0 18.5 2.3 97.8
Panel B: Initiation-event sample
Repurchase Variables
RepIntens (million shares per quarter) 2,258 0.7 0.0 3.5 0.0 99.0
RepOtherIntens (million shares per quarter) 2,258 0.2 0.0 3.7 0.0 121.9
Liquidity Variables
QSPREAD ($) 2,258 0.181 0.121 0.368 0.013 7.631
ESPREAD ($) 2,258 0.078 0.051 0.215 0.010 5.341
DEPTH ('000 shares) 2,258 1.66 1.06 3.08 0.23 70.50
ADEPTH ('000 shares) 2,258 0.93 0.57 1.87 0.12 45.86
BDEPTH ('000 shares) 2,258 0.73 0.48 1.24 0.11 24.64
TURNOVER (million shares per day) 2,258 0.88 0.41 1.54 0.00 24.89
TRADES ('000 per day) 2,258 1.7 1.1 1.8 0.0 15.4
VOLA (% per day over quarter) 2,258 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.02 3.30
PIN (%) 2,258 11.7 10.6 7.2 0.0 100.0
ADSC (%) 2,258 74.9 76.3 9.5 36.2 91.1
ADSC*ESPREAD ($) 2,258 0.059 0.038 0.159 0.004 4.211
InfComp (%) 2,258 69.6 70.0 8.8 39.6 94.1
InfComp*QSPREAD ($) 2,258 0.133 0.085 0.274 0.006 6.278
Control variables
SIZE (million $) 2,258 4,186 1,633 8,251 35 108,329
PRICE ($) 2,258 32.54 26.52 44.90 1.82 801.99
SHAREHOLDERS (million) 2,258 19.8 3.5 103.3 0.0 2,500.0
ISSUANCE (million shares per quarter) 2,258 1.2 0.2 9.6 0.0 373.0
ANALYST (#) 2,258 8.3 7.0 6.4 0.0 37.3
LEVERAGE (%) 2,258 36.2 35.0 17.7 2.4 96.7
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Table III.2: Univariate tests
This table displays the mean and median for all liquidity-related variables for repurchase and non-repurchase
periods. For a deﬁnition of the variables and a description of the data sources see Appendix A. In Panel
A, the set of means and medians is calculated across all repurchase and non-repurchase quarters per ﬁrm.
In Panel B, the set of means and medians is calculated across the repurchase and non-repurchase quarters
per repurchase event. The diﬀerence in these means and medians between the two periods is then computed
per ﬁrm and repurchase event, respectively. The parametric paired t-test tests the null hypothesis that
the mean of the diﬀerences is zero. The non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test tests
the null hypothesis that both distributions are the same. All p-values are reported on the basis of two-tail
signiﬁcance levels. One, two, and three asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Means Medians
Non-Re- Re- Diﬀe- Non-Re Re- Diﬀe- %
Variables N purchase purchase rence purchase purchase rence Positive
Panel A: Within-ﬁrm-variance sample
QSPREAD 566 0.189 0.182 -0.007 0.131 0.122 -0.005 45 *
ESPREAD 566 0.075 0.077 0.001 0.050 0.050 0.000 49
DEPTH 566 1.84 1.75 -0.09 1.15 1.03 -0.11 40 ***
ADEPTH 566 1.02 0.96 -0.06 0.62 0.55 -0.06 39 ***
BDEPTH 566 0.83 0.80 -0.03 0.53 0.48 -0.03 42 ***
TURNOVER 566 0.96 0.99 0.03 0.39 0.44 0.02 58 ***
TRADES 566 1.7 1.9 0.3 *** 1.0 1.3 0.1 64 ***
VOLA 566 0.24 0.21 -0.03 *** 0.15 0.14 0.00 53
PIN 566 12.0 11.6 -0.4 ** 11.1 10.4 -0.6 42 ***
ADSC 566 75.0 74.6 -0.4 77.2 76.6 -0.3 48
ADSC*ESPREAD 566 0.056 0.058 0.001 0.037 0.039 0.000 50
InfComp 566 69.1 70.3 1.2 *** 70.0 70.9 1.4 60 ***
InfComp*QSPREAD 566 0.138 0.136 -0.003 0.090 0.086 -0.002 48
Panel B: Initiation-event sample
QSPREAD 1,129 0.181 0.181 0.000 0.123 0.120 0.000 50
ESPREAD 1,129 0.077 0.079 0.002 0.051 0.051 0.001 52
DEPTH 1,129 1.67 1.65 -0.02 1.08 1.03 -0.03 42 ***
ADEPTH 1,129 0.93 0.92 -0.02 0.59 0.55 -0.02 40 ***
BDEPTH 1,129 0.74 0.73 -0.01 0.49 0.48 -0.01 46 **
TURNOVER 1,129 0.87 0.90 0.03 ** 0.40 0.42 0.01 56 ***
TRADES 1,129 1.7 1.8 0.1 ** 1.1 1.2 0.1 67 ***
VOLA 1,129 0.20 0.17 -0.03 *** 0.14 0.14 0.00 53 ***
PIN 1,129 11.8 11.7 -0.1 10.6 10.6 -0.2 48
ADSC 1,129 75.0 74.7 -0.3 76.7 75.9 0.2 52
ADSC*ESPREAD 1,129 0.058 0.060 0.002 0.038 0.039 0.001 53
InfComp 1,129 69.2 70.0 0.8 *** 69.5 70.6 1.0 57 ***
InfComp*QSPREAD 1,129 0.133 0.134 0.001 0.085 0.085 0.001 53
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Table III.3: Real friction eﬀects - Turnover, number of trades, and return volatility
This table reports OLS regression results for the dependent variables TURNOV ER, TRADES, and V OLA.
Panel A (B) shows the results for the within-ﬁrm-variance (initiation-event) sample. For a deﬁnition of the
diﬀerent subsamples see Section 4.1. For a deﬁnition of the variables and a description of the data sources see
Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. Regression intercepts are not shown. One, two,
and three asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Dependent variables
variables log(TURNOVER) log(TRADES) log(VOLA)
Panel A: Within-ﬁrm-variance sample
log(RepIntens) 0.079 *** 0.074 *** -0.041 ***
log(SIZE) 0.746 *** 0.749 *** -0.335 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) 0.015 -0.005 -0.017 ***
log(ISSUANCE) 0.247 *** -0.044 0.047 ***
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.135 ** -0.084 * 0.019
SP500Dummy 0.196 * -0.072 0.090 ***
log(VOLA) 0.455 *** 0.402 ***
log(LEVERAGE) -0.022
log(TURNOVER) 0.136 ***
log(TRADES) 0.134 ***
R2 0.67 0.64 0.18
N 9,655 9,655 9,655
Panel B: Initiation-event sample
log(RepIntens) 0.139 *** 0.117 *** -0.031
log(SIZE) 0.742 *** 0.734 *** -0.312 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) 0.015 -0.017 -0.031 ***
log(ISSUANCE) 0.210 *** -0.061 * 0.022
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.145 ** -0.035 0.011
SP500Dummy 0.214 * -0.027 0.042
log(VOLA) 0.555 *** 0.492 ***
log(LEVERAGE) -0.027
log(TURNOVER) 0.116 ***
log(TRADES) 0.165 ***
R2 0.65 0.63 0.22
N 2,258 2,258 2,258
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Table III.4: Liquidity eﬀects - Spread
This table reports OLS regression results for the dependent variables QSPREAD and ESPREAD. Panel A
(B) shows the results for the within-ﬁrm-variance (initiation-event) sample. For a deﬁnition of the diﬀerent
subsamples see Section 4.1. For a deﬁnition of the variables and a description of the data sources see
Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. Regression intercepts are not shown. One, two,
and three asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Dependent variables
variables log(QSPREAD) log(ESPREAD)
Panel A: Within-ﬁrm-variance sample
log(RepIntens) -0.163 *** -0.042 *** -0.132 *** -0.031 ***
log(PRICE) 0.546 *** 0.842 *** 0.554 *** 0.714 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) -0.048 *** -0.014 ** -0.048 *** -0.016 ***
log(ISSUANCE) -0.133 *** -0.048 *** -0.121 *** -0.006
log(RepOtherIntens) -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 0.030
SP500Dummy -0.375 *** -0.069 ** -0.406 *** -0.089 ***
log(VOLA) 0.303 *** 0.268 ***
log(TURNOVER) 0.146 *** -0.085 ***
log(TRADES) -0.567 *** -0.238 ***
R2 0.28 0.53 0.36 0.55
N 9,655 9,655 9,655 9,655
Panel B: Initiation-event sample
log(RepIntens) -0.074 *** 0.017 -0.070 *** 0.008
log(PRICE) 0.548 *** 0.872 *** 0.574 *** 0.748 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) -0.029 ** -0.002 -0.039 *** -0.008
log(ISSUANCE) -0.110 *** -0.045 * -0.123 *** -0.012
log(RepOtherIntens) -0.057 -0.051 -0.051 -0.011
SP500Dummy -0.415 *** -0.121 ** -0.452 *** -0.125 ***
log(VOLA) 0.308 *** 0.271 ***
log(TURNOVER) 0.230 *** -0.052
log(TRADES) -0.661 *** -0.288 ***
R2 0.25 0.49 0.34 0.54
N 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258
106
Table III.5: Liquidity eﬀects - Depth
This table reports OLS regression results for the dependent variables DEPTH, ADEPTH and BDEPTH.
Panel A (B) shows the results for the within-ﬁrm-variance (initiation-event) sample. For a deﬁnition of the
diﬀerent subsamples see Section 4.1. For a deﬁnition of the variables and a description of the data sources see
Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. Regression intercepts are not shown. One, two,
and three asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Dependent variables
variables log(DEPTH) log(ADEPTH) log(BDEPTH)
Panel A: Within-ﬁrm-variance sample
log(RepIntens) 0.084 *** 0.068 *** 0.065 ** 0.049 *** 0.103 *** 0.089 ***
log(SIZE) -0.061 *** -0.139 *** -0.051 ** -0.128 *** -0.068 *** -0.151 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) 0.046 *** 0.023 *** 0.047 *** 0.022 *** 0.046 *** 0.025 ***
log(ISSUANCE) 0.361 *** 0.028 0.381 *** 0.030 0.334 *** 0.025
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.261 *** 0.018 0.274 *** 0.017 0.243 *** 0.019
SP500Dummy 0.370 *** 0.057 * 0.374 *** 0.043 0.361 *** 0.073 **
log(VOLA) -0.116 *** -0.130 *** -0.100 ***
log(TURNOVER) 1.118 *** 1.183 *** 1.035 ***
log(TRADES) -0.992 *** -1.057 *** -0.901 ***
R2 0.23 0.81 0.22 0.80 0.23 0.78
N 9,655 9,655 9,655 9,655 9,655 9,655
Panel B: Initiation-event sample
log(RepIntens) 0.061 ** 0.021 0.043 0.003 0.080 *** 0.040 ***
log(SIZE) -0.043 * -0.147 *** -0.032 -0.135 *** -0.050 ** -0.160 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) 0.057 *** 0.023 *** 0.057 *** 0.020 *** 0.056 *** 0.026 ***
log(ISSUANCE) 0.327 *** 0.027 0.345 *** 0.026 0.302 *** 0.027
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.279 *** 0.078 ** 0.295 *** 0.081 ** 0.258 *** 0.074 *
SP500Dummy 0.317 *** 0.048 0.314 *** 0.029 0.316 *** 0.068 *
log(VOLA) -0.154 *** -0.178 *** -0.128 ***
log(TURNOVER) 1.137 *** 1.212 *** 1.043 ***
log(TRADES) -1.011 *** -1.091 *** -0.904 ***
R2 0.21 0.81 0.20 0.80 0.22 0.80
N 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258
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Table III.6: Informational friction eﬀects - Probability of Informed Trading, Adverse
Selection Component, and Information Component
This table reports OLS regression results for the dependent variables PIN , ADSC ∗ ESPREAD, and
InfComp∗QSPREAD. Panel A (B) shows the results for the within-ﬁrm-variance (initiation-event) sample.
For a deﬁnition of the diﬀerent subsamples see Section 4.1. For a deﬁnition of the variables and a description
of the data sources see Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. Regression intercepts
are not shown. One, two, and three asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Dependent variables
variables log(PIN) log(ADSC*ESPREAD) log(InfComp*QSPREAD)
Panel A: Within-ﬁrm-variance sample
log(RepIntens) -0.011 -0.002 -0.007 ** -0.002 -0.012 *** -0.001
log(SIZE) -0.097 *** -0.026 *
log(PRICE) 0.057 *** 0.071 *** 0.096 *** 0.129 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 ** -0.002 ** -0.008 *** -0.003 *
log(ISSUANCE) 0.042 *** 0.034 ** -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.002
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.111 *** 0.100 *** 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.003
log(ANALYST) -0.131 *** -0.021 -0.026 *** -0.006 -0.058 *** -0.005
SP500Dummy -0.136 *** -0.156 *** 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.010
log(VOLA) -0.024 ** 0.021 *** 0.046 ***
log(TURNOVER) 0.024 0.009 0.021 **
log(TRADES) -0.198 *** -0.034 ** -0.084 ***
R2 0.13 0.16 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.40
N 9,655 9,655 9,655 9,655 9,655 9,655
Panel B: Initiation-event sample
log(RepIntens) -0.055 * -0.036 -0.004 * 0.000 -0.006 * 0.003
log(SIZE) -0.108 *** -0.040
log(PRICE) 0.060 *** 0.075 *** 0.096 *** 0.130 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) -0.017 * -0.021 ** -0.004 * -0.002 -0.005 * -0.002
log(ISSUANCE) 0.020 0.016 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 ** -0.008 **
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.100 ** 0.103 ** -0.001 0.000 -0.006 * -0.005
log(ANALYST) -0.104 *** 0.018 -0.029 *** -0.005 -0.057 *** -0.009
SP500Dummy -0.097 * -0.113 ** 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.010
log(VOLA) -0.061 ** 0.019 *** 0.038 ***
log(TURNOVER) 0.007 0.012 * 0.032 ***
log(TRADES) -0.197 *** -0.042 ** -0.091 ***
R2 0.13 0.17 0.25 0.32 0.27 0.38
N 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258
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Table III.7: Discontinuation-event sample
This table reports OLS regression results for the discontinuation-event sample. Panel A covers real friction
eﬀects (see Table III.3). Panel B and C cover total liquidity measured in spreads and depth (see also
Table III.4 and III.5). Panel D covers informational friction eﬀects (see Table III.6). For a deﬁnition of
the variables and a description of the data sources see Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the
ﬁrm-level. Regression intercepts are not shown. One, two, and three asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Independent Dependent variables
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Real friction eﬀects
log(TURNOVER) log(TRADES) log(VOLA)
log(RepIntens) 0.097 *** 0.054 ** 0.009
log(SIZE) 0.725 *** 0.742 *** -0.345 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) 0.027 -0.001 -0.019 **
log(ISSUANCE) 0.224 *** -0.088 ** 0.032
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.149 ** -0.017 -0.119 ***
SP500Dummy 0.220 * -0.014 0.073
log(VOLA) 0.638 *** 0.603 ***
log(LEVERAGE) -0.008
log(TURNOVER) 0.079 **
log(TRADES) 0.234 ***
R2 0.65 0.65 0.26
N 2,106 2,106 2,106
Panel B: Liquidity eﬀects - Spreads
log(QSPREAD) log(ESPREAD)
log(RepIntens) -0.080 *** -0.024 -0.076 *** -0.019
log(PRICE) 0.589 *** 0.879 *** 0.598 *** 0.762 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) -0.047 *** -0.010 -0.047 *** -0.010
log(ISSUANCE) -0.154 *** -0.080 *** -0.155 *** -0.030
log(RepOtherIntens) -0.057 -0.043 -0.019 0.025
SP500Dummy -0.421 *** -0.086 -0.452 *** -0.100 **
log(VOLA) 0.368 *** 0.318 ***
log(TURNOVER) 0.206 *** -0.056
log(TRADES) -0.636 *** -0.297 ***
R2 0.29 0.53 0.37 0.57
N 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106
Panel C: Liquidity eﬀects - Depths
log(DEPTH) log(ADEPTH) log(BDEPTH)
log(RepIntens) 0.083 *** 0.026 * 0.069 ** 0.010 0.097 *** 0.042 ***
log(SIZE) -0.070 *** -0.163 *** -0.056 ** -0.148 *** -0.082 *** -0.178 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) 0.060 *** 0.027 *** 0.061 *** 0.026 *** 0.058 *** 0.029 ***
log(ISSUANCE) 0.386 *** 0.038 0.403 *** 0.034 0.366 *** 0.044 *
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.254 ** 0.060 0.275 ** 0.066 0.229 ** 0.054
SP500Dummy 0.331 *** 0.065 * 0.315 *** 0.036 0.347 *** 0.096 ***
log(VOLA) -0.152 *** -0.180 *** -0.121 ***
log(TURNOVER) 1.164 *** 1.230 *** 1.077 ***
log(TRADES) -1.017 *** -1.087 *** -0.921 ***
R2 0.20 0.82 0.19 0.81 0.21 0.79
N 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106
Panel D: Informational friction eﬀects
log(PIN) log(ADSC*ESPREAD) log(InfComp*QSPREAD)
log(RepIntens) -0.061 ** -0.056 * -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
log(SIZE) -0.092 *** -0.036
log(PRICE) 0.066 *** 0.080 *** 0.104 *** 0.136 ***
log(SHAREHOLDERS) -0.022 *** -0.022 *** -0.005 * -0.002 -0.006 ** -0.001
log(ISSUANCE) 0.073 ** 0.048 -0.003 -0.001 -0.010 ** -0.007 *
log(RepOtherIntens) 0.181 *** 0.156 ** 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
log(ANALYST) -0.134 *** -0.034 -0.034 ** -0.009 ** -0.061 *** -0.007
SP500Dummy -0.124 ** -0.143 *** 0.007 0.014 0.001 0.015
log(VOLA) -0.016 0.028 *** 0.060 ***
log(TURNOVER) 0.056 0.009 0.026 ***
log(TRADES) -0.205 *** -0.038 ** -0.089 ***
R2 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.41
N 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106
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Chapter IV
Measuring the Quality of Corporate
Governance:
Is there a Uniform Standard?1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate if there is a uniform standard for measuring the quality of cor-
porate governance. An emerging literature in corporate governance investigates governance
indices and typically follows a tick-box-approach, which constructs a comprehensive index
of governance provisions that are deemed desirable by simply adding the number of such
provisions for each company. Some recent papers show that only a small number of corpo-
rate governance attributes that are included in these indices can be consistently related to
ﬁrm valuation.2 However, the attributes in these papers relate so far only to the institutional
environment in the US and it is unclear whether they have any relevance for ﬁrms domiciled
outside the US.
We address the heterogeneity of attributes that identify the quality of corporate gov-
ernance provisions across institutional environments. Our starting point is the hypothesis
that what is a good provision in one country may not at all be also a good provision in
1This chapter is joint work with Prof. Ernst Maug, Ph.D., from the University of Mannheim.
2The ﬁrst paper to show that only a small number of provisions can be related to ﬁrm value is Bebchuk,
Cohen, and FerrelI (2009) using IRRC governance data. Brown and Caylor (2006) use ISS governance data
and a diﬀerent regression approach, but obtain a similar conclusion.
111
another country. For example, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell's (2009) Entrenchment index is
largely based on the extent to which managers can entrench themselves against takeovers,
particularly hostile takeovers. However, hostile takeovers play very little or no role in most
civil law countries, so we expect that takeover provisions are accordingly less important.3
Entrenchment provisions as well as governance provisions related to executive compensation
or the independence of the board of directors and its committees also focus on the conﬂict
of interest between shareholders and management, which is important for ﬁrms with a dis-
persed ownership structure. However, most ﬁrms outside the common law countries have
concentrated equity ownership, so we hypothesize that for these ﬁrms governance attributes
that regulate the shareholder-management conﬂict are less important, whereas provisions
that relate to the conﬂict between large and small shareholders are more important.
Based on the literature on ﬁrms outside the US we also suspect that countries overregulate
corporate governance and impose attributes that are deemed desirable on all ﬁrms, thereby
restricting the scope to private contracting. However, those ﬁrms that decide not to choose
certain governance attributes may have good reasons for doing so and regulation may then
impose unnecessary costs for compliance with these regulations.4 In this sense, there may
be too much of a good thing.5
Finally, governance attributes can be substitutes as well as complements. An example
for a substitute may be the independence of the compensation committee: this provision
may become less necessary if shareholders have to approve all compensation provisions and
if shareholders are also suﬃciently informed about the costs and beneﬁts of compensation
plans.6 An example for complementary provisions could be the ability of the board to hire
outside advisors: This provision may be of little value if the board itself is chaired by the
CEO and has only a minority of independent directors, so that board independence becomes
3For a sample from 1993 to 2001, Martynova and Renneboog (2006) count 162 hostile bids for targets in
29 European countries. Of these 92 bids were for targets in the UK, 14 in France, 11 in Sweden, and 3 in
Germany.
4The literature on the question whether the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) has imposed excessive regulation
is controversial. Romano (2005) argues that the act was ill-conceived. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)
ﬁnd that SOX imposed costs on small ﬁrms that reduce their value. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009) do
not ﬁnd evidence consistent with the hypothesis that overregulation by the SOX has reduced cross-listings
in New York.
5This view is expressed by Arcot and Bruno (2009) and Bruno and Claessens (2010).
6See Thomas and Martin (1999) and Morgan and Poulsen (2001) for evidence on how shareholder pro-
posals aﬀect executive compensation.
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a complement. These relationships lead to non-linear interaction eﬀects between diﬀerent
corporate governance attributes. Given that many governance attributes are mandated in
most countries, the eﬀectiveness of ﬁrm-level governance then depends on those provisions
that are already in place by law (or are prevented by law).
We therefore hypothesize that governance provisions depend on the institutional environ-
ment, because of these non-linear relationships as well as the diﬀerent conﬂicts of interests
highlighted above. These are naturally diﬃcult to capture by tick-box-indices, which sim-
ply add diﬀerent provisions. We therefore ﬁrst investigate the marginal contribution of each
governance attribute separately, using selection techniques that have been used previously
in the literature. A comparison of four diﬀerent approaches reveals that stepwise regressions
seem to be more robust than the other approaches. In a second step we then construct par-
simonious governance indices and relate them to ﬁrm valuation. Ideally, we would conduct
this analysis at the country-level to capture all institutional diﬀerences. However, our data
set is heavily skewed towards the common law countries and we would have suﬃcient data
for only four countries to conduct a country-level analysis (Canada, Japan, UK, US), three
of which are English legal origin countries. We therefore conduct our analysis for pooled
samples of all ﬁrms that share the same legal origin.
We ﬁnd evidence consistent with all our hypotheses. We ﬁrst determine which governance
attributes display a statistically signiﬁcant relationship with ﬁrm valuation in each legal
origin sample and ﬁnd that the sets of attributes that are included for each of the legal
origin samples hardly overlap. Moreover, we ﬁnd that some attributes have a negative
relation to ﬁrm value in some of the samples, so there is evidence that there can be too
much of a good thing, and advice on good governance should include reﬂections on the
institutional environment. We then construct a parsimonious governance index for each
legal origin sample and ﬁnd that the indices are not highly correlated with each other. Each
index is signiﬁcantly related to ﬁrm value in its own sample, so we concur with the previous
literature that good governance pays. The provisions excluded from each of the indices have
no explanatory power for the relevant sample, so we can exclude the possibility that our
procedures have eliminated provisions that are relevant for ﬁrm values. In contrast, the
governance index for one legal origin sample has generally no explanatory power for ﬁrm
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values in any of the other samples. We are therefore led to the conclusion that governance
indices are highly dependent on the institutional and economic environment and that there
is no uniform standard against which the quality of corporate governance can be measured.
What is good in one country is therefore not necessarily also good in another country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the data set.
In Section 3 we present our regression analysis and perform the selection of value-relevant
governance attributes. In Section 4 we continue with constructing parsimonious governance
indices and studying their properties and relation to ﬁrm values. Finally, we present a
robustness checks in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and research design
In this section, we describe our sample selection process, the research design, and the main
variables.
2.1 Sample selection
Our source for governance data is the Corporate Governance Database compiled by Insti-
tutional Shareholder Service (ISS), one of the largest corporate governance data providers
for institutional investors. In 2002, ISS started to collect ﬁrm-level governance data for US
ﬁrms. The US coverage includes the S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P 600, and Russell 3000 indices
plus 2,300 additional companies. In 2003, ISS extended its database to non-US ﬁrms. The
non-US universe includes ﬁrms from four partly overlapping indices. UK coverage is based on
the FTSE All Share Index (98% coverage of total market capitalization). Canadian coverage
is based on the S&P/TSX Composite Index (71% coverage of total market capitalization).
Other countries are tracked on the basis of the MSCI EAFE Index (20 developed markets,
85% coverage of market capitalization in each country), and the FTSE All-World Developed
Index (20 developed markets, 90% coverage of the market capitalization in each country).
For 2005 the ISS database covers in total about 8,000 ﬁrms from 23 countries.
Our US data set contains 12 quarterly observations for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005.
Our non-US data set is composed of 10 quarterly observations for the same period, because
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ISS started data surveying in the second half of 2003. In this paper, we focus exclusively
on the 2005 sample, because this sample oﬀers the largest sample size and the best data
quality in terms of the smallest number of missing values. However, coverage for US ﬁrms
and non-US ﬁrms still diﬀers signiﬁcantly.
To derive the ﬁnal sample, we ﬁrst exclude all ﬁrms whose country of listing and incor-
poration diﬀers. This reduces the initial sample by about 50 ﬁrms. This exclusion yields
the sample that is denoted with ISS universe in Table IV.1. Table IV.1 summarizes the
remaining steps for the construction of our ﬁnal data set.
 Insert Table IV.1 approximately here 
Starting from the ISS universe of 7,941 ﬁrms, we follow the usual practice to exclude
all ﬁnancial ﬁrms from the sample.7 We then use the ﬁscal year end-date of each ﬁrm
to select the closest quarterly ISS observation. For a number of ﬁrms we ﬁnd no suitable
ISS observation, because either single quarterly observations were missing, or because ISS
tracking started one or more quarters after the ﬁrm's ﬁscal year end-date. If only single
quarterly observations were missing, we selected the last available ISS observation prior to
the ﬁrm's ﬁscal year end-date. If ISS tracking started one or more quarters after the ﬁrm's
ﬁscal year end-date, we had to exclude these observations from the sample. This second
step leaves a sample of 6,120 ﬁrms. Of these we can successfully merge 4,589 observations
to Worldscope and Datastream. The US coverage is larger than the international coverage
(as it is often the case). We therefore reduce the US sample and select a subsample with
propensity score matching based on Sales, Net Income, Total Assets, and two-digit SIC
codes. The remaining US sample consists of 832 of the original 2,990 ﬁrms. The ﬁnal sample
for all countries has 2,431 ﬁrms.
Table IV.1 also shows the diﬀerences in the attribute coverage between non-US and US
ﬁrms. For US ﬁrms included in the sample, on average 2% of the governance attributes
are missing. Non-US ﬁrms have on average almost six times as many missing values with
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the individual countries. The percentage of missing values
varies from 3% for Australian and Canadian ﬁrms to 21% for ﬁrms from Greece.
7Financial ﬁrms are usually excluded, because they are subject to special laws, regulations, and accounting
standards and their corporate governance, ﬁnancial structure, and accounting ratios diﬀer substantially from
ﬁrms in other industries.
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2.2 Firm characteristics
We use several accounting and other ﬁnancial variables in this paper that are all obtained
from either Thomson Financial's Worldscope or Datastream. We use a simple approximation
of Tobin's Q as measure of ﬁrm value, which deﬁnes Tobin's Q as the ratio of the market value
to the book value of the assets.8 The market value of assets is computed as the book value of
assets plus the market value of common equity less the book value of common equity.9 Firms'
market value of common equity is determined 90 calendar days after the ﬁrm's ﬁscal year
end-date. We estimate the Age of a ﬁrm by calculating the number of months between the
ﬁrm's ﬁrst trading day and the ﬁrm's ﬁscal year end-date. The variables PPE and Leverage
are deﬁned as property, plant, and equipment to assets and total debt to assets, respectively.
We compute ﬁrm-speciﬁc Risk as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns
over the year ending with the ﬁscal year end-date. We ﬁnally create an indicator variable for
cross-listings in the US. ADR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has an American
Depository Receipt (ADR) and zero otherwise.
To create our ﬁnal data set we correct for the diﬀering ISS coverage of US and non-US
ﬁrms. The non-US universe is limited to the largest companies in each country, while the US
universe also includes mid-size and small companies. We use a propensity score matching
approach to identify a subsample of US ﬁrms that is comparable to the non-US sample
in terms of size and industry classiﬁcation. The industry matching is based on two-digit
SIC-codes. The propensity scores for the match are derived from a Probit regression of an
indicator variable (that is 1 for all non-US ﬁrms and zero otherwise) on Sales, Net Income,
Total Assets, and industry dummies. The propensity score equals the probability that a ﬁrm
with certain characteristics is a non-US ﬁrm. We use a nearest neighbor matching algorithm
with replacement to allow US ﬁrms to be used more than once as closest match in order
to improve the matching quality. The ﬁnal US sample consists of all US ﬁrms that were
matched at least once. Table IV.2 reports the average ﬁrm characteristics for the matched
8Tobin's Q is deﬁned as the ﬁrm's market value divided by the replacement value of the assets. However,
Perfect and Wiles (1994) showed that replacement values can be estimated by the ﬁrm's book value of assets
without biasing results. For a detailed discussion of diﬀerent measures of Tobin's Q see also Whited and
Erickson (2006).
9Balance sheet deferred taxes are not considered in this simple approximation of the market value of
assets. See also Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Black, Jang, and Kim (2006b), Bruno
and Claessens (2010), and Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009).
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US sample in comparison to the non-US sample and the non-matched US sample.
 Insert Table IV.2 approximately here 
Table IV.2 shows that the average ﬁrm in the overall US sample of 2,990 ﬁrms is about
one-third of the size of the non-US ﬁrms in terms of Sales, Net Income, and Total Assets. Our
matching approach signiﬁcantly reduces this gap, but without closing it completely. This
matching approach excludes the majority of mid-size and small US ﬁrms. Table IV.2 also
reports the mean values of the ﬁrm characteristics used in later regressions. In comparison
to the non-US ﬁrms, the matched US ﬁrms have a higher Tobin's Q, are younger, have less
tangible assets, are riskier, and have slightly higher leverage. Table IV.3 displays descriptive
statistics for the ﬁrm characteristics in the ﬁnal sample.
 Insert Table IV.3 approximately here 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the overall sample. The average ﬁrm in our
sample has a Tobin's Q (TQ) of 1.91, Sales of $6,061 million, a ﬁrm Age of about 20 years,
a PPE ratio and an annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns (Risk) of about
31%, and a Leverage of 23%. 14% of all ﬁrms in the sample are cross-listed in the US. Panel
B reports the mean and median of the same ﬁrm characteristics for four subsamples. The
subsamples are formed by grouping countries by their legal origin. The ﬁgures show that
English and Scandinavian law ﬁrms have the highest Tobin's Q. This is consistent with the
ﬁgures on Sales and Age for French and German law ﬁrms, which are larger and older.
2.3 Governance provisions
ISS tracks 55 individual governance provisions for all non-US ﬁrms and 61 governance at-
tributes for US ﬁrms. The 61 US governance attributes comprise the 55 non-US attributes
until the second quarter in 2005. Starting in the third quarter of 2005, ISS replaced six of
the 55 non-US governance provisions with six other attributes not tracked in the non-US
sample. We use these attributes in the following way: First, in order to keep as many of
the 55 non-US attributes as possible, we supplement the US observations from the third and
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fourth quarter by the second quarter observations for the six excluded attributes (if available
for the ﬁrm in question).10 Second, we exclude four of the 55 non-US governance attributes
from our analysis, because they cover special poison pill features, which apply only to a small
subset of ﬁrms.11 Third, we split two attributes into two separate governance provisions.
On the one hand, we use the attribute Options grants align with company performance and
the burn rate is reasonable to create the two attributes Option grants alignment (a52) and
Option burn rate (a37). On the other hand, we split the attribute No poison pill is in place
and blank check preferred stock is not authorized into the two provisions Poison pill (a45)
and Blank check preferred stock (a38). This three-step procedure leaves us with a data set
of 53 governance attributes per ﬁrm, more than in any other study conducted with ISS data.
Each governance attribute has between two and seven mutually exclusive assessment
categories. Most attributes have three answer categories: two of them indicate the presence
or absence of a characteristic and the third indicates missing information. We use a binary
coding for the governance attributes that is common in the literature.12 We assign a value
of one to an attribute if the company meets a minimally required corporate governance
standard as deﬁned by ISS and assign zero otherwise.13Appendix A provides an overview on
the 53 governance attributes together with a deﬁnition of the minimally required corporate
governance standard. To complete the coding of the governance attributes, we set all missing
observations to zero. This means, we make the (conservative) assumption that the ﬁrms with
missing values did not adopt the respective provision.14
10These are the six attributes Directors retirement age (a47), Directors term limits (a48), Auditor rotation
(a49), Option repricing (a50), Pension plans (a51), and Corporate loans (a53).
11These provisions cover the four poison pill features three-year independent director evaluation, sunset
provision, qualiﬁed oﬀer clause, and trigger.
12Studies using IRRC data: Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen, and FerrelI (2009), and
Cremers and Nair (2005). Studies using ISS data: Brown and Caylor (2006), Bruno and Claessens (2010),
Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2010), and Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009).
13The following two exceptions apply: First, ISS deﬁnes the minimal governance standard for the attribute
Oﬃcers and directors ownership (a17) as Oﬃcers and directors should have a signiﬁcant ownership position
in their company's stock.. Similar to Brown and Caylor (2006) and Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson
(2010), we interpret signiﬁcant as at least 1% but not over 30% of shares outstanding. Second, ISS deﬁnes
the minimal governance level for the attribute Directors education (a18) as All board members should
participate in an ISS accredited director education program.. Similar to Brown and Caylor (2006), we
deﬁne minimally required as At least one director has participated in an ISS accredited director education
program. This adjustment is necessary because otherwise this attribute would not exhibit any variation
over all non-US observations.
14We also experimented with other procedures to handle the missing values. About 9% of the 128,843
data ﬁelds (53 attributes*2,341 ﬁrms) are missing. Excluding single governance attributes or ﬁrms from the
sample is not a reasonable approach, because these missing values are spread over 35 (out of 53) governance
attributes and 1,938 (out of 2,431) ﬁrms.
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Table IV.4 summarizes the frequency of the 53 governance attributes by country.
 Insert Table IV.4 approximately here 
Table IV.4 reports a high variation in the percentage of ﬁrms that adopted certain gov-
ernance provisions, both across provisions and across countries. We highlight the following
observations:
2 Only few ﬁrms, notably in Spain, the US, and Italy provide shareholders with Cumu-
lative voting rights (a07).
2 A policy that limits outside directorship to four or fewer boards (a23) is only in place
in a minority of ﬁrms in the Netherlands, the UK, and the US.
2 Most ﬁrms require a supermajority vote to change the charter/bylaws (a39), the ex-
ception being ﬁrms in Greece, the Netherlands, and the US.
2 State anti-takeover provisions (a46) are in place in all countries, except in Ireland and
the UK.
Five governance provisions stand out, because they are adopted by almost all ﬁrms in almost
all countries:
2 Virtually all ﬁrms respond to shareholder proposals (a19).
2 Blank check preferred stock (a38) is usually not authorized, with the exception being
US and Canadian ﬁrms.
2 Shareholders can call Special meetings (a42). The exception are about a quarter of the
ﬁrms from Singapore and about three ﬁfth of ﬁrms from the US.
2 Boards usually cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval (a43), the exception
being the majority of ﬁrms in Italy and virtually all ﬁrms in the US.
2 Poison pills (a45) are not a common governance practice. They are only used fre-
quently in Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the US.
Some governance attributes exhibit a very strong variation across countries:
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2 Annually elected boards (a05) are common in Canada, Finland, and Sweden, while
classiﬁed boards are the rule in many other countries, e.g., Germany, Italy, and Singa-
pore.
2 The performance of the board is regularly reviewed (a12) in almost all Canadian and
German ﬁrms, but not in Greece, Hong Kong, and Japan.
The last row in Table IV.4 states the number of attributes with no variation within the
respective country. This number ranges from 1 for the US to 32 for Austria and indicates
the extent to which governance is regulated, respectively, the extent to which governance is
left to the contracting parties. On average, English law countries have only 5.3 governance
attributes with no within-country variation, whereas the numbers for French law (17.3),
German law (19.8), and Scandinavian law (22.1) are substantially higher.15 Hence, English
law countries impose less homogeneity of governance on ﬁrms and leave more scope to private
contracting compared to civil law countries.
2.4 Research design
In order to examine the relation between a ﬁrm's corporate governance and its valuation,
we use the following OLS regression speciﬁcation:
log (TQi) = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βk ∗ CGik +
J∑
j=1
βj ∗Xij
+IndustryDummiesix + CountryDummiesiy + εi.
Index i denotes the individual ﬁrms. CGik stands for one or more (k ≥ 1) individual
governance provisions and/or comprehensive or parsimonious governance indices. Xij de-
notes ﬁrm-level control variables. The ﬁrm-level controls are the six ﬁrm characteristics
log(Sales), log(Age), PPE, Risk, Leverage, and ADR. We include these control variables
to address the endogeneity problem caused by omitted variables. These controls are either
observable joint determinants or proxy variables for unobservable ﬁrm characteristics that
15These numbers are not tabulated. They are calculated as averages of the numbers of provisions without
variation in each country as reported in Table IV.4, weighted by the number of observations from each
country.
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aﬀect the level of corporate governance and ﬁrm value. The association of these control vari-
ables with governance was examined by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005),
Black, Jang, and Kim (2006a), Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2007), and Doidge, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2004). We use Sales and ﬁrm Age as an indicator for ﬁrm size. PPE proxies for
the tangibility/intangibility of the ﬁrm's assets. Risk measures the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty.
Leverage is a proxy for managerial discretion and therefore for agency problems. ADR is
an indicator for cross-listings in the US. We do not include value drivers (e.g., ROA or sales
growth) as controls in our regressions, even though these have been shown to be reliably
related to Tobin's Q. The reason is that we want to measure the relationship between ﬁrm
value and corporate governance, irrespective of the transmission mechanism. Hence, if im-
provements in corporate governance aﬀect proﬁtability or growth, then we want to measure
this aspect rather than control for it, so we leave out these ﬁrm-level controls.16
We winsorize extreme percentiles (1st and 99th) of the variables Tobin's Q, PPE, Risk,
and Leverage in order to avoid that extreme observations or outliers distort the regression
results. We furthermore use a logarithm-transformation for Tobin's Q, Sales, and Age,
because the distributions of these variables are highly skewed. The industry dummies are
based on the Worldscope classiﬁcation of 25 industry groups (including ﬁnancial ﬁrms).
A White- and Breusch-Pagan-test for homoskedasticity suggest the presence of het-
eroskedasticity. This fact implies that OLS estimates are unbiased, but the reported standard
errors are incorrect. For this reason, White (robust) standard errors are commonly used for
statistical inference.17 Beyond this, Rogers (clustered-robust) standard errors can be used
to assess the signiﬁcance of the estimated OLS coeﬃcients.18 These clustered-robust stan-
dard errors also take into account the correlation of errors within clusters. In the regression
setting above, one would ideally allow for a clustering of errors along the industry dimension
and along the country dimension, or at least one-way clustering along the country dimen-
sion.19 However, clustered-robust standard errors only yield correct inference if the number
16See, e.g., Klapper and Love (2004), Bebchuk, Cohen, and FerrelI (2009), Durnev and Kim (2005), Bruno
and Claessens (2010), Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2010), or Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009).
17See Greene (2003), p. 222-224.
18See Rogers (1993). For a comparison of diﬀerent approaches to estimate standard errors in ﬁnance
data sets see Petersen (2009). For multi-way clustering and the importance of the according cluster-robust
inference see, e.g., Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006).
19See, e.g., Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2010) and Bruno and Claessens (2010) for the use of
clustered standard errors at the country level.
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of clusters is suﬃciently large (≥50) and if the number of observations is evenly distributed
over all clusters.20 Both prerequisites are violated in our data as we have only 23 countries
(24 industries) with between 10 and 832 (10 and 347) observations. We therefore use White
standard errors for inference.
3 Analysis
The ﬁrst step of our analysis is the construction of parsimonious corporate governance in-
dices. Previous research for the US shows that only a small number of governance provisions
can be related to ﬁrm value, whereas many other governance provisions do not seem to have
any reliable relationship with ﬁrm value. Following the discussion in the Introduction, we
expect that there are signiﬁcant cross-country diﬀerences with respect to the relevance of
governance provisions. Comprehensive indices cover this heterogeneity, because they may
be signiﬁcant in all countries, even though the relevant provisions diﬀer from country to
country. We construct parsimonious indices using four diﬀerent methods:
The BCF-approach. The ﬁrst approach was pioneered by Bebchuk, Cohen, and FerrelI
(2009) for IRRC governance data and modiﬁed for ISS data by Brown and Caylor (2006).
We run 53 separate regressions of the logarithm of Tobin's Q on (1) provision i, where i is
any of the 53 attributes, (2) an index of all the other 52 attributes (which is equivalent to the
comprehensive index minus attribute i), and (3) the set of controls and dummies as described
in the research design section (2.4).21 We then select all those governance attributes that
are signiﬁcant at least at the 10%-level in these regressions.
The ALL-approach. The ALL-approach follows Brown and Caylor (2006) and simulta-
neously includes all 53 attributes in a regression of the logarithm of Tobin's Q and uses the
same control variables as the BCF-approach. We then also select those attributes that are
signiﬁcant at least at the 10%-level. The main advantage of this approach relative to the
BCF-approach is that it does not aggregate the other provisions. However, many of the
20See Kézdi (2004).
21Bebchuk, Cohen, and FerrelI (2009) use three other variants of this approach, in particular one where
component (2) is replaced by dummy variables for each of the remaining attributes, and show that these
modiﬁcations lead to very similar results.
122
provisions are highly correlated within countries and therefore with the country dummies,
which gives rise to multicollinearity problems.22
The AIC-approach. Our third approach applies a stepwise regression technique. We
include all dummy variables and control variables as in the BCF-approach and the ALL-
approach. We use a backward elimination procedure that can only aﬀect the governance
attributes, but not the controls and dummies. At each step, the attribute with the highest
p-value in a two-sided test for signiﬁcance is eliminated. We then use the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC) to choose the best of these regression speciﬁcations.23 We select the
regression that minimizes the AIC, which is deﬁned as -2*L + 2*p, where L represents the
maximized log-likelihood of the regression and p stands for the number of parameters used in
this regression. The idea here is to judge the regression by its goodness of ﬁt, but to penalize
the inclusion of additional parameters, so that the regression that is ﬁnally chosen trades oﬀ
improvements in the explained variation against the inclusion of additional parameters.24
The STEP-approach. Finally, we alter the AIC-approach by no longer using the AIC
to select a regression speciﬁcation. The elimination process for the governance provisions is
the same as in the AIC-approach above, but the procedure stops once the regression only
contains attributes with p-values below 10%. This approach is also inspired by Brown and
Caylor (2006). However, we use backward elimination instead of forward selection.
Our regression methodology encounters one additional problem. Many attributes have
very little within-sample variation, so that they are highly correlated with the country dum-
mies. We therefore eliminate all attributes from each legal origin sample that have identical
22Multicollinearity inﬂates standard errors. Variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) are a common measure to
assess the degree to which collinearity of the independent variables increases the standard errors for these
variables. A VIF of one indicates the absence of any correlations and the use of correct standard errors.
A VIF of around or greater than ten indicates that collinearity is associated with this variable and that
standard errors are inﬂated by a factor greater three. The majority of variables with VIFs greater than ten
are country dummies.
23See Greene (2003), pp. 159-160.
24We also experimented with the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which is similar to the AIC, but
replaces 2 by log(n) in the second argument in the equation, where n stands for the number of observations.
For log(n)>2, BIC favors more parsimonious models than AIC, because it penalizes speciﬁcations with more
parameters more. In our model, the regression that is chosen by BIC typically contains no governance
attributes (except for the Scandinavian law sample). The reason is that a large proportion of the explained
variation comes from the dummy variables and control variables included in the regression, so that the
additional explanatory power of the governance attributes is judged to be too small. We therefore do not
adopt this approach.
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values for more than 95% of the ﬁrms in that sample, i.e., all attributes where the percent-
age of ﬁrms that have the governance provision is either above 95% or below 5%. This step
eliminates 4 attributes from the English law sample, 10 attributes from the French law sam-
ple, 24 attributes for German law ﬁrms, and 20 attributes for Scandinavian law ﬁrms. This
highlights once more that the German law countries and the Scandinavian law countries are
more highly regulated, whereas English law countries leave more governance attributes to
private contracting. We will later provide a robustness check where we include all attributes.
Note that some variables we exclude may be economically important, yet we cannot detect
their relevance because of a lack of within-sample variation.
 Insert Table IV.5 approximately here 
Table IV.5 presents the results for all 28 attributes that were signiﬁcant in at least one
of the four samples for at least one methodology. The other 25 attributes that were never
signiﬁcant are omitted from the table. The four methodologies used here generate broadly
similar results. If an attribute is included by one approach, then it is mostly also signiﬁcant
with at least one other approach. Only the BCF- and the AIC-approach include attributes
that are not included by any other approach. This is not surprising, because, on the one hand,
AIC is the only approach that does not require a maximum p-value for inclusion in the ﬁnal
regression. AIC therefore imposes less stringent requirements and includes more attributes.
On the other hand, the BCF-approach just includes two governance related regressors in each
regression. BCF therefore enhances the association with individual governance provisions.
The ALL-approach and the STEP-approach never include any attribute that is not included
by at least one other approach. There are still eleven cases where the ALL-approach and
the STEP-approach disagree as to whether a speciﬁc attribute should be included for a
particular sample. In seven cases the STEP-approach identiﬁes an attribute that is not
signiﬁcant in the ALL-approach. In ﬁve of these seven cases the decision of the STEP-
approach is corroborated by the BCF-approach, which is never the case for the four cases
where the ALL-approach identiﬁes an attribute but not the STEP-approach. We therefore
conclude that the STEP-approach delivers decisions that cohere better with those of the
other approaches and rely on the STEP-approach for most of our remaining discussion.
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The number of attributes included depends on the sample as well as on the selection
approach. The ALL-approach is the most conservative and includes on average 4.5 attributes,
whereas the AIC-approach includes on average 8.3 attributes. Across all four approaches,
ﬁve to ten attributes are included for the German law sample, whereas for the Scandinavian
law sample the same number ranges from one to six. This diﬀering number of included
attributes is only partially explained by sample size (which is smaller for German law than
for English law). It is also not related to the average within-sample variation of the attributes
(which is highest for English law and lowest for German law).
Negative regression coeﬃcients. The ﬁrst and most striking observation is that a large
number of the regression coeﬃcients - 35 out of 84 - is negative, and a third of the negative
coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%-level or higher. Interestingly, most of the
negative coeﬃcients cluster in the German legal origin sample, where three attributes (iden-
tiﬁed by the STEP-approach) have consistently negative coeﬃcients across all approaches:
2 Board size (a06) indicates whether the size of the board is within the recommended
interval of 6 to 15 members. More than 70% of all German legal origin companies
have boards that are within this size limit, and these are spread evenly across the
four German legal origin countries. However, with the exception of one German and
one Swiss company, all companies in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland with boards
outside the recommended size range have less than 6 members, whereas in Japan 86%
of the 137 boards outside the recommended range have more than 15 members.
2 Auditor ratiﬁcation (a27) requires that auditors are ratiﬁed at the most recent annual
general meeting. This attribute is shared by 90% of all German legal origin ﬁrms,
which are spread very evenly across countries.
2 Executives stock ownership requirements (a32) require executives to hold stock as part
of their contract. This is the case for 75% of the managers for Swiss companies, but
only for one German company and no other Austrian or Japanese company.
For Scandinavian law ﬁrms no attribute has a negative association with Tobin's Q, and for
English law and French law ﬁrms there are three other attributes with a negative sign:
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2 For English law countries, Board amendments (a43), which prevent the board from
changing the bylaws without shareholder approval, has a negative coeﬃcient for all
approaches. This attribute is shared by all companies in the English law sample other
than the US ﬁrms and one UK company. In the US, only 21 out of 832 companies
have boards that cannot amend the bylaws. This diﬀerence reﬂects the general dif-
ference between the US, where the relationship and the board follows the model of
a representative democracy, and most other countries, where this role is modeled on
a direct democracy with more direct shareholder involvement. Zetsche (2005) argues
that direct shareholder involvement is optimal for concentrated ownership, whereas
dispersed ownership calls for limits to shareholder rights in order to prevent abuse
of direct intervention rights by dissident shareholders. We therefore suspect that the
US-model, which limits shareholder rights, is in fact optimal for many companies that
allow boards to amend the bylaws.
2 For French law countries, Nominating committees (a02) that are comprised solely of
independent directors are negatively associated with ﬁrm value. This also seems to be
a country eﬀect, as 21 of the 34 companies that staﬀ their nominating committees only
with independent directors are from the Netherlands. Furthermore, Board attendance
(a21), which requires directors to attend at least 75% of the board meetings, has a
negative coeﬃcient. However, this eﬀect is not attributable to a particular country, as
regular board attendance in not common in all of these countries.
Hence, for three of the six attributes that are negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with ﬁrm
valuation, the eﬀect seems to be driven by one country. Then it may be the case that this is
an isolated country-eﬀect, where a particular institution either destroys value in the context
of the particular institutions of that country, or this requirement is implemented in a way
that is diﬀerent from the original intention of this requirement. However, for Board size (a06)
and Auditor ratiﬁcation (a27) in the context of German law countries and Board attendance
(a21) in the French law sample, the eﬀect cannot be attributed to one single country. It is
also plausible that those companies that deviate from the norm actually beneﬁt from doing
so. Other authors have argued before that legislation on corporate governance may lead to
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overregulation and that there can be too much of a good thing.25
No overlap between samples. A second salient feature of our results is that there is
little overlap between the attributes that are included for the diﬀerent legal origin samples.26
The following overlaps can be observed in Table IV.5: The ALL-approach and the AIC-
approach only include one attribute (a01) for two of the legal origin subsamples. The BCF-,
AIC-, and STEP-approach all include Board structure (a05) for the English law and for
the Scandinavian law sample. The AIC-approach and STEP-approach both include (1)
Executives stock ownership requirements (a32) for English law and for German law ﬁrms,
but with negative coeﬃcients for the German law sample (see discussion above), and (2)
Option repricing policy (a30) for the French law and Scandinavian law sample with a positive
coeﬃcient. The AIC-approach produces another four overlaps between two legal origin
subsamples (for a02, a21, a27, and a33), but in three cases the coeﬃcients have the opposite
sign and in the other case the coeﬃcients in the respective AIC-regressions are insigniﬁcant.
Referring to the STEP-approach, this means that only three of the 18 identiﬁed governance
attributes overlap in two of the four subsamples.
From this we conclude that there is hardly any overlap between the attributes that
indicate good corporate governance in the diﬀerent legal origin subsamples. What indicates
good corporate governance in the context of one legal origin subsample bears little or no
relation to what indicates good corporate governance in any of the other subsamples.
The ﬁrst candidate explanation for the lack of overlap, we investigate, concerns institu-
tions that are so homogeneous within one subsample that they were either excluded from
our analysis or still had insuﬃcient within-sample variation to generate signiﬁcant results.
Lack of within-sample variation for a particular attribute does not preclude that such an
attribute has a large economic impact (positive or negative). Such an eﬀect would simply
not be measurable with our methodology. We ﬁrst investigate this hypothesis informally
25See Arcot and Bruno (2009) and Bruno and Claessens (2010).
26To support this argument we also checked for each attribute identiﬁed in the STEP-approach that its
regression coeﬃcient is at least once signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the coeﬃcients in the other subsamples
in pairwise comparisons. We compare the regression coeﬃcients from a regression of Tobin's Q on all
these attributes for each of the legal origin subsamples. For 10 of the 15 attributes at least one of the six
pairwise t-tests on the coeﬃcients rejected the null hypothesis of equal coeﬃcients. No signiﬁcant diﬀerence
was observable for the attributes Compensation committee (a03), Meetings outside directors (a13), Board
attendance (a21), Board amendments (a43), and Unequal voting rights (a44).
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and identify some variables that potentially match this description:
2 Board structure (a05), which mandates annually elected boards (no staggered or clas-
siﬁed boards) is signiﬁcant for English law and for Scandinavian law, but not available
for French law, where only less than 2% of the ﬁrms (5 out of 264) have annually elected
boards. However, a signiﬁcant proportion of Japanese and Swiss ﬁrms (about 30% of
the German legal origin ﬁrms) have this attribute, without any detectable implication
for ﬁrm value.
2 Executives stock ownership requirements (a32) and Directors stock ownership require-
ments (a33) are both signiﬁcant for German law ﬁrms (although the coeﬃcient on the
ﬁrst attribute is negative, see discussion above). Both attributes are not included for
Scandinavian law ﬁrms because of lack of within-sample variation. However, the (neg-
ative) German law evidence is inconsistent with the (positive) English law evidence
and there is no signiﬁcant result for both attributes for French law ﬁrms, even though
both attributes are available there.
2 Unequal voting rights (a44), which rules out deviations from the one-share, one-vote
policy, is signiﬁcantly related to ﬁrm value for English legal origin countries, but this
attribute is mandatory for German legal origin ﬁrms (which all have it), so that the
eﬀect is not measurable for this sample. This may also be true for the French legal
origin sample, because the majority of French ﬁrms deviates from having equal voting
rights in the French law sample.27
Another potential explanation for the lack of overlap may be that countries and therefore also
our legal origin samples attract diﬀerent industries. Optimal governance regulations may well
be diﬀerent for diﬀerent industries, e.g., because ﬁrms have a diﬀerent asset structure and
require diﬀerent speciﬁc investments. We test this hypothesis by investigating the industry
correlations of each attribute.
 Insert Table IV.6 approximately here 
27ISS classiﬁes French double-voting rights as violation of the one-share, one-vote policy. These double-
voting rights do not depend on the type of shares (there is only one class of shares) but on the duration of
ownership, where double-voting rights accrue to investors who hold the shares for longer than a minimum
period of time speciﬁed by the bylaws (typically 2 to 4 years). Roosenboom and Schramade (2006) ﬁnd that
this practice is harmful.
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We consider those 15 attributes that have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the STEP-approach
for at least one of the samples, and we select only those industries with at least three ﬁrms in
this industry in each of the subsamples, which leaves us with 15 industries.28 Then we rank
the industries for each attribute and each sample, so that the industry where most ﬁrms have
this attribute receives a rank of one, and the industry where the smallest number of ﬁrms
have this attribute receives a rank of ﬁfteen. Table IV.6 shows the rank correlations for each
pair of samples from this exercise. If governance practices would cluster by industry, then
we would expect that the ranking of industries is more or less the same in all subsamples,
i.e., the attributes that are important for an industry should give this industry a low rank in
each sample. It appears that the rank correlations are fairly randomly distributed, and that
there are slightly more negative coeﬃcients (47) than positive coeﬃcients (37). For some
samples the correlation cannot be computed, because the attribute has no variation for that
sample. There is no evidence of any industry clustering of governance attributes, so this
cannot account for the lack of overlap between legal origin samples we observe.
Finally, we investigate the hypothesis that the identiﬁcation results are mainly driven by
within-sample variation of individual attributes. For that purpose we compare the average
standard deviation of the identiﬁed attributes to those that were excluded (results not tab-
ulated). It turns out that for French and German law the average standard deviation of the
attributes identiﬁed by the STEP-approach is lower than the standard deviation of the other
attributes. For English and Scandinavian law this is not the case, but the average standard
deviation of the identiﬁed attributes (0.46 and 0.46) is only marginally above that of the
included attributes (0.43 and 0.45). Overall, we conclude that the lack of within-sample
variation cannot explain the lack of overlap across the diﬀerent legal origin samples.
We can draw three conclusions from the discussion in this section: First, there is little
agreement of what measures the quality of corporate governance between legal origin samples.
Governance quality has to be measured at a level that reﬂects institutional diﬀerences.
Potentially, this should be the country level, but we choose the legal origin level, which oﬀers
a better trade-oﬀ of sample size and institutional homogeneity. Second, the apparent lack
of agreement between samples is not a consequence of industry clustering across countries
28The excluded industries are: aerospace, apparel, automotive, beverages, electrical, metal producers,
recreation, textiles, and tobacco.
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and/or legal origins. Third, this lack of agreement is also not caused by a statistical artifact.
At least we cannot detect any pattern that would allow us to attribute these ﬁndings to
sample size, within-sample variation of governance attributes, or the stringency of regulation.
4 Parsimonious governance indices
4.1 Constructing parsimonious indices
From Section 3 we conclude that governance quality has to be measured at the level of
the legal origin samples and that we cannot simply construct a comprehensive governance
measure (index) that reﬂects a uniform latent variable to which we might refer as the quality
of corporate governance. We now proceed to construct parsimonious corporate governance
indices for each of the legal origin samples separately. We construct an index for a particular
sample by considering all the attributes that are identiﬁed by the STEP-approach. We
add the scores for attributes that have a positive coeﬃcient in the STEP-regression, and
subtract the scores for all attributes that have a negative coeﬃcient. By this procedure we
obtain a corporate governance index for each legal origin sample (EnglishCG, FrenchCG,
GermanCG, ScandCG). We have experimented with alternatives to this design, where we
weighted the attributes by their regression coeﬃcients, which gives each attribute a weight
proportional to its regression coeﬃcient, without obtaining materially diﬀerent results (not
reported). We also constructed indices based on the other three selection approaches, again,
without obtaining materially diﬀerent results (not reported). Appendix B lists all governance
indices used in our analysis and provides a deﬁnition for each index. We follow the literature
and construct an index of all other provisions by adding the scores from all the attributes
that are not included in the respective parsimonious index, and therefore obtain four other
provisions indices (EnglishOP , FrenchOP , GermanOP , ScandOP ).
In addition to the governance indices based on our own procedure, we also include the
entrenchment index suggested by Bebchuk, Cohen, and FerrelI (2009) (BebchukCG) and the
Gov-7-index proposed by Brown and Caylor (2006) (BrownCG). These authors derive their
respective index from US ﬁrms only and we include them in order to be able to compare their
results to ours. Again, we construct another provisions index from all attributes not included
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in the respective indices (BebchukOP , BrownOP ). In addition to these parsimonious in-
dices, we also construct several comprehensive governance indices. COMP is the index of all
53 governance attributes.29 We are also interested in the question whether country-level at-
tributes or ﬁrm-level attributes are more important and therefore split the COMP -index into
a country-level and a ﬁrm-level subindex. We construct an index CountryCG of country-
speciﬁc provisions, deﬁned as sum over all provisions shared by all ﬁrms within a country,
normalized by the total number of country-speciﬁc provisions. FirmCG is the complemen-
tary index of all ﬁrm-speciﬁc provisions within a country and captures all attributes that
show some within-country variation. In a second approach to the same problem, we create
a ﬁrm-level subindex by using the country median of COMP as proxy for the country-level
governance (CountryMedCG). The complementary ﬁrm-level index FirmMedDevCG is
deﬁned as the number of attributes a ﬁrm chooses above the median of COMP for its coun-
try. Our approach to this question diﬀers from that of Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009),
who select a subset of indicators they deem to be relevant and then deﬁne country-level
governance as the minimal level of each attribute achieved in a certain country.
 Insert Table IV.7 approximately here 
Table IV.7 reports descriptive statistics on all governance indices listed in Appendix B.
We make the diﬀerent indices comparable by normalizing them, so that the minimum value of
the index across all observations equals 0, and the maximum observation equals 1. Without
such a normalization some statistics would not be comparable across indices and we could
not compare the coeﬃcients in our regressions. We report the minimum and the maximum
of the raw indices in Panel A of Table IV.7. Panel B shows that COMP , the comprehensive
index of all provisions, is highest for English law (0.61) and signiﬁcantly lower for the three
civil law samples (between 0.36 and 0.42), which accords with the previous literature.30 Panel
B also reports that EnglishCG is lower than EnglishOP , showing that ﬁrms in English law
countries have on average more other provisions, which cannot be reliably related to ﬁrm
valuation, than provisions that have a signiﬁcant relationship to ﬁrm valuation. A similar
pattern can be observed for GermanCG, although it is less pronounced.
29Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) analyze such a comprehensive index.
30See, e.g., ?'s Anti-director-rights Index, recoded by Spamann (2010) and revised and extended by
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
131
We also report the standard deviation and quartiles for all indices to investigate if there
is suﬃcient within-sample variation. Only the German law sample shows little variation,
where the standard deviation for 11 of 17 indices is 0.1 or less, which is never the case for
the French or English law sample, and only twice for the Scandinavian law sample.
 Insert Table IV.8 approximately here 
Panel A in Table IV.8 presents the correlations of all eleven corporate governance indices
in our analysis (we exclude the six other provisions indices). The most important observation
from Table IV.8 is that the correlations among the four legal origin indices are generally low
and often negative, which is true if the correlations are calculated for the whole sample (Panel
A) or separately for each legal origin sample (Panel B). In the whole sample, ScandCG is
positively correlated with all other legal origin indices, whereas the correlations of the other
legal origin indices are always low and have varying signs. Only the correlation between
EnglishCG and ScandCG is somewhat higher at 0.65, which suggests a higher similarity
of Scandinavian law and English law governance systems than between these and the other
two. Table IV.8 therefore corroborates our earlier ﬁnding that the governance indices of
attributes that are related to valuation in one sample are diﬀerent and show little overlap in
the attributes included, so correlations are accordingly low.
Second, we observe that the Bebchuk entrenchment index has little or no correlation with
all other indices. This is not surprising, given that it mainly rests on anti-takeover provisions,
which have little relevance in civil law countries, where internal governance provisions are
more important. By contrast, the index suggested by Brown and Caylor also includes internal
governance provisions and has higher correlations, even though it is optimized for the US.
Surprisingly, CountryCG is negatively correlated with all other indices exceptBebchukCG,
in particular with FirmMedDevCG (-0.29), FirmCG (-0.30), and COMP (-0.28). This
shows that country-level governance and ﬁrm-level governance are substitutes: ﬁrms, where
a large proportion of governance provisions are mandated by law, do not choose ﬁrm-level
governance provisions in addition to those required by regulation. In contrast, the index of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes, FirmCG, is positively correlated with all indices except FrenchCG,
in particular with COMP (0.99), CountryMedCG (0.73), and FirmMedDevCG (0.72).
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Hence, the content of all indices is to a large extent ﬁrm-speciﬁc and contains very little in
the way of country-speciﬁc provisions. The correlation between FirmCG and CountryCG
is negative and signiﬁcant, so country-level provisions and ﬁrm-level provisions seem to sub-
stitute for each other.
Panel B of Table IV.8 displays the correlations of the four legal origin indices for the four
diﬀerent samples. Only the correlations between EnglishCG and ScandCG are positive,
large, and signiﬁcant in three of the four subsamples. All other correlations are low in all
samples. The correlations with FrenchCG are mostly insigniﬁcant and often negative. These
ﬁndings support the notion that the measurement of the quality of corporate governance has
to be context-dependent.
4.2 Valuation analysis
We now use the governance indices constructed in the previous section to run regressions
along the lines of the previous literature on governance indices.31 In the regressions of Tobin's
Q on the governance indices we use the six ﬁrm characteristics log(Sales), log(Age), PPE,
Risk, Leverage, and ADR as controls and include industry and country dummies.
 Insert Table IV.9 approximately here 
Table IV.9 shows regressions with the logarithm of Tobin's Q as dependent variable
and governance indices as the independent variables for the pooled sample. Regression (1)
only uses one index as an explanatory variable, whereas regressions (2) to (5) have two
indices that attempt to break down the impact of the quality of corporate governance into
two components. Regression (1) shows that governance matters for valuation. This result
has become standard in this governance literature and demonstrates that the quality of
governance matters for company valuation. The eﬀect is also economically large: an increase
in the scaled COMP -index by one standard deviation (0.18, see Table IV.7) increases Tobin's
Q by 5.5%. Similarly, moving from the ﬁrst quartile of COMP (0.36) to the third quartile
(0.67) increases Tobin's Q by 9.5%. Regression (2) and (3) decompose the eﬀects summarized
31An incomplete list includes Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Klapper and Love (2004), Bebchuk,
Cohen, and FerrelI (2009), Durnev and Kim (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006), Black, Jang, and Kim
(2006b), Black, Jang, and Kim (2006a), and Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2007).
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in COMP into a country-component (which is identical for all ﬁrms in the same country) and
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component. We therefore do not include country dummies in these regressions.
Interestingly, only the ﬁrm-speciﬁc indexFirmCG is relevant in regression (3), whereas the
country-index CountryCG does not have any explanatory power at all. For the second
decomposition of COMP into CountryMedCG and FirmMedDevCG, where the subindices
were positively related, both governance measures are highly signiﬁcant. This lends support
to the results of Durnev and Kim (2005) who also ﬁnd that ﬁrm-level governance is more
important than country-level governance using a diﬀerent methodology.32
For the indices suggested by Bebchuk, Cohen, and FerrelI (2009) and by Brown and
Caylor (2006), we always enter their index as well as the respective other provisions index,
which is always equal to COMP minus the index in question. This way we can establish
whether there is more explanatory power in the index compared to the provisions excluded
from the index. Regressions (4) and (5) show that in both cases, the index itself is insigniﬁ-
cant, whereas the corresponding other provisions index is highly signiﬁcant and has a similar
magnitude to the coeﬃcient in regressions (1) to (3).33
 Insert Table IV.10 approximately here 
In Table IV.10 we apply the methodology of Table IV.9 to the four legal origin samples.
For each sample, we regress the logarithm of Tobin's Q on the four legal origin indices and
also enter the complementary other provisions index in each case as well as our controls. In
all cases we ﬁnd that the legal origin speciﬁc index is related to Tobin's Q in the sample for
which it was optimized (regressions (1), (6), (11), (16)). These indices are always statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1%-level and the other provisions index is never signiﬁcant in any of these
four regressions. Interestingly, compared to COMP , economic signiﬁcance is sometimes
even larger: a one standard deviation increase in ScandCG increases Tobin's Q by 25.3%,
for FrenchCG the same number is 8.4%. For the other 12 regressions, where a legal origin-
speciﬁc governance index enters together with the corresponding other provisions index in
32Durnev and Kim (2005) measure country-level governance with legal environment variables.
33In non-tabulated analyses we run regressions (4) and (5) again on two samples of US ﬁrms, our matched
sample, which covers mostly large ﬁrms, and the complete sample of all US ﬁrms. With our control vari-
ables we never ﬁnd BebchukCG to be signiﬁcant. BrownCG is signiﬁcantly related to valuation for the
comprehensive sample of all US ﬁrms. In all cases, the other provisions indices are signiﬁcant.
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a sample for which it was not optimized, it is either (1) the other provisions index that is
signiﬁcant (four cases), whereas the governance index itself remains insigniﬁcant, or (2) both
indices are insigniﬁcant (ﬁve cases). Only the ScandCG is also signiﬁcant in the English law
and French law sample and the EnglishCG in the Scandinavian law sample. This supports
the ﬁndings on earlier tables that Scandinavian law is closer to English law than the other
civil law countries. Overall, the results in Table IV.10 are therefore consistent with the view
that the quality of corporate governance has to be measured with respect to the institutional
environment and that there is no comprehensive one size ﬁts all indicator that can measure
the quality of corporate governance.
5 Robustness check
We derive our parsimonious governance indices in Table IV.5 by limiting the considered
attributes to those attributes that are not identical for more than 95% of the ﬁrms of the
respective sample. In this section we perform a robustness check to demonstrate that this
decision does not cause our results, at least for the most part.
 Insert Table IV.11 approximately here 
Table IV.11 is structured in the same way as Table IV.5, but now all attributes (instead
of attributes with suﬃcient variation only) are considered. We display only those attributes
that are included by the STEP-approach in Table IV.5, but are not included if all attributes
are considered, and those that are not included by the STEP-approach in Table IV.5, but
are included if all attributes are considered.
The most important observations in Table IV.11 are: First, most coeﬃcients that were
signiﬁcant in Table IV.5 are still signiﬁcant and have the same sign, the exceptions being
Option grants alignment (a52) for German law and Meetings outside directors (a13) for
Scandinavian law. The level of signiﬁcance for these coeﬃcients changes only slightly for some
attributes, for example for Board attendance (a21) in the French law sample, and Executives
stock ownership requirements (a32) and Directors stock ownership requirements (a33) in the
German law sample. Second, the majority of the additional coeﬃcients is negative (6 out
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of 10), clusters in the German law sample (8 out of 10), and aﬀects governance attributes
excluded in Table IV.5 due to minimal variation (6 out of 10). The negative association
of Vote requirement mergers (a40) in the German law sample is caused by one Japanese
and one Swiss ﬁrm. The same applies to the attributes Special meetings (a42) and Board
amendments (a43) whose coeﬃcients are attributable to one Japanese ﬁrm and one German
ﬁrm, respectively. The negative eﬀect of Outside advisors (a15) is driven by 24 ﬁrms from all
four countries, the majority of them from Austria (13). The additional positive coeﬃcients
in the French law and Scandinavian law sample can be traced back to similar observations.
The signiﬁcance of Written consent (a41) in the French law sample is driven by one Belgium
ﬁrm, while the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the attribute Governance committee (a04) is caused
by ﬁve ﬁrms from Finland and Norway.
From this, we can draw the following conclusion: to get reliable results, it is sensible
to exclude these rarely observed governance attributes, because the estimation results are
otherwise distorted by extreme observations. The results presented in Table IV.5 and the
derived parsimonious governance indices are robust to these extreme observations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate which ﬁrm-level corporate governance attributes aﬀect ﬁrm
values and the extent to which the relationship between governance attributes and ﬁrm
value depends on the institutional environment. We partition a sample of 2,431 ﬁrms from
23 countries into subsamples according to the legal origin of the country of domicile and
apply a range of techniques that have been suggested in the literature to identify those
governance attributes that are consistently related to ﬁrm value in each subsample. We
construct governance indices based on these attributes. We then relate these governance
indices, which are speciﬁc to the legal origin of each sample, and relate them to ﬁrm valuation.
Our main ﬁnding is that the quality of corporate governance cannot be measured by one
single indicator that is uniform or even similar across all four legal origin subsamples. In
fact, there is practically no overlap between the governance attributes that are consistently
related to ﬁrm value across the legal origin samples. Moreover, some of the attributes that
are considered signiﬁcant in the literature  typically based on an analysis for US ﬁrms 
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have negative coeﬃcients for the samples of civil law countries, which suggest that some
governance provisions that add value in one institutional context may be harmful to ﬁrms
in another institutional context.
Our ﬁndings are conform to those in the previous literature that governance pays, as
ﬁrm valuation is consistently related to measures of the quality of corporate governance.
For each legal origin sample we can identify a small number of provisions (between one and
ten, depending on the sample and the selection approach) that capture essentially all value-
relevant aspects of corporate governance. However, with the exception of some similarities
between Scandinavian law countries and English law countries, the governance indices that
capture the value relevant-aspects for one sample are never related to ﬁrm valuation in any
of the other samples. From this we conclude that the value-relevant aspects of corporate
governance diﬀer across institutional environments.
Our research design has some limitations, which we acknowledge, and which should be
addressed in future work. First, we analyze only one cross-section for the year 2005. Hence,
we cannot assess how stable our results are over time, and whether they are speciﬁc to
the period of our analysis. To some extent, the sample sizes we have for earlier periods
prevents us from extending our analysis, as we found that sample size is partially relevant
for the number of attributes that are included in the governance index. Second, sample size
prevents us also from conducting meaningful analysis at the country level. This would be
desirable as the institutional environment is heterogeneous, even within the set of countries
that share the same legal origin.
Future research should also address the relevance of ownership structure for corporate
governance. Ownership concentration and the identity of large investors varies widely across
the countries and ﬁrms included in our analysis.34 The conﬂicts of interests and therefore
the problems to be solved by the governance structure of the ﬁrm diﬀer between widely held
ﬁrms, where manager-shareholder conﬂicts dominate, and closely held ﬁrms, where the main
conﬂict is between small and large shareholders. Including the ownership structure of the
ﬁrm in the analysis would therefore be important.
34See, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Durnev and Kim (2005).
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Appendix
A. Coding governance provisions
This Appendix deﬁnes the minimally required corporate governance standard for each of the 53 governance
provisions. Each governance provisions is coded as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm fulﬁlls the mini-
mally required governance standard and zero otherwise.
No. Name Minimally required corporate governance standard
a01 Board independence Board controlled by a supermajority (> 66.7%) of independent outsiders
a02 Nominating committee Committee comprised solely of independent outsiders
a03 Compensation committee Committee comprised solely of independent outsiders
a04 Governance committee Governance committee exists
a05 Board structure Board annually elected (no staggered/classiﬁed board)
a06 Board size Board size not less than 6 or more than 15 members
a07 Cumulative voting Shareholders have cumulative voting rights
a08 CEO boards served on CEO serves on the boards of less than 3 public companies
a09 Former CEOs on board No former CEO on the board
a10 Chairman/CEO separation Chairman and CEO positions separated
a11 Governance guidelines Governance guidelines publicly disclosed
a12 Board performance reviews Performance of the board reviewed regularly
a13 Meetings outside directors Outside directors meet without CEO
a14 CEO succession plan Board approved succession plan in place for CEO
a15 Outside advisors Board has the express authority to hire / has its own outside advisors
a16 Directors resignation Directors required to submit resignation upon a change in job
a17 Oﬃcers and directors ownership Oﬃcers + directors ownership as % of shares outstanding≥1% and ≤30%
a18 Directors education At least one director participated in ISS accredited director education program
a19 Response to shareholder proposals Board does not ignore shareholder proposals
a20 Change board size Shareholder approval required to increase/decrease the size of the board
a21 Board attendance All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse
a22 Board vacancies Shareholders vote on directors selected to ﬁll vacancies
a23 Directors boards served on Policy on outside directorships with 4 or fewer boards as limit
a24 CEO related party transactions CEO not listed as having related-party transactions in proxy statement
a25 Audit committee Committee comprised solely of independent outsiders
a26 Audit fees Consulting fees (audit related and other) less than audit fees
a27 Auditor ratiﬁcation Auditors ratiﬁed at most recent annual meeting
a28 Directors stock ownership All directors with more than one year of service own stock
a29 Cost of option plans Last time shareholders voted on an option plan, ISS deemed cost reasonable
a30 Option repricing policy Repricing prohibited
a31 Shareholder approval All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval
a32 Executives stock ownership
requirements
Executives subject to stock ownership requirements
a33 Directors stock ownership
requirements
Directors subject to stock ownership requirements
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No. Name Minimally required corporate governance standard
a32 Executives stock ownership
requirements
Executives subject to stock ownership requirements
a33 Directors stock ownership
requirements
Directors subject to stock ownership requirements
a34 Compensation committee
interlocks
No interlocks among compensation committee members across companies
a35 Director compensation Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock
a36 Option expensing Company expenses options
a37 Option burn rate Options burn rate reasonable (average annual option grants≤3% of outstanding
shares over past 3 years)
a38 Blank check preferred stock Blank check preferred stock not authorized
a39 Vote requirement charter/bylaw Simple majority vote (not supermajority) required to amend charter/bylaws
a40 Vote requirement mergers Simple majority (not supermajority) vote required to approve mergers
a41 Written consent Shareholders may act by written consent
a42 Special meetings Shareholders may call special meetings
a43 Board amendments Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can only do so
under limited circumstances
a44 Unequal voting rights One-share, one-vote policy
a45 Poison pill Company has no poison pill in place
a46 State anti-takeover provisions Company incorporated in state without any state anti-takeover provisions
a47 Directors retirement age Mandatory retirement age for directors in place
a48 Directors term limits Director term limits in place
a49 Auditor rotation Policy disclosed regarding auditor rotation
a50 Option repricing No option repricing within last three years
a51 Pension plans Non-employee directors do not participate in pension plan
a52 Option grants alignment Options grants align with company performance
a53 Corporate loans Company does not provide loans to executives for exercising options
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B. Deﬁnition governance indices
This Appendix lists all constructed corporate governance indices and their deﬁnition.
Governance index Deﬁnition
COMP - covers all 53 governance attributes
CountryCG - covers the attributes that show no variation within a country (either all 1 or 0)
- = sum over country-speciﬁc attributes / number of country-speciﬁc attributes
- calculation based on the total ISS universe excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms, i.e., ﬁgures diﬀer from
Table IV.4
FirmCG - covers the attributes that show variation within a country, i.e., are ﬁrm-speciﬁc
- = sum over ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes / number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes
CountryMedCG - = median of COMP for each country
FirmMedDevCG - number of attributes a company chooses below or above the country median (deviation from
country median)
- = COMP - CountryMedCG
EnglishCG - covers 5 attributes: Board independence (a01), Board structure (a05), Executives stock
ownership requirements (a32), Board amendments (a43), and Unequal voting rights (a44)
FrenchCG - covers 4 attributes: Nominating committee (a02), Compensation committee (a03), Board
attendance (a21), and Option repricing policy (a30)
GermanCG - covers 6 attributes: Board size (a06), Board performance reviews (a12), Auditor ratiﬁcation
(a27), Executives stock ownership requirements (a32), Directors stock ownership requirements
(a33), and Option grants alignment (a52)
ScandCG - covers 3 attributes: Board structure (a05), Meetings outside directors (a13), and Option
repricing policy (a30)
EnglishOP/
FrenchOP /
GermanOP /
ScandOP
- other provisions index
- covers all attributes that are not included in the parsimonious governance indices for the
respective legal origin samples
- = COMP - EnglishCG / FrenchCG / GermanCG / ScandCG
BebchukCG - Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and FerrelI (2009)
- covers only 5 instead of 6 attributes: Board structure (a05), Vote requirement charter/bylaw
(a39), Vote requirement mergers (a40), Board amendments (a43), Poison pill (a45)
- attribute Golden parachutes not included, because not tracked by ISS
BebchukOP - other provisions index
- covers 48 attributes and is diﬀerent from Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell's other provision index of
18 remaining IRRC attributes
- = COMP - BebchukCG
BrownCG - Gov-7 Index of Brown and Caylor (2006)
- covers 7 attributes: Board structure (a05), Governance guidelines (a11), Board attendance
(a21), Executives stock ownership requirements (a32), Option burn rate (a37), Poison pill
(a45), and Option repricing (a50)
BrownOP - other provisions index
- covers 2 attributes more than Brown and Caylor's Gov-44 Index: Option grants alignment
(a52) and Unequal voting rights (a44)
- = COMP - BrownCG
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Table IV.1: Sample derivation
This table provides details on the derivation of our ﬁnal sample from the ISS universe for the year 2005. The
ISS universe comprises all companies that are listed and incorporated in the 23 developed countries listed
below. About 50 ﬁrms incorporated in other countries (e.g., Bermuda, China, Barbados, or Hungary) are
excluded from the sample. % denotes the percentage of missing values per ﬁrm for the tracked governance
provisions.
Firms Final
with sample
Non- Worldscope complete (with Per-
ISS ﬁnancial matched ﬁnancial matched centage
universe ﬁrms ﬁrms data US ﬁrms) of all
Country N % N % N % N % N % ﬁrms
Australia 132 5 99 4 75 4 66 3 66 3 50
Austria 20 16 15 14 14 14 13 14 13 14 65
Belgium 26 20 18 20 18 20 18 20 18 20 69
Canada 186 5 162 5 161 5 149 5 149 5 80
Denmark 23 12 20 12 20 12 19 12 19 12 83
Finland 32 9 29 9 29 9 29 9 29 9 91
France 88 9 77 10 77 10 74 10 74 10 84
Germany 88 12 76 12 76 12 73 12 73 12 83
Greece 44 21 38 21 38 21 35 21 35 21 80
Hong Kong 114 16 81 15 71 15 69 15 69 15 61
Ireland 16 9 11 9 11 9 10 9 10 9 63
Italy 73 8 47 7 47 7 44 7 44 7 60
Japan 604 16 517 16 460 16 455 16 455 16 75
Netherlands 51 11 44 11 44 11 38 10 38 10 75
New Zealand 20 5 17 5 14 4 13 4 13 4 65
Norway 23 15 21 14 21 14 19 14 19 14 83
Portugal 14 16 11 16 11 16 11 16 11 16 79
Singapore 58 14 46 14 44 14 44 14 44 14 76
Spain 55 19 46 19 45 19 44 19 44 19 80
Sweden 47 11 38 11 38 11 34 10 34 10 72
Switzerland 60 10 48 10 48 10 48 10 48 10 80
United Kingdom 547 5 465 5 320 6 294 5 294 5 54
Non-US 2,321 11 1,926 11 1,682 11 1,599 11 1,599 11 69
US 5,620 3 4,493 3 4,438 3 2,990 2 832 2 15
Total 7,941 5 6,419 5 6,120 3 4,589 5 2,431 8 31
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Table IV.2: Summary statistics matching non-US vs. US ﬁrms
This table reports the mean values of the main ﬁrm characteristics for non-US ﬁrms and matched and non-
matched US ﬁrms. The ﬁrm characteristics Sales (Worldscope item wc07240), Net Income (Worldscope
item wc07250), and Total Assets (Worldscope item wc07230) are used for the propensity score matching
of US and non-US ﬁrms. The propensity score equals the probability that a ﬁrm with certain characteristics
is not a US ﬁrm. This probability is estimated in a Probit regression. An indicator variable that equals
one if a ﬁrm is a non-US ﬁrm and zero otherwise is regressed on Sales, net income, total assets, and
industry dummies. Tobin's Q (TQ) is calculated as the book value of assets (Worldscope item wc07230 or
wc02999) plus the market value of common equity (Datastream item MV) less the book value of common
equity (Worldscope item wc07220 or wc03501) divided by the book value of assets (Worldscope item
wc07230 or wc02999). Sales are Net Sales/Revenues in million $ (Worldscope item wc07240). Age is
the number of months between the ﬁrst trading day as reported in Datastream (item BDATE) and the
ﬁrm's ﬁscal year end-date in 2005 (Worldscope item wc05350). PPE is property, plant, and equipment
(Worldscope item wc02501) to total assets (Worldscope item wc02999). Risk is the annualized standard
deviation of daily stock returns (Datastream item RI) over the year ending with the ﬁrm's ﬁscal year
end-date in 2005 (Worldscope item wc05350). Leverage is total debt (Worldscope item wc03255) to total
assets (Worldscope item wc02999). ADR (Worldscope item wc11496) is a dummy variable, equal to one
if a ﬁrm has an American Depository Receipt (ADR), and zero otherwise.
Sample Non-US ﬁrms US ﬁrms
N 1,599 832 2,158 2,990
Variable Matched Non-matched All
Sales (million $) 6,696 4,841 1,581 2,488
Net Income (million $) 390 301 83 144
Assets (million $) 8,510 5,333 2,032 2,950
Propensity score 0.42 0.38 0.28 0.31
TQ 1.8 2.5 3.2 3.0
Age (months) 258 219 176 188
PPE (%) 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.23
Risk (annualized) 0.27 0.40 0.62 0.56
Leverage (%) 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.25
ADR (%) 0.21 - - -
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Table IV.3: Descriptive statistics ﬁrm characteristics
This table displays descriptive statistics for the main ﬁrm characteristics. Panel A displays the mean,
standard deviation (sd), minimum, median, 25th and 75th percentile (p25 and p75), and maximum for the
total sample. Panel B displays the mean and median for the four legal origin subsamples. Tobin's Q (TQ)
is calculated as the book value of assets (Worldscope item wc07230 or wc02999) plus the market value of
common equity (Datastream item MV) less the book value of common equity (Worldscope item wc07220
or wc03501) divided by the book value of assets (Worldscope item wc07230 or wc02999). Sales are Net
Sales/Revenues in million $ (Worldscope item wc07240). Age is the number of months between the ﬁrst
trading day as reported in Datastream (item BDATE) and the ﬁrm's ﬁscal year end-date in 2005 (World-
scope item wc05350). PPE is property, plant, and equipment (Worldscope item wc02501) to total assets
(wc02999). Risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns (Datastream item RI) over
the year ending with the ﬁrm's ﬁscal year end-date in 2005 (Worldscope item wc05350). Leverage is
total debt (Worldscope item wc03255) to total assets (Worldscope item wc02999). ADR (Worldscope
item wc11496) is a dummy variable, equal to one if a ﬁrm has an American Depository Receipt, and zero
otherwise. The variables Tobin's Q, PPE, Risk, and Leverage are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Panel A: Total sample (2,431 observations)
Variable mean sd skew min p25 median p75 max
TQ 1.91 1.25 2.77 0.77 1.19 1.51 2.14 8.15
Sales (million $) 6,061 16,100 9.86 0 550 1,720 5,189 328,000
Age (months) 245 138 0.09 13 119 220 393 500
PPE (%) 0.31 0.22 0.75 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.44 0.90
Risk (annulized) 0.31 0.15 2.25 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.35 1.03
Leverage (%) 0.23 0.18 0.77 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.34 0.82
ADR (%) 0.14 0.35 2.06 0 - - - 1
Panel B: Legal origin subsamples
Legal origin English law French law German law Scandinavian law
Countries Australia Belgium Austria Denmark
Canada France Germany Norway
Hong Kong Greece Japan Norway
Ireland Italy Switzerland Sweden
New Zealand Netherlands
Singapore Portugal
UK Spain
US
N 1,477 264 589 101
Variable mean median mean median mean median mean median
TQ 2.08 1.65 1.86 1.50 1.51 1.23 2.04 1.71
Sales (million $) 4,451 1,073 9,657 2,748 8,623 3,082 5,261 1,988
Age (months) 227 191 229 213 305 393 189 187
PPE (%) 0.31 0.26 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.23
Risk (annualized) 0.34 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.24
Leverage (%) 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.22
ADR (%) 0.10 - 0.24 - 0.19 - 0.23 -
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Table IV.6: Industry rank correlations identiﬁed governance provisions
This table reports industry rank correlation coeﬃcients for each pair of legal origin subsamples. We consider
those 15 governance provisions that have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the STEP-approach for at least one of
the subsamples. We select all industries with at least three ﬁrms in this industry in each of the subsamples,
which leaves us with 15 industries. For each attribute we rank industries in each subsample so that the
industry where most ﬁrms have this attribute receives a rank of one, and the industry where the smallest
number of ﬁrms have this attribute receives a rank of ﬁfteen. For the German and Scandinavian sample the
correlations for the attributes Board amendments (a43) and Unequal voting rights (a44) cannot be computed,
because these attributes show no variation in these samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample 1 English English English French French German
Sample 2 French German Scand German Scand Scand
a01 Board independence 0.39 0.04 0.67 *** 0.05 0.31 0.18
a02 Nominating committee+ 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.02 -0.36 -0.16
a03 Compensation committee+ 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.24 -0.03 0.27
a05 Board structure -0.30 0.17 -0.09 -0.30 -0.36 0.40
a06 Board size -0.24 0.01 0.05 0.58 ** 0.02 -0.16
a12 Board performance reviews+ -0.18 -0.45 * 0.08 0.52 ** 0.13 -0.13
a13 Meetings outside directors+ -0.28 -0.14 -0.05 -0.49 * -0.02 0.29
a21 Board attendance -0.02 -0.54 ** -0.18 0.08 -0.38 -0.17
a27 Auditor ratiﬁcation -0.24 -0.60 ** -0.38 0.32 -0.02 -0.05
a30 Option repricing policy -0.33 -0.13 0.08 -0.09 -0.36 0.45 *
a32 Executives stock ownership require. -0.64 ** -0.09 -0.31 0.11 0.06 -0.06
a33 Directors stock ownership require.+ -0.61 ** -0.14 -0.25 0.28 -0.12 -0.13
a43 Board amendments -0.67 *** 0.31 . 0.19 . .
a44 Unequal voting rights+ -0.18 . -0.14 . 0.02 .
a52 Option grants alignment -0.05 -0.55 ** 0.10 0.39 -0.13 -0.13
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Table IV.7: Descriptive statistics governance indices
This table displays descriptive statistics for all constructed governance indices. For a deﬁnition of the
governance indices see Appendix B. Panel A reports the minimum and maximum of the raw indices and
the mean, median, 25th and 75th percentile (p25 and p75), and standard deviation (sd) for the normalized
indices for the total sample. Panel B reports the mean and standard deviation (sd) of the normalized indices
for the four legal origin subsamples.
Panel A: Total sample (2,431 observations)
After transforming [min,max] to [0,1]
Governance index min max p25 mean median p75 sd
COMP 6 45 0.36 0.52 0.18 0.67 0.18
CountryMedCG 17 33 0.15 0.54 0.30 0.76 0.30
FirmMedDevCG -20 16 0.49 0.57 0.12 0.63 0.12
CountryCG 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.42 0.35 0.64 0.35
FirmCG 0.06 0.88 0.39 0.52 0.17 0.66 0.17
BebchukCG 0 5 0.40 0.45 0.18 0.60 0.18
BebchukOP 5 42 0.35 0.51 0.19 0.65 0.19
BrownCG 0 7 0.43 0.53 0.18 0.71 0.18
BrownOP 5 40 0.34 0.50 0.17 0.63 0.17
EnglishCG -1 4 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.60 0.22
EnglishOP 5 41 0.36 0.52 0.19 0.67 0.19
FrenchCG -2 2 0.50 0.54 0.18 0.75 0.18
FrenchOP 6 41 0.37 0.52 0.17 0.66 0.17
GermanCG -3 2 0.33 0.41 0.16 0.50 0.16
GermanOP 6 39 0.36 0.52 0.18 0.67 0.18
ScandCG 0 3.0 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.67 0.30
ScandOP 6 42 0.36 0.52 0.18 0.67 0.18
Panel B: Legal origin subsamples
Sample English law French law German law Scandinavian law
N 1,477 264 589 101
Governance index mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
COMP 0.61 0.15 0.41 0.13 0.36 0.10 0.42 0.12
CountryMedCG 0.72 0.19 0.34 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.33 0.17
FirmMedDevCG 0.58 0.14 0.54 0.12 0.55 0.07 0.56 0.11
CountryCG 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.12 0.52 0.05 0.57 0.09
FirmCG 0.60 0.15 0.43 0.16 0.39 0.11 0.45 0.15
BebchukCG 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.46 0.10 0.55 0.09
BebchukOP 0.61 0.16 0.40 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.40 0.13
BrownCG 0.58 0.17 0.45 0.19 0.42 0.14 0.60 0.18
BrownOP 0.59 0.15 0.39 0.12 0.34 0.09 0.38 0.11
EnglishCG 0.48 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.39 0.18
EnglishOP 0.62 0.15 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.40 0.12
FrenchCG 0.45 0.15 0.57 0.15 0.74 0.06 0.56 0.15
FrenchOP 0.60 0.15 0.42 0.13 0.37 0.10 0.44 0.11
GermanCG 0.45 0.14 0.42 0.19 0.32 0.13 0.45 0.16
GermanOP 0.61 0.15 0.40 0.13 0.35 0.09 0.42 0.13
ScandCG 0.51 0.33 0.24 0.20 0.47 0.17 0.47 0.26
ScandOP 0.61 0.15 0.42 0.13 0.35 0.10 0.42 0.12
148
Table IV.8: Univariate analysis governance indices
This table displays the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients for the calculated governance indices. For a deﬁnition
of governance indices see Appendix B. One, two, and three asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Total sample (2,431 observations)
Governance COMP Country Firm Country Firm Bebchuk Brown English French German
index Med MedDev
CountryMed 0.78 -
***
FirmMedDev 0.69 0.08 -
*** ***
Country -0.28 -0.13 -0.29 -
*** *** ***
Firm 0.99 0.73 0.72 -0.30 -
*** *** *** ***
Bebchuk 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.12 0.01 -
*** *** ***
Brown 0.70 0.55 0.47 -0.01 0.71 0.27 -
*** *** *** *** ***
English 0.69 0.48 0.54 -0.54 0.67 0.07 0.45 -
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
French -0.39 -0.51 -0.03 -0.03 -0.34 0.03 -0.34 -0.16 -
*** *** *** *** ***
German 0.43 0.41 0.21 -0.15 0.44 -0.08 0.45 0.18 -0.24 -
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Scand 0.57 0.36 0.49 -0.46 0.57 0.23 0.46 0.65 0.15 0.22
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Panel B: Legal origin subsamples
Sample English law French law German law Scandinavian law
N 1,477 264 589 101
EnglishCG vs. FrenchCG 0.20 *** -0.09 -0.02 0.11
EnglishCG vs. GermanCG 0.10 *** -0.11 * 0.09 ** 0.18 *
EnglishCG vs. ScandCG 0.71 *** -0.04 0.55 *** 0.42 ***
FrenchCG vs. GermanCG -0.03 -0.10 * -0.09 ** 0.18 *
FrenchCG vs. ScandCG 0.28 *** 0.46 *** 0.07 0.14
GermanCG vs. ScandCG 0.27 *** 0.29 *** 0.18 *** -0.10
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Table IV.9: Multivariate analysis governance indices
This table displays the regression results of the logarithm of Tobin's Q on several governance indices for the
total sample. In all regressions we include the controls log(Sales), log(Age), PPE, Risk, Leverage, and
an ADR dummy as well as industry and country dummies. Inference is based on robust standard errors.
All p-values are reported on the basis of two-tail signiﬁcance level. One, two, and three asterisks (*,**,***)
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Total Total Total Total Total
N 2,431 2,431 2,431 2,431 2,431
COMP 0.288*** - - - -
CountryMedCG - 0.260*** - - -
FirmMedDevCG - 0.305*** - - -
CountryCG - - -0.022 - -
FirmCG - - 0.486*** - -
BebchukCG - - - 0.041 -
BebchukOP - - - 0.272*** -
BrownCG - - - - 0.109
BrownOP - - - - 0.212**
log(Sales) -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.059*** -0.048*** -0.048***
log(Age) -0.095*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.095*** -0.095***
PPE -0.096* -0.133** -0.133** -0.095* -0.094*
Risk -0.355*** -0.406*** -0.408*** -0.356*** -0.356***
Leverage -0.310*** -0.262*** -0.260*** -0.310*** -0.311***
ADR 0.080*** 0.094*** 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.080***
Country dummies yes no no yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
R2 adjusted 25.1% 23.1% 22.8% 25.1% 25.1%
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Table IV.10: Multivariate analysis parsimonious governance indices
This table displays the regression results of the logarithm of Tobin's Q on the parsimonious governance
indices for all legal origin subsamples. In all regressions we include the controls log(Sales), log(Age), PPE,
Risk, Leverage, and an ADR dummy as well as industry and country dummies. Inference is based on robust
standard errors. All p-values are reported on the basis of two-tail signiﬁcance level. One, two, and three
asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample English law French law
N 1,477 264
EnglishCG 0.385*** - - - -0.074 - - -
EnglishOP -0.060 - - - 0.183 - - -
FrenchCG - 0.029 - - - 0.545*** - -
FrenchOP - 0.247** - - - 0.197 - -
GermanCG - - -0.142 - - - -0.181 -
GermanOP - - 0.245** - - - 0.248 -
ScandCG - - - 0.126* - - - 0.243*
ScandOP - - - 0.133 - - - 0.016
log(Sales) -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.061** -0.055** -0.061** -0.058**
log(Age) -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.196*** -0.206*** -0.189*** -0.200***
PPE -0.06 -0.061 -0.06 -0.062 -0.390*** -0.420*** -0.384** -0.397***
Risk -0.382*** -0.365*** -0.388*** -0.365*** -0.906*** -0.867*** -0.954*** -0.897***
Leverage -0.338*** -0.333*** -0.333*** -0.336*** -0.491** -0.520** -0.483** -0.515**
ADR 0.06 0.077* 0.075* 0.077* 0.011 0.006 0.008 0.016
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 adjusted 18.9% 17.7% 17.8% 17.9% 32.7% 35.3% 33.1% 33.3%
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Sample German law Scandinavian law
N 589 101
EnglishCG -0.066 - - - 0.656** - - -
EnglishOP 0.250 - - - 0.505 - - -
FrenchCG - 0.004 - - - 0.510 - -
FrenchOP - 0.165 - - - 1.245** - -
GermanCG - - 0.626*** - - - 0.097 -
GermanOP - - -0.061 - - - 1.282** -
ScandCG - - - 0.030 - - - 0.979***
ScandOP - - - 0.185 - - - 0.009
log(Sales) -0.016 -0.016 -0.011 -0.016 -0.038 -0.053 -0.046 -0.032
log(Age) -0.163*** -0.164*** -0.153*** -0.164*** -0.074 -0.062 -0.081 -0.111
PPE -0.114 -0.112 -0.149 -0.111 -0.007 0.112 0.096 0.082
Risk 0.117 0.118 0.157 0.116 -1.1 -1.098 -0.944 -0.873
Leverage -0.265*** -0.262*** -0.215** -0.260*** -0.242 -0.36 -0.397 -0.393
ADR 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.116*** -0.174 -0.213* -0.19 -0.104
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 adjusted 33.5% 33.4% 37.1% 33.5% 21.4% 21.1% 19.9% 31.9%
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Table IV.11: STEP-approach results including all governance provisions
This table displays the regression coeﬃcients for the STEP-approach for each of the legal origin subsamples.
In all regressions we use the logarithm of Tobin's Q as dependent variable and include the controls log(Sales),
log(Age), PPE, Risk, Leverage, and an ADR dummy as well as industry and country dummies. Inference
is based on robust standard errors. In contrast to Table IV.5, we do not exclude any governance provisions.
Attributes identiﬁed in Table IV.5 are shaded grey. Attributes excluded in Table IV.5 are marked with frames.
Bold ﬁgures indicate negative coeﬃcients. All p-values are reported on the basis of two-tail signiﬁcance
level. One, two, and three asterisks (*,**,***) indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. All governance attributes that exhibit no missing values in the ﬁnal sample are marked with a
+.
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